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Art. 1.—JANE AUSTEN, *ob.* JULY 18, 1817.

'To lounge away the time as they could, with sofas and chitchat, and Quarterly Reviews.'—'Mansfield Park,' Cap. x.

THE concluding storms of a great conflict had hardly died down, when her world, almost unaware, bade farewell to Jane Austen; now, amid the closing cataclysms of a conflict yet more gigantic, we celebrate the hundredth year of her immortality. Time is the woodsman who fells the smaller trees and coppice in the forest of literature, and allows us at last to see the true proportions of its enduring giants; and the century that has passed since Jane Austen's death now sees her preeminence securely established. An early editor could only dare timidly to suggest that perhaps she might be found not wholly unworthy of a place in the same shelf with Miss Burney and Miss Edgeworth. Alas for both these, gone by now into the spare bedroom, and become the dusty curiosities of literature! Not even Jane Austen's devotion has availed to save Fanny Burney from a too-general oblivion, whereas Jane Austen herself has long since taken rank as the centre of a cult as ardent as a religion. There is no *via media*, indeed, where Jane Austen is concerned; by those who might have lent features to her fools she is vividly disliked,* and by those for whom her fools were drawn, she is no less fervently adored. In water-logged trench, in cold cave of the mountains, in sickness and in health, in dulness, tribulation and fatigue, an ever-increasing crowd of worshippers

* Women often appreciate her imperfectly, because she appreciated them so perfectly, and so inexorably revealed them.

flies insatiably for comfort and company perennially refreshing, to Hartfield and Randalls, Longbourn, Northanger, Sotherton and Uppercross.

Such positions in literature are not achieved by log-rolling. Macaulay blunders, indeed, in his praise, and in the instances he selects for it; but he undoubtedly hits the bull's eye with his usual essential accuracy, when he lights on the fact that Jane Austen is comparable only with Shakespeare. For both attain their solitary and special supremacy by dint of a common capacity for intense vitalisation; both have the culminating gift of immediately projecting a living human being who is not only a human being, but also something much greater than any one person, a quintessentialised instance of humanity, a generalisation made incarnate and personal by genius. But the dramatist has the easier task; the novelist, unaided by actors or stage, has to impress his own imagination straight upon ours. And it is of this secret that Jane Austen is so capital a mistress; a prefatory line or two, an initial sentence, and there goes Mrs Allen or Mrs Price, a complete and complex identity, walking independently away down the ages. Even in their circumstances, too, Shakespeare and Jane Austen run curiously parallel. Our two greatest creators exist for us only in their work; and, when we search into their personal lives and tastes and tragedies, we glean nothing but a little chopped dull chaff of details, in which all trace of the sacred germ is lacking. In Jane Austen's case, indeed, the disappearance of the creator into his creation is made but the completer for the abundance of superficial details with which we are provided. When the dry bones of her facts are fitted together, there results for us only a lay-figure, comfortable and comely, but conveying no faintest suggestion of the genuine Jane Austen.

She was obviously ill-served by her circumstances. Behind the official biographies, and the pleasant little empty letters, and the accounts of how good she was to her mother and wouldn't use the sofa, we feel always that she really lived remote in a great reserve. She praised and valued domesticity indeed, sincerely loved her own family, and made domestic instincts a cardinal virtue in all her heroes. But the praise and value are rather official than personal; her only real intimate at

home was her sister Cassandra, and it is significant that only upstairs, behind her shut door, did she read her own work aloud, for the benefit of her chosen circle in the younger generation. Yet more significant, though, is the fact that nowhere does she give any picture of united family happiness; the successful domestic unity will certainly not be successfully sought at Longbourn or Mansfield, Northanger or Kellynch. This, to any one who understands Jane Austen's preoccupation with truth, and her selection of material only from among observed facts tested by personal experience, speaks volumes, in its characteristically quiet way, for her position towards her own family. She was in it; but she was not really of it.

Even on the point of her intimacy with Cassandra there is something curiously suggestive in the fact that, after her first two novels, she never again gives us a picture of two intimately united sisters. Maria and Julia are allies only till their interests clash; Isabella is nothing to Emma; only time and trials teach Fanny to surmount her first startled disapproval of Susan; and the best that Anne can feel for Mary Musgrove is that she 'is not so repulsive and unsisterly as Elizabeth.' On the other hand, in three out of these four books, the author's delight is transferred to the relations between brother and sister—Wentworth and 'Sophy,' Henry and Eleanor, William and Fanny, and, above all, for depth of tried alliance, Crawford and Mary. Finally, she does not even die for us of anything particular, but fades out, with Victorian gentility, in a hazy unspecified decline. How much more fortunate, in her different class, is Charlotte Brontë, of whom no detail is hidden from her admirers by any such instinct for muffling things up in discretions and evasions! Even in popular language this distinction holds; no one dreams of calling the lesser writer anything but 'Charlotte Brontë,' while there still exists a whole sect of Jane Austen's devotees, no Laodiceans either, who to this day will always talk of her as 'Miss Austen.' Which is as if one were to speak currently of Mr Milton, and Monsieur de Molière.

These fantasies of propriety, together with her own misleadingly modest allusion to the 'little piece of ivory' on which she worked, have done much to perpetuate the

theory, still held among the profane, that she is a 'limited' writer. It is by no means so that her faithful see their radiant and remorseless Jane; and, though criticism depends, in the last resort, chiefly on what the critic himself brings to his subject (so that what each man comes seeking, that he will most surely find), Jane Austen's personality may be much more profitably re-constructed in her work, than from the superficial details of her life, doled out to us by her biographer. A writer's fame, in fact, relies for its permanent value on his own transpiring personality; in every line he is inevitably 'giving himself away,' and the future of his work depends on whether what he has to give possesses the salted quality of eternity. And impersonality comes as the first ingredient in the specific for immortality. The self-revelation of the writer must be as severely implicit as it is universally pervasive; it must never be conscious or obtruded.

There is, indeed, a section of writers, as of readers, who believe in frequent appearances of the author before his curtain, to make deductions from his text, and point out conclusions. This is a pandering to laziness in the reader; every meaning should be clearly discoverable in the text, without its being necessary for the author himself to dig it out for us. And to such readers as these, who want their pabulum already peptonised, Jane Austen deliberately avoids appeal. As in her own life she evaded the lionising that lesser women covet, and would assuredly have approved Cassandra's destruction of her private letters, so in her work she no less carefully avoids overt appearance on her stage. She is there all the time, indeed, but never *in propria persona*, except when she gaily smiles through the opener texture of 'Northanger Abbey,' or, with her consummate sense of art, mitigates for us the transition out of her paradises back into the grey light of ordinary life, by letting the word 'I' demurely peer forth at last, as the fantas-magoria in 'Mansfield Park,' 'Emma' or 'Northanger Abbey' begins to thin out to its final pages. Otherwise she is the most aloof of writers, and does not work 'for such dull elves' (as she says herself) as will not so far come to meet the author as to make out for themselves his conclusions and deductions.

This elimination of the author is only part of the intense concentration which the greatest writers develop in their subject. The essence of conviction, in the game of make-believe, is to convince yourself first of all, finally and absolutely. This can only be done by forgetting yourself entirely, by blotting out the whole irrelevant world from your purview, and centralising, with a single-eyed undeviating passion of conviction, upon the tale you are setting out to live. It is at this point that all living writers (with the exception of Rhoda Broughton) fail. They are telling stories in which they have either no flesh-and-blood belief of their own, or else too much; telling them with an eye to their audience and to themselves and their own pet notions, telling them, that is, objectively, not subjectively, and piling up masses of detail and explanation in order to obscure the inner lack of any completed identity between the author and his matter.

It is precisely here that Jane Austen so magnificently succeeds. Wars may be raging to their end as the background of 'Persuasion,' or social miseries strike a new facet of 'Emma'; otherwise all the vast anguish of her time is non-existent to Jane Austen, when once she has got pen in hand, to make us a new kingdom of refuge from the toils and frets of life. Her kingdoms are hermetically sealed, in fact, and here lies the strength of their impregnable immortality; it is not without hope or comfort for us nowadays, to remember that 'Mansfield Park' appeared the year before Waterloo, and 'Emma' the year after. For Jane Austen is always concerned only with the universal, and not with the particular. And it is according as they invest their souls in the former or the latter that authors eternally survive or rapidly pass away. Fashions change, fads and fancies come and go, tyrannies and empires erupt and collapse; those who make events and contemporary ideas the matter of their work have their reward in instant appreciation of their topical value. And with their topical value they die.* Art is a mysterious entity, outside and beyond daily life, whether its manifestation be

* After Mr Gray of Sackville Street, Jane Austen specifies no tradesman, except Broadwood, nor even dwells on any detail of fashion.

by painting or sculpture or literature. If it use outside events at all, it must subdue them to its medium, and become their master, not their mere vehicle. So a hundred thousand novels come and go; but Jane Austen can never be out of date, because she never was in any particular date (that is to say, never imprisoned in any), but is coextensive with human nature.

Talk of her 'limitations' is vain, and based on a misapprehension. When we speak of her as our greatest artist in English fiction we do not mean that she has the loudest mastery of any particular mood, the most clamant voice, the widest gamut of subjects; we mean that she stands supreme and alone among English writers in possession of the secret which so many French ones possess—that is, a most perfect mastery of her weapons, a most faultless and precise adjustment of means to end. She is, in English fiction, as Milton in English poetry, the one completely conscious and almost unerring artist. This is to take only the technical side of her work; her scale and scope are different matters. There is, in some quarters, a tendency to quarrel with Jane Austen because in her books there is nothing that she never intended to be there, no heroic hectorings, no Brontesque ebullencies, no mountain or moor or 'bonny beck' (to use Charlotte Brontë's own phrase)—surely one of the monumental ineptitudes of criticism, seeing that the most elementary axiom of art is the artist's initial right to choose his own medium. We have no more right, in fact, to cavil at Jane Austen for not writing 'The Duchess of Malfi' than at Webster for not writing 'Northanger Abbey.'

At the same time, it must never be thought that limitation of scene implies limitation of human emotion. The measure of perfection has no relation to the size of its material. Perfection is one and incommensurable. Class-limitation, in fact, is no limitation of sympathy; and a breaking heart is a breaking heart, no more nor less, whether it find vent in the ululations of Tamburlaine, or in the 'almost screamed with agony' of Marianne Dashwood. Jane Austen's heroes and heroines and subject-matter are, in fact, universal human nature, and conterminous with it, though manifested only in one class, with that class's superficial limitations, in habits and manner of life.

And here another error vitiates the caviller's thought. Readers fall into two groups—the objective and the subjective. And it is only the objective class who, because emotion is not vehemently expressed by Jane Austen, will fail to realise with what profound effect it is implied. She does not expound feeling; she conveys it. With her artist's instinct, she knows that exposition by the writer destroys conviction in the reader. She has at heart, all through her life, that maxim of the French which English writers find it so impossible to assimilate—'*Glissez toujours, n'appuyez pas*': do your work rightly, and trust the intelligence of the reader to do the rest. When Anne again meets Wentworth there is nothing shown in the text but the little flutter given to the sentence by the repetition of the descriptive adjective in:—'*The room seemed full, full of persons and voices;*' but the sensitised reader is left fairly staggering in the gale of Anne's emotion, revealed in that tiny hint more intimately than by all the paragraphs of passionate prose in which other writers would exhaustively set out the emotions of Wentworth and Anne, until no emotion at all was left in the reader. For the objective writer toils and toils outside his subject, accumulating convincing details until conviction is destroyed; the subjective gives the bare and encyclopædic essential in a line or a word, and then goes on. And of all great writers Jane Austen is the most evocative, doing in half a dozen words (applied in exactly the proper measure, in exactly the proper place) what the sedulous subtleties of Henry James are unable to convey so clearly in as many fine-spun pages. Knightley, for instance, staying '*vigorously*' on, away from Emma in Brunswick Square, gives us in one syllable more of Knightley and more of Emma than whole long paragraphs of analysis.

And among the secrets of Jane Austen's inexhaustible charm is that her work, especially in her second period, is so packed with such minute and far-reaching felicities that the thousandth reading of '*Emma*' or '*Persuasion*' will be certain to reveal to you a handful of such brilliant jewels unnoticed before. If she has nothing to say to those who want to sit passive while the whole story is put down plain before them like meat on a plate, she has all the more delights to unfold for those who know that

the whole point of reading lies in eager cooperation with a sympathetic writer. The more rigid, in fact, the elimination of the non-essential, the more blazing the certitude with which the essential is projected. Jane Austen is even of an Elizabethan economy in her stage-settings. Modern writers pretend to reveal their characters by dint of descriptions copious as an upholsterer's catalogue; she produces her details sparingly, bit by bit, only where each is dramatically necessary to the course of character or action; often, by one of her most characteristic exquisites, they are only revealed in the conversation of her persons. And, in the result, with what a life-long intimacy do we come at last to know her houses and her rooms, her gardens and shrubberies! This indirect method, too, she often chooses, to give emotions and impressions and personal pictures. Elizabeth Bennet's own delightfulness is sensibly enhanced by that of Mrs Gardiner, since she was so special a favourite there; while Elizabeth Elliot's 'something so formal and *arrangé* in her air; and she sits so upright,' though it comes quite at the end of the book, gives us an instant intimate vision of Lady Russell, besides flashing at us the whole essence of Elizabeth herself.

As for landscape, so often the stumbling-block of novelists, Jane Austen cannot be said to make any very serious use of it in her first period; but in the second, although she is far too craft-wise to fancy you can vitalise a character by dint of emotionalising its countryside and garden, she quite definitely (though still with finest economy) avails herself more and more of the outer world, not only for its value as a picture in itself—we may spend a vivid day at Sotherton—but also as playing its part in the development of her people. The squalor of Portsmouth, the autumn landscapes of Lyme and Uppercross, have a definite place in the evolution of Fanny and Anne; while the July storm which darkens the dark climax of 'Emma' is the pathetic fallacy pure and simple. It is only towards the end of her own life, that is, with the deepening of her own sympathies, that her faultless sense of fitness and relevance so far widens also as to give greater latitude to her methods of inspiring sympathy.

For it is but fair to her cruder critics to admit that

Jane Austen has no taste for expressed erotics, and will thereby always seem insipid to the large crowd of readers, chiefly women, who are responsible for that perennial ill-repute of fiction against which Jane Austen herself personally launches the novelist's Magna Carta in 'Northanger Abbey,' because they read fiction principally as an erotic stimulant, and judge its merits accordingly, by the ardour of its descriptions and expressions. In this aspect of life Jane Austen has no interest. Her concern is primarily with character unfolded through love, not with that love's crudities of appetite and incident. In the supreme moments, in point of fact, humanity becomes inarticulate, and thus no longer gives material for art. Jane Austen, knowing this, is too honest to forge us false coin of phrases, and too much an artist to pad out her lines with asterisks and dashes and ejaculations. She accepts the condition, asks her reader to accept it also, and contents herself with dealing with the emotions on either side of the crucial outbreak. It is notorious how she avoids detail in her proposal-scenes; certainly not from 'ladylike' cowardice, nor from any incapacity, but merely in her artist's certainty that the epical instants of life are not to be adequately expressed in words. 'What did she say? Just what she should, of course: a lady always does.' Jane Austen, with whimsical gaiety of candour, here lays down her position once for all, and frankly tells her reader that there are matters into which neither he nor she can decently pry. That she *could* tear a passion to tatters with the best of them, indeed, is shown by Marianne Dashwood; that she never repeated the picture shows her sense of its unfitness and fatal facility, by comparison with the subtler treatments of emotion in which alone she was interested. Any red-blood writer can state passions, it takes a genius to suggest them; and Jane Austen is preeminently a clear-brained writer rather than a red-blooded one. Yet no one is left doubting Emma's feeling for Knightley, or Anne's for Wentworth, though nothing at all is said of physical attractions, and the whole effect is made by implication. But made it indubitably is, and indelibly.

On the feelings of her men, of course, Jane Austen has nothing to say at first hand, is too honest an artist

to invent, and too clean a woman to attempt the modern female trick of gratifying her own passions by inventing a lover, and then identifying herself with his desires, in so far as she can concoct them. Yet it would be quite a mistake to call her men pallid or shadowy. In point of fact, they are usually carried out with all her vivid certainty, yet considered only in relation to her women, and thus, by comparison, quieter in colour, deliberately subordinate in her scheme. Even the earlier heroes will be found perfectly adapted to their place in her books, when once that place is understood; as for the later ones, they stand most definitely on legs of their own, so far as their movements in the story require. Perhaps the best of all is Knightley, not only in relation to Emma but also in himself.

Nor must it be brought against Jane Austen that she does not lard her work with sociology, religion or metaphysics. Such divagations may make a story more stirring; they certainly make it more ephemeral. And, against such writers as believe the novel is Heaven's appointed jam for the powder of their own opinions, Jane Austen decisively heads the other school, which believes that 'the book, the whole book, and nothing but the book' is the novelist's best motto. She herself pours scorn on the notion that 'Pride and Prejudice' would really be better if padded out with 'solemn nonsense about Bonaparte'; and where for once (in order to prove Fanny's brains) she ventures on irrelevant flights of rhetoric, she for once lamentably falls to earth, in those two speeches of Fanny's in the Vicarage shrubbery—deliverances false in fact, trite in thought, turgid and sententious in expression. Normally, however, she remains undistracted from the purpose of her book; and, from the first sentence, submerges herself in the single thought of the story's development, with that wholeheartedness of delight in creation for its own sake which is the prerogative of the highest genius alone, alone awakening in the reader an answering rapture of conviction and absorption. Thus it is that, to her faithful, Jane Austen has become flesh and blood of their mind's inmost fabric. Who commonly quotes Charlotte Brontë or George Eliot? But every turn and corner of life is illuminated or defined for us by some sentence of Jane

Austen's; and every dim character in our 'dusty mortal days' has something of one or another in the long gallery of her creations. Thus to become the very texture of humanity's mind and talk from generation to generation, is the attainment of the supreme visualisers only; talent, at the best, can merely photograph, either from the real or from an ideal.

So far we have looked only at the literary aspect of Jane Austen. The secret of her immortality is to be found in that underlying something which is the woman herself; for, of all writers, she it is who pursues truth with most utter and undeviable devotion. The real thing is her only object always. She declines to write of scenes and circumstances that she does not know at first hand; she refuses recognition, and even condonement, to all thought or emotion that conflicts with truth, or burkes it, or fails to prove pure diamond to the solvent of her acid. She is, in fact, the most merciless, though calmest, of iconoclasts; only her calm has obscured from her critics the steely quality, the inexorable rigour of her judgment. Even Butler, her nearest descendant in this generation, never seems really to have recognised his affinity. For Jane Austen has no passion, preaches no gospel, grinds no axe; standing aloof from the world, she sees it, on the whole, as silly. She has no animosity for it; but she has no affection. She does not want to better fools, or to abuse them; she simply sets herself to glean pleasure from their folly. Nothing but the first-rate in life is good enough for her tolerance; remember Anne Elliot's definition of 'good company,' and her cousin's rejoinder, 'That is not good company; that is the best.'

Everything false and feeble, in fact, withers in the demure greyness of her gaze; in 'follies and nonsense, whims and inconsistencies,' she finds nothing but diversion, dispassionate but pitiless. For, while no novelist is more sympathetic to real values and sincere emotion, none also is so keen on detecting false currency, or so relentless in exposing it. At times, even, her antagonism to conventionalities and shams betrays her almost to a touch of passion. Yet, if ever she seems cruel, her anger is but just impatience against the slack thought and ready-made pretences that pass current in the world and

move her always to her quiet but destructive merriment; as in the famous outburst about Miss Musgrove's 'large fat sighings over a son whom alive no one had cared for'—a *cri de cœur* for which the author for once feels immediately bound to come before the curtain, to mitigate it with a quasi-apology quite devoid of either conviction or recantation. Nor will she hear of any reserves in honesty and candour; not only the truth, but the whole truth, must be vital to any character of whom she herself is to approve. Civilised urbane discretion, and assent to social falsehoods, make strong points in Anne's private distrust of William Elliot, and in Fanny's disapproval of Henry Crawford, artfully thrown in contrast as he is against the breezy impetuous young frankness of William Price.

She is consumed with a passion for the real, as apart from the realistic; and the result is that her creations, though obviously observed, are no less obviously generalised into a new identity of their own. She acknowledges no individual portrait, such as those in which alone such essentially unimaginative writers as Charlotte Brontë can deal. And in this intense preoccupation with character, she is frankly bored with events; the accident at Lyme shows how perfunctorily she can handle a mere occurrence, being concentrated all the time on the emotions that engender it, and the emotions it engenders. Her very style is the mirror of her temperament. Naturally enough, she both writes and makes her people speak an English much more flowing and lucid than is fashionable in ordinary writers and ordinary life; but, allowing for this inevitable blemish, the note of her style is the very note of her nature, in its lovely limpidity, cool and clear and flashing as an alpine stream, without ebulliciencies or turbidness of any kind. It is not for nothing that 'rational' is almost her highest word of praise. Good sense, in the widest meaning of the word, is her be-all and end-all; the perfect *σωφροσύνη* which is also the perfect *αὐταρκεία*.

For her whole sex she revolts against 'elegant females,' and sums up her ideal woman, not as a 'good-natured unaffected girl' (a phrase which, with her, connotes a certain quite kindly contempt), but as a 'rational creature.' The pretences of 'Vanity Fair,' for instance,

to be an historical novel, fade into the thinnest of hot air when one realises, with a gasp of amazement, that Amelia Sedley is actually meant to be a contemporary of Anne Elliot. And thus one understands what a deep gulf Victorianism dug between us and the past; how infinitely nearer to Jane Austen are the sane sensible young women of our own day than the flopping vaporious fools who were the fashion among the Turkish-minded male novelists of Queen Victoria's fashions.* Take Catherine Morland, a country parson's daughter, suffered to run quite wild,† and compare her list of reading with the incredible Pinkertonian education in 'accomplishments.' Imagine Miss Pinkerton allowing Amelia Sedley to read 'Othello'; or Amelia wishing to do so, or understanding any of it if she did! At the same time, the famous outburst in 'Northanger Abbey' shows that, in those days as well as later, 'imbecility in females is a great enhancement of their personal charms.' It is by a most curious irony of fate, indeed, that the ignorant attribute to Jane Austen and her heroines just that very primness and futility of which she, and they, are most contemptuous.

Her heroines, indeed, are out-of-door creatures, by no means fettered by conventional ignorance or innocence; and they all have minds of their own so clear and firm that, while their good-feeling remains unalienated, their judgments equally remain unconciliated. 'A knowledge, which she often wished less, of her father's character' is part of lovely gentle Anne; and even self-righteous Fanny owns to herself that *her* father was still worse than she had expected—'he swore and he drank, he was dirty and gross'—with a succinct yet comprehensive candour that would certainly not have marked any Victorian heroine's attitude towards her 'dear papa.'

* It is but fair to add that male delight in female imbecility is as eternal as Jane Austen herself declared; and that Scott's heroines (with the exception of Diana Vernon) are generally of an insipid feebleness sinking to the lowest Victorian standards.

† Jane Austen seems to have postulated so much of intelligence in her girls, as to *prefer* for them a haphazard rather than a regular education. Elizabeth Bennet, also, was left to choose for herself whether she would learn or not; while Miss Lee's pompous curriculum at Mansfield is openly laughed at, and shown to lead to no good result, to no real education in character.

And, how much nearer we are to-day to Anne and Fanny than to the generation immediately behind us, is shown by the fact that Pastor Manders' ejaculation in 'Ghosts,' that it is Oswald's duty to love and honour his impossible dead father, represented such an accepted axiom to the Victorians that its obvious irony in the play was felt to be a blasphemy; whereas to us of to-day the irony has lost all point, because the axiom itself is seen as clearly to be mere nonsense, as it was seen long ago, by Fanny and Anne and Eleanor Tilney.

In fact, all the women whom Jane Austen commends are absolutely honest and well-bred in mind. Breeding is not a matter of birth or place, but of attitude towards life; Jane Austen's standard, like Anne Elliot's behaviour, is as 'consciously right as it is invariably gentle'; and, one may add, as unselfconscious about its quality as real breeding is always bound to be. Her tone of perfect quiet assurance, and taking-for-grantedness, has nowhere been equalled. Many writers, even of the great (especially nowadays, and especially among women), are too painfully at ease in their Sions of castle or country-house,* with a naïve excessiveness, a solemn rapture of emphasis, that shows their inmost feeling to be really Mary Crawford's at finding herself in Mansfield Vicarage garden. Even Thackeray gloats over the silver coffee-pots at Castle Gaunt; even Henry James lingers too lovingly amid the material details of what Gertrude Atherton would call 'aristocratic' life; Jane Austen alone is as indifferent and as much at ease, wherever she goes, as those only can be who are to the manner and the matter born and bred. Note, with what decision, for instance, but with what a lack of betraying emphasis, she reserves 'vulgar' forms, such as 'quiz' and 'beau,' and 'you was,' to the exclusive use of her vulgar characters. And how it is only her underbred women—Isabella Thorpe, Mrs Elton, Lucy Steele—who use the bare surname of a man; Jane and Elizabeth Bennet, even in their most intimate private dialogues, never talk of 'Bingley' or 'Darcy' until the familiarity has been justified by betrothal. And again, the middle-class

* Mary Crawford 'had seen scores of great houses, and cared for none of them.'

sisters, Lady Bertram and Mrs Norris, are to each other, respectively, 'Sister' and 'Lady Bertram,' throughout their book. These are samples of the small unobtruded points that give Jane Austen's readers such unending delight.

'Lady Susan' is the first of her books to call for comment. It is not good; it is crude and hard, with the usual hardness of youth. Yet it is so important to the study of its author's career and temperament that it would be disastrous to omit it from future editions, in deference to any fancied wishes of her 'shade.' The faults of youth are really only the excesses of what are to be excellences in the matured writer; and the cold unpleasantness of 'Lady Susan' is but the youthful exaggeration of that irreconcilable judgment which is the very backbone of Jane Austen's power, and which, harshly evident in the first book, is the essential strength of all the later ones, finally protruding its bony structure nakedly again in 'Persuasion.' But 'Lady Susan' also links on to 'Mansfield Park.' For where and when did Jane Austen come into contact with the 'Smart Set' of her time? Biographies give no slightest hint; but we must not forget Miss Mitford's impression of Jane Austen as a pretty little empty-headed husband-hunting fool. However violently at variance may be this verdict from all we can divine of Jane Austen, it was evidently this unsuspectedly gay creature who foregathered at one time with the 'Souls,' in intellectual attraction and moral repulsion. For out of the same set, brilliant and heartless, which is the very scene of Lady Susan, are ultimately to be projected Henry and Mary Crawford.

With 'Sense and Sensibility' we approach the maturing Jane Austen. But it has the almost inevitable frigidity of a reconstruction, besides an equally inevitable uncertainty in the author's use of her weapons. There are *longueurs* and clumsinesses; its conviction lacks fire; its development lacks movement; its major figures are rather incarnate qualities than qualified incarnations. Never again does the writer introduce a character so entirely irrelevant as Margaret Dashwood, or marry a heroine to a man so remote in the story as Colonel Brandon. This is not, however, to say that 'Sense and

Sensibility,' standing sole, would not be itself enough to establish an author's reputation. The opening dialogue, for instance, between John and Fanny Dashwood—obviously belonging to the second version of the story—ranks among the finest bits of revelation that even Jane Austen has given us; and criticism stands blissfully silent before Sir John Middleton, Mrs Jennings, and the juxtaposition of Lady Middleton and Fanny Dashwood, 'who sympathised with each other in an insipid propriety of demeanour and a general want of understanding.' But its tremendous successors set up a standard beside which 'Sense and Sensibility' is bound to appear grey and cool; nobody will choose this as his favourite Jane Austen, whereas each one of the others has its fanatics who prefer it above all the rest.

But now comes the greatest miracle of English Literature. Straight on the heels of 'Lady Susan' and 'Sense and Sensibility' this country parson's daughter of barely twenty-one breaks covert with a book of such effortless mastery, such easy and sustained brilliance, as would seem quite beyond reach of any but the most mature genius. Yet, though 'Pride and Prejudice' has probably given more perfect pleasure than any other novel (Elizabeth, to Jane Austen first, and now to all time, 'is as delightful a creature as ever appeared in print,' literature's most radiant heroine, besides being the most personally redolent of her creator), its very youthful note of joyousness is also the negation of that deeper quality which makes the later work so inexhaustible. Without ingratitude to the inimitable sparkle of this glorious book, even 'Northanger Abbey,' in its different scale, must be recognised as of a more sumptuous vintage. 'Pride and Prejudice' is, in fact, alone among the Immortal Five, a story pure and simple, though unfolded in and by character, indeed, with a dexterity which the author never aimed at repeating. For, as Jane Austen's power and personality unfold, character becomes more and more the very fabric of her works, and the later books are entirely absorbed and dominated by their leading figures; whereas Darcy and Elizabeth are actors among others in their comedy, instead of being the very essence of it, like Anne or Emma. And to the reader, the difference is that, whereas

he can never come to an end of the subtle delights that lurk in every sentence of the later books, there does come a point at which he has 'Pride and Prejudice' completely assimilated.

Perhaps Jane Austen never quite recovered this first fine careless rapture; still, the book has other signs of youth. It has a vice-word, 'tolerably,' and its dialogue retains traces of Fanny Burney. Compare the heavy latinised paragraphs of the crucial quarrel between Darcy and Elizabeth (the sentence which proved so indelible a whip-lash to Darcy's pride is hardly capable of delivery in dialogue at all, still less by a young girl in a tottering passion) with the crisp and crashing exchanges in the parallel scene between Elton and Emma. The later book provides another comparison. Throughout, when once its secret is grasped, the reader is left in no doubt that subconsciously Emma was in love with Knightley all the time. In 'Pride and Prejudice' the author has rather fumbled with an analogous psychological situation, and is so far from making clear the real feeling which underlies Elizabeth's deliberately fostered dislike of Darcy, that she has uncharacteristically left herself open to such a monstrous misreading as Sir Walter Scott's, who believed that Elizabeth was subdued to Darcy by the sight of Pemberley. In point of fact, we are expressly told that her inevitable feeling, 'this might have been mine,' is instantly extinguished by the belief that she could not bear it to be hers, at the price of having Darcy too; while her subsequent remark to Jane is emphatically a joke, and is immediately so treated by Jane herself ('another entreaty that she would be serious,' etc.), wiser than some later readers of the scene.

Sir Walter's example should be a warning of how easy it is to trip even amid the looser mesh of Jane Austen's early work. Rapid reading of her is faulty reading. As for Mr Collins and Lady Catherine, whom some are ungrateful enough to call caricatures, it must definitely be said that they are figures of fun, indeed, but by no means figures of farce. At the same time both are certainly touched with a youthful sheer delight in their absurdity which gives to them an objective ebullience not to be found in more richly comic studies

such as Lady Bertram or Mr Woodhouse. Nor does Jane Austen ever again repeat the parallelism between two sisters, that makes the fabric of the two early books. Already, in her incisive treatment of Charlotte Lucas, the later Jane Austen is foreshadowed; and 'Pride and Prejudice' contains the first example of her special invention, the middle-aged married woman whose delightful presence in the middle-distance of the picture reflects an added pleasantness on the different leading figures with which Mrs Gardiner, Mrs Grant, Mrs Weston, and Mrs Croft are brought in contact, as foils and confidants. Had Macaulay happened on these examples, the proof of his contention would have been as unquestionable as its truth.

In 'Northanger Abbey' Jane Austen takes a big stride forward. Developing her taste for technical problems, she here tackles a very difficult one—in an artist's consciousness of the problem, indeed, but with youth's indomitable unconsciousness of its full difficulty. A lesser writer, or a maturer, would have either jibbed at such a task as that of interweaving two motives, of parody and serious drama, or would have crashed heavily through their thin ice. In buoyancy of youth and certainty of power, Jane Austen skims straight across the peril, and achieves a triumph so complete that easy readers run the risk of missing both triumph and problem, in mere joy of the book. She even allows herself to dally here with her own delight, and personally steps forward in the tale with her three great personal outbreaks,—on Novels, on Folly in Females, and on the Vanity of Feminine Motives in Dress. As for the reader, the closer his study of the dovetailing of the two motives, the profounder his pleasure. Parody rules, up to the arrival of Catherine at Northanger, which is the pivot of the composition; after which the drama, long-brewing out of the comic motive, runs current with it, and soon predominates. The requisite hyphen is provided by John and Isabella Thorpe, as differently important in one aspect of the tale as in the other. Each moment of the drama artfully echoes some note of the parody that had prevailed before; and the General's final outburst is just what had been foreshadowed long before, in burlesque, of Mrs Allen. Catherine herself suffers by this very nicety of poise and

adjustment; she is really our most delightful of all *ingénues*, but her story is kept so constantly comic that one has no time to concentrate on its chief figure.

Fun, too, tends to overshadow the emotional skill with which the movement is developed. Even the processes by which Catherine so plausibly hardens herself into her grotesque belief that General Tilney killed his wife, even her stupefaction before the commonplaceness of the murdered martyr's room, pale beside the sudden comic tragedy of her awakening,* so convincing as it is, so completely blending the two motives of the book, and, in itself, so vibrant with an emotion as genuine as its generating causes are ridiculous. 'She raised her eyes to him more fully than she had ever done before,' is an early, but very notable, instance of Jane Austen's peculiar power of conveying intense feeling with a touch. In fact, 'Northanger Abbey' marks the point of transition between the author's first period and her second. Already character is a serious rival to the story; henceforth it becomes more and more the main motive, till finally we reach 'Persuasion,' than which no known novel of anything like equal calibre is so entirely devoid of any 'story' at all.

And now, in Jane Austen's life comes an unexpected gap. The family is moving; it goes to Bath; it goes to Portsmouth. In all those ten odd years she produces nothing, except the beginning of 'The Watsons,' which she soon dropped in an unexplained distaste, for which critics have vainly sought a reason. Was it, perhaps, because these were the crucial years of the Napoleonic war, during which its stress was most felt, and concentration on novel-writing was found to be impossible? Much more probably she was simply fretted with removals and uncongenial surroundings; and unhappy, not only in general circumstances, but also with what gleam of personal romance came abortive into her own life. Anne Elliot's distaste for Bath has a more personal note than is usual in her creator's work, and the Portsmouth scenes of 'Mansfield Park' a peculiarly *vécu* quality. Altogether one cannot but feel that in her thirties our heroine was

* Jane Austen loves to have her heroine taken in, either by herself or some one else; so that author and reader can enjoy a private smile together.

not in health of body and spirit, nor in any environment sufficiently settled and sympathetic, to generate those floods of delight which she had hitherto poured forth. And then the family settles at Chawton. Immediately Jane Austen gets to work again; and with astounding fecundity pours forth the three supreme efforts of her maturity in the last three or four years before her death, presumably of cancer, at the age of forty-two. And not one of the three is a novel of laughter, like those of the earlier period.

'Mansfield Park' is Jane Austen's *gran rifiuto*, perhaps under the influence of the unhappiness through which she had been passing. None of her books is quite so brilliant in parts, none shows a greater technical mastery, a more audacious facing of realities, a more certain touch with character. Yet, alone of her books, 'Mansfield Park' is vitiated throughout by a radical dishonesty, that was certainly not in its author's own nature. One can almost hear the clerical relations urging 'dear Jane' to devote 'her undoubted talent to the cause of righteousness'; indeed, if dates allowed, one could even believe that Mr Clarke's unforgettable suggestion about the country clergyman had formed fruit in this biography of Edmund Bertram. In any case, her purpose of edification, being not her own, is always at cross-purposes with her unprompted joy in creation. She is always getting so interested in her subject, and so joyous in her management of it, that when her official purpose comes to mind, the resulting high sentiment or edifying speech is a wrench alike to one's attention and credulity. And this dualism of motive destroys not only the unity of the book, but its sincerity. You cannot palter with truth; one false assumption puts all the drawing and colouring out of gear.

For example, Jane Austen has vividly and sedulously shown how impossible a home is Mansfield for the young, with the father an august old Olympian bore, the mother one of literature's most finished fools, and the aunt its very Queen of Shrews; then suddenly, for edification, she turns to saying that Tom Bertram's illness converted him to a tardy appreciation of domestic bliss. Having said which, she is soon overmastered by truth once more, and lets slip that he couldn't bear his

father near him, that his mother bored him, and that consequently these domestic blisses resolved themselves into better service than you'd get in lodgings, and the ministrations of the uninspiring Edmund. Worse still, because more vital in the book, is her constant deliberate weighting of the balance against Crawford and Mary, who obviously have her artist's affection as well as her moralist's disapproval (as is proved by the very violence of her outbreaks of injustice against them). The consequent strain is such that she defeats her own end by making us take their side against Edmund and Fanny. She throws away the last chance of imposing her view, when she makes Mary, *ex hypothesi* worldly, calculating and callous, not only accept a penniless dull little nobody as her brilliant brother's wife, but even welcome her with a generous cordiality of enthusiasm which sets Fanny's cold self-righteous attitude of criticism to the Crawfords in a more repellent light than ever.

The *dénouement* is an inevitable failure, accordingly. It is the harshest of those precipitate *coups de théâtre* by which Jane Austen, impatient of mere happenings, is too apt to precipitate the conclusions of her books, and jerk her reader's belief with a sudden peripety for which no previous symptom of character had prepared him. Indeed, 'Pride and Prejudice' and 'Northanger Abbey' are the only two of her books which work out to an inevitable end by means of character, and character alone. But the elopement of Crawford and Maria is a specially flagrant fraud on the reader, a dishonest bit of sheer bad art, meant to clear the field for Fanny, and wrench away the story from its obvious proper end, in the marriages of Edmund and Mary, Crawford and Fanny. However much an author may dislike letting his 'pen dwell on guilt and misery,' this is no excuse for making Henry forfeit the woman he loves (and is winning), for the sake of another about whom he does not care two straws. Crawford was no mere boy, to be rushed by any married woman into a scandal so fatal to his plans; and without some sufficient explanation one utterly declines to believe he ever did so. Yet Jane Austen inartistically shirks giving any reason for a per-
versity otherwise incredible. It was not that she would not; her fundamental honesty told her she could not.

Yet Henry, after all, had a very lucky miss of Fanny. How he could ever seriously have wanted to marry her, in fact, becomes a puzzle, for she is the most terrible incarnation we have of the female prig-pharisee. Those who still survive of the Victorian school, which prized a woman in proportion as she was 'little' and soft and silly, keep a special tenderness in their hearts for Fanny Price. Alas, poor souls, let them only have married her! Gentle and timid and shrinking and ineffectual as she seems, fiction holds no heroine more repulsive in her cast-iron self-righteousness and steely rigidity of prejudice; though allowance must be made, of course, as Jane Austen always implies it, and at least once definitely states it, for the jealousy that taints her whole attitude to Mary. Fate has not been kind to Mary Crawford. Her place in the book, her creator's spasms of bias against her, combine to obscure the fact that she is by far the most persistently brilliant of Jane Austen's heroines. It is mere unfair Fanny-feeling to pretend she has neither heart nor morals, but she predominates in brains; and, of all her creator's women, she would be the most delightful as a wife—to any man of brains himself, with income and position. For even dear Elizabeth might sometimes seem a trifle pert beneath the polluted shades of Pemberley, and dear Emma have her moments of trying to direct destiny at Donwell as disastrously as she'd already done at Hartfield.

On the whole, then, 'Mansfield Park,' with its unparalleled flights counteracted by its unparalleled lapses, must count lower as an achievement than 'Emma,' with its more equal movement, at a higher level of workmanship. Had it not been for its vitiating purpose, indeed, 'Mansfield Park' would have taken highest rank. Amazing, even in Jane Austen, is the dexterity of the play scenes, and the day at Sotherton; amazing even in a French realist would be the unflinching veracity with which the Portsmouth episode is treated. Only those who have tried to write, perhaps, can fully realise the technical triumphs of Jane Austen. At Sotherton she has practically her whole cast on the stage at once, yet she juggles so accurately that each character not only keeps its own due importance but continues to evolve in exactly the proper relation to all the other ones. And

this *tour de force* is bettered by the play scenes, prolonged over a whole period as they are, with an even larger crowd manœuvred simultaneously in a complicated maze of movement, that never for an instant fails to get each person into its right prominence at the required moment, without prejudice to the general figure of the dance and the particular positions of the other performers. It is a tragedy that skill so mature should here have been ruined by distracting purposes. All through 'Mansfield Park,' in fact, Jane Austen is torn between the theory of what she ought to see, and the fact of what she does see. The vision is her own, the suggestion another's; and while, in talking of what she does see, she is here at her finest, in forcing herself to what she ought to see she is here at her worst; to say nothing of the harm done to her assumptions by her insight, and to her insight by her assumptions.

But now we come to the Book of Books, which is the book of Emma Woodhouse.* And justly so named, with Jane Austen's undeviating flair for the exact title. For the whole thing is Emma; there is only one short scene in which Emma herself is not on the stage; and that one scene is Knightley's conversation about her with Mrs Weston. Take it all in all, 'Emma' is the very climax of Jane Austen's work; and a real appreciation of 'Emma' is the final test of citizenship in her kingdom. For this is not an easy book to read; it should never be the beginner's primer, nor be published without a prefatory synopsis. Only when the story has been thoroughly assimilated, can the infinite delights and subtleties of its workmanship begin to be appreciated, as you realise the manifold complexity of the book's web, and find that every sentence, almost every epithet, has its definite reference to equally unemphasised points before and after in the development of the plot. Thus it is that, while twelve readings of 'Pride and Prejudice' give you twelve periods of pleasure repeated, as many readings of 'Emma' give you that pleasure, not repeated

* 'Heavens, let me not suppose that she dares go about Emma-Woodhouseing me!'—'Emma,' Cap. XXXIII—a typical instance of a remark which, comic in itself, has a second comic intention, as showing Emma's own ridiculousness.

only, but squared and squared again with each perusal, till at every fresh reading you feel anew that you never understood anything like the widening sum of its delights. But, until you know the story, you are apt to find its movement dense and slow and obscure, difficult to follow, and not very obviously worth the following.

For this is *the* novel of character, and of character alone, and of one dominating character in particular. And many a rash reader, and some who are not rash, have been shut out on the threshold of Emma's Comedy by a dislike of Emma herself. Well did Jane Austen know what she was about, when she said, 'I am going to take a heroine whom nobody but myself will much like.' And, in so far as she fails to make people like Emma, so far would her whole attempt have to be judged a failure, were it not that really the failure, like the loss, is theirs who have not taken the trouble to understand what is being attempted. Jane Austen loved tackling problems; her hardest of all, her most deliberate, and her most triumphantly solved, is Emma.

What is that problem? No one who carefully reads the first three opening paragraphs of the book can entertain a doubt, or need any prefatory synopsis; for in these the author gives us quite clear warning of what we are to see. We are to see the gradual humiliation of self-conceit, through a long self-wrought succession of disasters, serious in effect, but keyed in Comedy throughout. Emma herself, in fact, *is never to be taken seriously*. And it is only those who have not realised this who will be 'put off' by her absurdities, her snobberies, her misdirected mischievous ingenuities. Emma is simply a figure of fun. To conciliate affection for a character, not because of its charms, but in defiance of its defects, is the loftiest aim of the comic spirit; Shakspeare achieved it with his besotted old rogue of a Falstaff, and Molière with Celimène. It is with these, not with 'sympathetic' heroines, that Emma takes rank, as the culminating figure of English high-comedy. And to attain success in creating a being whom you both love and laugh at, the author must attempt a task of complicated difficulty. He must both run with the hare and hunt with the hounds, treat his creation at once objectively and subjectively, get inside it to inspire it with sympathy, and

yet stay outside it to direct laughter on its comic aspects. And this is what Jane Austen does for Emma, with a consistent sublimity so demure that indeed a reader accustomed only to crude work might be pardoned for missing the point of her innumerable hints, and actually taking seriously, for example, the irony with which Emma's attitude about the Coles' dinner-party is treated, or the even more convulsing comedy of Emma's reflexions after it. But only Jane Austen is capable of such oblique glints of humour; and only in 'Emma' does she weave them so densely into her kaleidoscope that the reader must be perpetually on his guard lest some specially delicious flash escape his notice, or some touch of dialogue be taken for the author's own intention.

Yet, as Emma really does behave extremely ill by Jane Fairfax, and even worse by Robert Martin, merely to laugh would not be enough, and every disapproval would justly be deepened to dislike. But, when we realise that each machination of Emma's, each imagined piece of penetration, is to be a thread in the snare woven unconsciously by herself for her own enmeshing in disaster, then the balance is rectified again, and disapproval can lighten to laughter once more. For this is another of Jane Austen's triumphs here—the way in which she keeps our sympathies poised about Emma. Always some charm of hers is brought out, to compensate some specially silly and ambitious naughtiness; and even these are but perfectly natural, in a strong-willed, strong-minded girl of only twenty-one, who has been for some four years unquestioned mistress of Hartfield, unquestioned Queen of Highbury. Accordingly, at every turn we are kept so dancing up and down with alternate rage and delight at Emma that finally, when we see her self-esteem hammered bit by bit into collapse, the nemesis would be too severe, were she to be left in the depths. By the merciful intention of the book, however, she is saved in the very nick of time, by what seems like a happy accident, but is really the outcome of her own unsuspected good qualities, just as much as her disasters had been the outcome of her own most cherished follies.

In fact, Emma is intrinsically honest (it is not for nothing that she is given so unique a frankness of outlook

on life); and her brave recognition of her faults, when confronted with their results, conduces largely to the relief with which we hail the solution of the tangle, and laugh out loud over 'Such a heart, such a Harriet'! The remark is typical, both of Emma and of Emma's author. For this is the ripest and kindest of all Jane Austen's work. Here alone she can laugh at people, and still like them; elsewhere her amusement is invariably salted with either dislike or contempt. 'Emma' contains no fewer than four silly people, more or less prominent in the story; but Jane Austen touches them all with a new mansuetude, and turns them out as candidates for love as well as laughter. Nor is this all that must be said for Miss Bates and Mr Woodhouse. They are actually inspired with sympathy. Specially remarkable is the treatment of Miss Bates, whose pathos depends on her loveliness, and her loveliness on her pathos, till she comes so near our hearts that Emma's abrupt brutality to her on Box Hill comes home to us with the actuality of a violent sudden slap in our own face. But then Miss Bates, though a twaddle, is by no means a fool; in her humble, quiet, unassuming happiness, she is shown throughout as an essentially wise woman. For Jane Austen's mood is in no way softened to the second-rate and pretentious, though it is typical of 'Emma' that Elton's full horror is only gradually revealed in a succession of tiny touches, many of them designed to swing back sympathy to Emma; even as Emma's own bad behaviour on Box Hill is there to give Jane Fairfax a lift in our sympathy at her critical moment, while Emma's repentance afterwards is just what is wanted to win us back to Emma's side again, in time for the coming catastrophe. And even Elton's 'broad handsome face,' in which 'every feature works,' pales before that of the lady who 'was, in short, so very ready to have him.' 'He called her Augusta; how delightful!'

Jane Austen herself never calls people she is fond of by these fancy names, but reserves them for such female cads or cats as Lydia Bennet, Penelope Clay, Selina Suckling, and 'the charming Augusta Hawkins.' It is characteristic, indeed, of her methods in 'Emma,' that, though the Sucklings never actually appear, we come to know them (and miss them) as intimately as if they did.

Jane Austen delights in imagining whole vivid sets of people, never on the stage, yet vital in the play; but in 'Emma' she indulges herself, and us, unusually lavishly, with the Sucklings at Maple Grove, the Dixons in Ireland, and the Churchills at Enscombe. As for Frank, he is among her men what Mary Crawford is among her women, a being of incomparable brilliance, moving with a dash that only the complicated wonderfulness of the whole book prevents us from lingering to appreciate. In fact, he so dims his cold pale Jane by comparison that one wonders more than ever what he saw in her. The whole Frank-Jane intrigue, indeed, on which the story hinges, is by no means its most valuable or plausible part. But Jane Fairfax is drawn in dim tones by the author's deliberate purpose. She had to be dim. It was essential that nothing should bring the secondary heroine into any competition with Emma. Accordingly Jane Fairfax is held down in a rigid dulness so conscientious that it almost defeats another of her *raisons d'être* by making Frank's affection seem incredible.

But there is very much more in it than that. Emma is to behave so extremely ill in the Dixon matter that she would quite forfeit our sympathy, unless we were a little taught to share her unregenerate feelings for the 'amiable, upright, perfect Jane Fairfax.' Accordingly we are shown Jane Fairfax always from the angle of Emma; and, despite apparently artless words of eulogy, the author is steadily working all the time to give us just that picture of Jane, as a cool, reserved, rather sly creature, which is demanded by the balance of emotion and the perspective of the picture.* It is curious, indeed, how often Jane Austen repeats a favourite composition; two sympathetic figures, major and minor, set against an odious one. In practice, this always means that, while the odious is set boldly out in clear lines and brilliant colour, the minor sympathetic one becomes subordinate to the major, almost to the point of dulness. The respective positions of Emma, Jane, and Mrs Elton shed a flood of light back on the comparative paleness of Eleanor Tilney, standing in the same minor relation to

* Remember, also, that Jane Austen did herself personally hate everything that savoured of reserve and disingenuousness, 'trick and littleness.'

Catherine, as against Isabella Thorpe; and the trouble about 'Sense and Sensibility' is that, while Marianne and Elinor are similarly set against Lucy, Elinor, hypothetically the minor note to Marianne, is also, by the current and intention of the tale, raised to an equal if not more prominent position,* thus jangling the required chord, so faultlessly struck in 'Northanger Abbey,' and in 'Emma' only marred by the fact that Jane Fairfax's real part is larger than her actual sound-value can be permitted to be.

Sentimentality has busied itself over the mellowing influences of approaching death, evident in 'Persuasion.' The only such evidences are to be found in its wearinesses and unevennesses, and in the reappearance of that bed-rock hardness which only in 'Lady Susan' stands out so naked. Jane Austen herself felt its faults more strongly than subsequent generations have done. She was depressed about the whole book. And what she meant, however much one may disagree, is plain. 'Persuasion' has its uncertainties; the touch is sometimes vague, too heavy here, too feeble there—Mrs Smith is introduced with too much elaboration, Anne Elliot with too little; balance is lost, and the even, assured sweep of 'Emma' changes to a fitful wayward beauty. This is at once the warmest and the coldest of Jane Austen's works, the softest and the hardest. It is inspired, on the one hand, by a quite new note of glacial contempt for the characters she doesn't like, and, on the other, by an intensified tenderness for those she does. The veil of her impersonality wears thin; 'Persuasion' is no Comedy, like 'Emma,' and contains no woven pattern of Austenian irony. The author allows herself to tell her tale almost openly, and, in her strait treatment of Lady Russell and the Dowager Viscountess, shows very plainly her own characteristic attitude towards the artificial claims of rank—with such decision, indeed, that one wonders why, with 'Persuasion' to his hand, Mr Goldwin Smith should have been at pains to note a mere flash of 'radical sympathy' in 'poor Miss Taylor' (where, in point of fact, there is no trace of it).

* The first version of the book was called 'Elinor and Marianne'; which quite clearly, coming from Jane Austen, shows that Elinor was meant to be the dominant figure.

As for Mrs Clay, she is introduced with so much more emphasis than her ultimate place in the story warrants, that it looks as if she had originally been meant to play a much larger part in it. And worst of all is the violent and ill-contrived exposure of William Elliot, which is also wholly unnecessary, since we are expressly told that not even for Kellynch could Anne have brought herself to marry the man associated with it. In fact, the whole Clay-Elliot imbroglio that cuts the non-existent knot at the end of the book is perhaps the clumsiest of Jane Austen's *coups de théâtre*, though not deliberately false as that of Mansfield Park.

And yet, when everything is said and done in criticism, those who love 'Persuasion' best of all Jane Austen's books have no poor case to put forward. For 'Persuasion' is primarily Anne Elliot. And Anne Elliot is a puzzling figure in our literature. She is not a *jeune fille*, she is not gay or happy, brilliant or conspicuous; she is languidly, if not awkwardly brought on the stage, unemphasised, unemphatic. And yet Anne Elliot is one of fiction's greatest heroines. Gradually her greatness dawns. The more you know of her, the more you realise how perfectly she incarnates the absolute lady, the very counterpart, in her sex, of the *καλοκάγαθος* among men. And yet there is so little that is obvious to show for all this. For the book is purely a cry of feeling; and, if you miss the feeling, you miss all. It sweeps through the whole story in a vibrating flood of loveliness; yet nothing very much is ever said. Jane Austen has here reached the culminating point in her art of conveying emotion without expression. Though 'Persuasion' moves very quietly, without sobs or screams, in drawing-rooms and country lanes, it is yet among the most emotional novels in our literature.

Anne Elliot suffers tensely, hopelessly, hopefully; she never violates the decencies of silence, she is never expounded or exposed. And the result is that, for such as can feel at all, there is more intensity of emotion in Anne's calm (at the opposite pole to Marianne's 'sensitivity') than in the wildest passion-tatterings of Maggie Tulliver or Lucy Snowe; and that culminating little heart-breaking scene between Harville and Anne (quite apart from the amazing technical skill of its contrivance)

towers to such a poignancy of beauty that it takes rank with the last dialogue of mother and daughter in the 'Iphigeneia,' as one of the very sacred things of literature that one dares not trust oneself to read aloud. And any other ending would be unbearable. So completely, in fact, do Anne and her feelings consume the book that the object of them becomes negligible. Wentworth, delightful jolly fellow that he is (with his jolly set of sailor-friends, whom Anne so wanted for hers), quite fades out of our interest, and almost out of our sight.

It is not so with the rest of the people, however. I have had curious testimony to their singular actuality. A great friend of mine, a man who never opens a book by any chance, if a newspaper be to hand, finding himself shut up for weeks in a tiny Chinese town on the borders of Tibet, was driven at last, in sheer desperation of dullness, to Jane Austen. I watched the experiment with awe and anguish. I might have spared myself. 'Emma' baffled him indeed, but 'Pride and Prejudice' took him by storm. And then, to my terror, he took up 'Persuasion'; for surely of all her works, the appeal of 'Persuasion' is the most delicate and elusive. But again I might have spared my fears. 'Persuasion' had the greatest success of all; for days, if not weeks, my friend went mouthing its phrases, and chewing the cud of its felicities. 'That Sir Walter,' he would never weary of repeating, 'he's a *nib*!' And when I tried to find out what had so specially delighted him in 'Persuasion,' he suddenly and finally summed up the whole of Jane Austen and her work:—'Why, all those people, they're —they're *real*!'

REGINALD FARRER.

Art. 2.—THE PROBLEM OF DEGENERACY.

1. *The Laws of Heredity*. By G. Archdall Reid. Methuen, 1910.
2. *Eugenics*. By Edgar Schuster. Cambridge: University Press, 1911.
3. *Heredity in relation to Eugenics*. By C. B. Davenport. Williams & Norgate, 1913.
4. *Mental Deficiency*. By A. F. Tredgold. 2nd Edition. Baillière, 1914.
5. Publications of the Carnegie Institute, Washington; of the Eugenics Record Office, New York, and other Scientific Periodicals.

By the term 'degeneracy' is usually understood any marked falling away, either morally, mentally, or physically, from the average condition of the nation or race. Thus, among civilised peoples, the habitual criminal and the morally perverse, the mentally unstable and insane, the physically weak and ill-developed, are often spoken of as 'degenerates.' But these various conditions may be dependent upon widely different causes; and in the endeavour to make this clear, and to attach, if possible, a more precise meaning to the word, it will be well to refer to some points regarding individual development.

In a previous article in this Review (Oct. 1913) it was stated that the development of the individual is dependent upon two factors, namely, the *seed* from which he is derived and the *soil* in which that seed is grown. These are commonly spoken of as heredity and environment, or nature and nurture; perhaps they are more accurately defined as intrinsic potentiality and extrinsic stimulation. It was shown that the highest degree of development necessitates the presence of a maximum developmental potentiality *plus* an optimum environment. It follows that defective development, of sufficient severity to come within the usual meaning of the word degeneracy, may be caused by a defect in either, or both, of these contributory factors. As examples of such inferiority due to defects in the environment, I may refer to the intellectual poverty and the immorality or moral obliquity which result from inadequate or improper training and instruction during youth and

adolescence; also to the stunted growth and poor physique, often the actual disease and deformity, which follow insanitary surroundings, deprivation of suitable food and exercise, and general neglect or mismanagement, during the early months and years of development. These are conditions with which most of us are only too familiar; and probably no one would deny that under such adverse surroundings the individual must fail to attain that degree of development of which he is innately capable.

On the other hand, we are equally familiar with instances in which, in spite of the most hygienic surroundings, the best education and the most careful upbringing, the individual never reaches the average developmental plane. Many children of this type die within a few months of birth, not so much from actual disease as simply because they have not strength to live. Others survive, but are physically, mentally or morally deficient. Doubtless in some cases there may be obscure faults in the environment, but there are very many in which this is not so, and in which there are clear indications of an innate defect of potentiality; in other words, of the fault being in the seed and not in the soil. The great bulk of the mentally deficient belongs to this group.

The difference between these two types of so-called degeneracy, however, lies not only in their mode of causation, but in their ultimate results. That which is due to an inadequate or adverse environment acting upon the embryo, that is, after fertilisation of the germ-cell has taken place, is, in most instances, an affection of the cells of the body only. These are incapable of attaining their full development, because some of the necessary external stimuli to that development are lacking. If the want is supplied before the period of growth is past, the arrears may be made up; if not, some degree of permanent defect results. In some cases it is probable that the germ-plasm which is stored within the individual, to give rise, in due time, to another generation, may also be affected; but in most instances this is not so. What is produced is a somatic modification only, the germinal potentiality of the seed being unimpaired. The case is entirely different with regard to

that type of degeneracy which appears in spite of a satisfactory environment. The defect here is clearly germinal; it is, in fact, a germ-variation, and as such is transmissible to subsequent generations in accordance with the laws of heredity.

In view of this important and far-reaching difference between these two types, usually comprehended by the word 'degeneracy,' some verbal distinction is clearly necessary. In my opinion that term should be restricted to the latter group, accordingly I venture to define degeneracy as 'a retrograde condition of the individual resulting from a pathological variation of the germ-cell'; and it is in this sense that it will here be used. Perhaps the most convenient word to denote the somatic modification arising from a defective environment would be 'decadency.'

Degeneracy, then, is the expression of a germ-variation. It is generally accepted by biologists that variations of the germ-cell tend to be transmitted to subsequent generations. It is doubtful whether this transmission is invariable, and the laws governing it are still very imperfectly known, but, as a broad fact, it is certainly true. It follows that the occurrence of variations is a phenomenon of the utmost importance to the future of the race. Such variations may be divided into two main groups. Firstly, those which connote an increased potentiality for development in some particular direction, thereby placing the individual at a greater advantage in the struggle for existence. These may be termed 'progressive' variations, and they obviously lie at the root of progressive racial evolution. Secondly, those which connote a diminished potentiality for development of such a nature as to impair the survival value. These may be termed 'retrogressive' variations and lie at the root of social degeneracy. It is with this latter class only that we are now concerned.

The prevention of the perpetuation of these retrogressive variations is clearly a social problem of great moment, and comprises what is known as restrictive or negative eugenics. But the problem of their causation is even more important; for restrictive eugenics, however complete, can never prove entirely satisfactory so

long as degenerates are still being produced *de novo*. Accordingly it is chiefly with the question of causation that it is proposed to deal.

There are three chief views as to this causation, which may be discussed seriatim. The first is, that degeneracy is not the expression of any new germinal change, but the perpetuation of a defect which has existed in certain strains or stocks of the human race from the very beginning or from a Simian ancestry. This idea has probably occurred to most thinkers on the subject, but it has recently again been advanced by Dr C. B. Davenport of America. Dr Davenport,* speaking of the origin of mental defect, says:

'The conclusion is forced upon us that the defects of this germ plasm have surely come all the way down from man's ape-like ancestors, through two hundred generations or more. The germ plasm that we are tracing remains relatively simple; it has never gained, or only temporarily, at most, the one or the many characteristics whose absence we call (quite inadequately) "defects." Feeble-mindedness is thus an uninterrupted transmission from our animal ancestry. It is not reversion; it is direct inheritance.'

Now, with regard to this theory, we must either assume that the defect has been present since the very origin of life, or, that it has appeared at some subsequent period. On the former view it is presumed that the innate potentiality only sufficed for the attainment of a certain low stage of mental development; degeneracy, however, is no mere evolutionary arrest at some particular phase; it is usually seen as, if I may venture to use such a term, a progressive retrogression of certain stocks. If, however, we admit that the variation has made its appearance at some later stage of evolution, then this theory affords no explanation as to its causation; it simply pushes the enquiry back to that period, 'two hundred generations or more.'

In this connexion it may be remarked that atavism is not uncommonly invoked as the explanation of feeble-mindedness, which is one of the most prevalent forms of

* 'The origin and control of mental defectiveness,' 1912.

degeneracy. It is contended that, for some reason or other, these persons reproduce, or hark back to, a stage of mental development which was typical of savage or prehistoric man, but from which normal mankind have evolved. It is inferentially suggested that, although mental defectives are incapable of holding their own in a civilised community, they would not be incapable of so doing among these more primitive types. I cannot accept this view. I find it exceedingly difficult to believe that the feeble-minded members of a civilised community would be any better able to hold their own among a community of savages than they are in their present environment; and I find it still more difficult to imagine that such persons represent a normal developmental phase in the mental evolution of the human race.

In this place also reference may be made to a recent work by V. A. Moschkoff (*'Neue Theorie von der Abstammung des Menschen und seiner Degeneration'*). This author looks upon the whole of mankind as being blended in various degrees from two types—white diluvial man and Pithecanthropus. He describes the physical, mental and moral characteristics of these types with a minuteness which puts the deductive ability of Owen completely in the shade, and which might, indeed, almost be the outcome of a personal acquaintance with these primeval beings in the flesh. White diluvial man would appear to have been a sort of Apollo, the possessor of many beauties and virtues, and of a body which was in every way more perfect than any now existing. Pithecanthropus, on the other hand, was a speechless, repulsive being, apparently somewhat midway between an African pygmy and a modern gorilla. According to Moschkoff, not only is degeneracy, as seen in idiots, cretins, and certain ethnic groups, due to a reversion to the pithecanthropic element, but the alternate expression of the characters of these two stocks takes place at different ages in the same individual and at different cycles in the life of the nation, and so leads to successive alterations of individual character, and even to progressive and retrogressive changes involving the whole community. Even civil wars and internal dissensions, which the sociologist usually attributes to economic causes, are claimed by the author as being due to the

swing of the pendulum bringing into play a preponderating pithecanthropic element. And the pendulum would appear to swing so regularly, that, given the requisite biological data, he would even be able to forecast which would be the fat and which the lean years of a nation's future. Can anything more be expected of science than this?

The second theory of causation is that these retrogressive variations are not caused, but arise of themselves; in other words, that they are 'spontaneous' in origin. Thus, in the Report of the Royal Commission on the Feeble-minded the following statement occurs: 'Both on the ground of fact and of theory there is the highest degree of probability that feeble-mindedness is usually spontaneous in origin, that is, not due to influences acting on the parent.' Now, as Huxley remarked many years ago, to say that a variation is spontaneous is simply to express our ignorance of its causation; and it is obvious that this theory of 'spontaneous variation' is extremely unsatisfactory. The more we learn of the phenomena of nature, the more do we find evidence of law and order; and it would be strange, to say the least, if chance and not law should control what is probably the most important happening in the whole of nature.

The third view is that retrogressive germ-variations have neither existed *ab initio* nor are spontaneous in origin, but are produced by the operation of natural processes and in obedience to natural laws. In my opinion this is not only the most reasonable view in itself, but the only one which is supported by definite evidence; and, although it is not yet possible fully to explain the manner of production of these germ-variations, it is possible to advance certain considerations which at least possess the merit of carrying us a step further towards the elucidation of this problem.

If we pass for a moment from the germ-cells to consider the cells of the body, we find that retrogressive changes occur under two conditions: firstly, in consequence of an endogenous decline of their vitality; secondly, through the action of external agencies. The former of these changes occurs in old age. By this is not meant old age as expressed by years; some persons are old at forty, others still young at eighty. What is

meant is that condition of senescence which results from the exhaustion of the inherent vitality of the cells. They are unable to function because they have come to the end of their physiological banking account. Decay arising from without is best exemplified by the action of such inorganic and organic poisons as alcohol, lead, and phosphorus, or by toxic bodies produced by certain micro-organisms. These agents may bring about such a deterioration of important cells and tissues that the death of the individual results. The problem we have to consider is whether the germ-cells may be affected by similar agencies. May they undergo pathological variation in consequence of senescence? May the same result be caused by adverse factors of the environment?

To begin with the first of these questions—as the modern conception of the continuity of the germ-plasm has become popular, it is not infrequently said that this plasm is ‘immortal.’ But, even if it be granted that germ-plasm existing to-day is the lineal descendant of plasm which has existed since the origin of life, this statement requires some qualification. The unexpended germ-cells not only die, of course, at the death of the individual, like any other piece of protoplasm, but they may die, or at all events lose their capacity for reproduction (which comes to the same thing), whilst the ordinary somatic cells are still alive. This commonly takes place in women between the fortieth and fiftieth year. Now, it has been noticed by several observers that children born towards the end of the female reproductive period tend to be feebler than those born whilst the generative organs are in full vigour. Possibly this, in part, may be due to a senility of the maternal tissues which nourish the seed, but it is equally likely to be due to a senility of the seed itself, so that there is some ground for thinking that senescence may be a possible cause of pathological germ variations.

Again, there are certain Infusoria, which, while ordinarily multiplying by fission, from time to time undergo a form of conjugation not unlike that which occurs between the sperm and germ-cells in human beings. It was shown by Maupas that, if this periodical conjugation is prevented, the offspring resulting from subsequent fissions gradually undergoes a form of degradation until

the whole group eventually becomes extinct. Prof. Marcus Hartog argues from this and similar researches made by other enquirers that conjugation or fertilisation plays an important part in warding off senescence. Is such introduction of fresh blood necessary to ward off senescence and prevent germinal impairment in the case of higher animals, human beings in particular? With regard to certain domestic animals, there is reason to think that close in-breeding is followed by a gradual deterioration of offspring; and experienced breeders are practically unanimous that the effect of this is to produce debility, abnormalities, and eventually sterility. As Sir Francis Darwin says, 'it is generally admitted that degeneration either in constitution or in other ways does ultimately ensue; so that at any cost the breeder is absolutely compelled to admit blood from another family or strain of the same race.' In the case of human beings, however, in-and-in breeding to this extent is practically unknown; and it is therefore unlikely that senescence of the germ-plasm from such a cause plays any practical part in the production of degeneracy. At the same time it is to be remarked that the effect of consanguineous marriages is to intensify any existing defect; and the same is true where mating is rigidly restricted to the members of any one small section of society. We are apt nowadays to bewail the not infrequent union of members of our old and formerly exclusive aristocracy with chorus girls and the like. The process may be attended with a serious decline in 'form' and manners; but it is possible that it may possess physiological compensations which are beneficial to the race as a whole.

We have now to consider the question of the modification of the germ-plasm by the environment. Fifty years ago few scientific persons would have doubted this; and even to-day it is probable that most medical men would say that their clinical experience supported such a view. But in those days it was supposed that the germ-cells arose, by some means or other, from the body-cells; it followed that their condition was dependent upon the condition of the body-cells, and the production of germ-variations through the environment was a necessary and logical sequence. But recent writers, particularly

Professor Weismann, have proclaimed the 'continuity' of the germ-plasm; they have contended, in other words, that it is not produced anew in each individual, but is an independent plasm which is handed on from generation to generation as a separate entity; and it is consequently argued that the germ-plasm is immune to its surroundings. Some writers have even gone so far as to say not only that the environment has, in fact, no influence in the production of germ-variations, but that it cannot have any such influence, because, if it had, it would be subversive of the whole doctrine of evolution. Since this argument strikes at the very root of what I conceive to be the origin of degeneracy, it will be well to consider the basis upon which the assertion is made. And in this connexion I cannot do better than quote the words of Dr Archdall Reid, who is perhaps the most strenuous advocate of this view. Dr Reid says:

'If this theory that germinal changes may be caused by waste products, circulating toxins and the like, is correct, all races affected by any sort of disease should drift steadily towards extinction.' Again: 'If disease produces any germinal change, then, no matter how small and imperceptible the differences between one generation and the next, . . . the constant accentuation of the alteration during hundreds, perhaps thousands, of generations must make it at last manifest and unmistakable.' . . . 'The facts are decisive; nearly all human races have been exposed to disease for thousands of years, and in no instance is there to be found an iota of evidence that any race has, as a consequence, become degenerate' (pp. 260-262).

Now, at first sight these statements may appear very plausible; but a little reflexion will show them to be really fallacious in that they entirely disregard one important consideration, namely, the possibility that the vulnerability of the germ-plasm may vary greatly in different individuals. In the case of the ordinary tissues and organs of the body—the somatoplasm—there is no doubt whatever on this point; and one of the best-established facts in medicine is that of the varying resistance to disease presented by different individuals. Thus, one person will rapidly succumb to Tuberculosis, Influenza, Pneumonia or other toxic process; another will escape

death but evince considerable subsequent deterioration; while a third will recover without any permanent ill effects. It is surely not unjustifiable to consider that similar differences of vulnerability may exist in the case of the germ-plasm. Adverse factors of the environment will then not be operative upon the germ-plasm of the whole community, but only upon that of the susceptible portion; and it will no more follow that 'all races affected by any sort of disease should drift steadily towards extinction' than it follows that all persons affected with Tuberculosis, Influenza, or other disease will necessarily die of those complaints. Further, not only may some germ-plasm be practically immune, but plasm which is susceptible may be influenced to varying extent, both quantitatively and qualitatively, thereby giving rise to many different forms of variation and degrees of degeneracy.

As a matter of fact this is precisely what happens; and the manifestations of degeneracy as seen in daily life vary within very wide limits. In some instances the variation is so pronounced as to interfere seriously with the survival value of the resulting offspring. Such individuals will then be eliminated by natural selection, provided this is sufficiently rigorous, so that, far from being subversive of the doctrine of evolution, the process is one which actually conduces to racial evolution. It may happen, however, that the variation is much less pronounced and the social environment not sufficiently rigorous to bring about elimination. Such individuals will then not only be enabled to survive, but will intermarry with those whose germ-plasm is unimpaired, with the result that a dilution of the morbid process may take place so far as individual members are concerned, but there will be a more widespread dissemination throughout the community.

As will presently be shown, these milder manifestations of degeneracy occur more particularly in the central nervous system. They involve those parts of the nervous system concerned with the higher processes of mind, and they take the form of a diminished mental potentiality, a lessened vigour and initiative, a want of balance and a loss of control. The social expression of these changes is seen in an incapacity of the community

for sound government and legislation, for organisation and for social progress, and an inability to compete with more vigorous neighbours, both in the arts of peace and in those of war, the natural termination of which is social decline or even disruption. It is exceedingly questionable if any student of history will be found to maintain that there is not 'an iota of evidence' of the past existence of such degeneracy.

As to why the germ-plasm of different individuals should vary in susceptibility to the action of adverse factors of the environment, we know very little. It is not inconceivable, indeed it is a reasonable assumption, that its state of nutrition may be subject to change, and that this may determine its immunity or vulnerability; or the same result may be brought about by the absence or deficiency of some internal secretion. This question is one of great moment, but it is too intricate to enter upon in this place.

The fact is, then, that not only are there no *a priori* reasons against the modification of the germ-plasm by the environment, in spite of much reiteration to the contrary, but there are many such reasons in favour of this modification taking place. Doubtless the germ-material possesses a considerable degree of resistance to the action of the environment; for, were it otherwise, and did it reflect every transient change, racial stability could hardly exist. But there is a great difference between some degree of resistance and absolute immunity; and, when we remember that after all the germ-plasm is still living protoplasm and consequently dependent for its sustenance upon the quantity and quality of the fluids supplied to it, the view that it can lead a charmed life, utterly uninfluenced by any condition of its host, is untenable. As Beard says, 'the germ-cell must react to and be influenced by its environment'—a conclusion not only accepted by most competent biologists of the present day, but acquiesced in by Weismann himself.

However, the question is no longer one of speculation and *a priori* reasoning. Whatever may be asserted of the theoretical impossibility that the germ-cell should be adversely affected by its environment, there is now very clear evidence that it is so affected; and to some

of this evidence we may briefly refer. One of the earliest observations (1861) was that of Dr Constantin Paul regarding the effect of lead. This observer found that out of thirty-two pregnancies, in which the father alone suffered from lead poisoning, the mother being free from that condition, twelve of the children were stillborn, eight died during the first, four during the second, and five during the third year of life, while another died later in childhood. Similar data were published by Lizé (1862) regarding workers exposed to the fumes of nitrate of mercury. Out of twelve pregnancies in which the father alone was exposed, there were four stillbirths; of the remaining eight children, three died before the fourth year, and only one of those who survived could be described as vigorous. The toxic effects of alcohol upon growing protoplasm are well known; and, since experimentation with this is comparatively easy, it has naturally formed the subject of many investigations. One of the most recent is that by Stockard upon guinea-pigs, by which it was shown that the net result of twenty-four matings of alcoholised fathers with normal mothers was only five surviving offspring, or no more than might have been expected from a single pairing of two healthy animals; and, further, that at the age of two months these five survivors were only half the usual size. Dr E. Bertholet, after a series of microscopical examinations in 120 alcoholic and non-alcoholic human beings, was able to demonstrate very clear differences, and to assert that 'the hurtful influence of chronic alcoholism upon sexual glands is not to be denied.' Similar results have been obtained with other poisons; and during recent years it has also been shown that germ variations may be induced by temperature (Sumner, Bordage, Tower) and by the injection of chemicals into the immature ovary (Macdougall). Finally, from enquiries which I have lately made into the effect of X-rays, there seems to be no doubt that males working with unprotected tubes are rendered temporarily sterile owing to the action of the rays upon the sperm-cells. If this and other agencies can thus bring about the death of the germ-cell, it is a justifiable inference that smaller doses can so injure it as to produce a living but impaired offspring; and the

earlier observations above quoted show that this is actually the case.

In view of the evidence which is now available and is daily increasing, it is impossible to deny that the germ-cells may be adversely affected by the environment. As to the actual causal agents of this change in human beings our knowledge is still incomplete. My own observations lead me to think that Alcoholism, Tuberculosis, and venereal diseases play an important part. But there may be many others with which we are as yet unacquainted, and which will certainly be brought to light when once we discard the bogey of 'spontaneous variation,' and seek them in a true scientific spirit, devoid of preconceived notions as to what may be possible and what impossible.

The important question now arises as to the nature of the germinal change which is thus induced. In spite of the many researches of recent years, we still know very little about the physical basis of inheritance; but this much is certain, that, in some at present mysterious way, the germ-cell contains 'representatives' or 'determinants' of all the variable parts of the body of the offspring to which it subsequently gives rise. Perhaps the best way of regarding these is that of a series of directive forces or specific energies, each of which is concerned with directing the growth of a particular tissue. On this hypothesis we may assume that the effect of toxic agents is to reduce this innate potentiality, and to bring about what may be termed a devitalisation, or an impairment of the whole, or of certain specific, energies of the germ-cell. This will not only be operative in the case of the immediately resulting offspring, but, since it is fundamental, may involve subsequent generations. This is in no wise antagonistic to the view of germ-continuity.

But the different organs of the human body, as they exist to-day, vary greatly in what may be called their antiquity. There are some—for instance, the circulatory system—which have undergone comparatively little change with the evolution of the human race through many lower species. There are others, such as the nervous system, which have undergone a very great

elaboration, probably even in man himself. It is legitimate to conclude that the innate germinal potentiality of the systems of less antiquity, which have undergone more recent evolutionary change, will be more liable to alteration under adverse or abnormal conditions of the environment than will the potentiality of those which are more organically fixed and have, in fact, a longer heritage; and hence it will come about that these adverse factors exert a selective influence upon the constituents of the germ-cell, being chiefly operative upon the higher parts of the nervous system. At the same time our conception of development can hardly be that of a series of organs each pursuing its own growth independently. It seems likely that a certain mutual inter-restraint exists, and that, where the potentiality for growth of one organ or tissue is rendered defective, the lessening of restraint may result in irregularity and overgrowth of contiguous tissues, with the production of gross anatomical anomalies and developmental errors.

When we turn to the manifestations of degeneracy—that is, to the manner in which these pathological variations of the germ-cell are revealed in the offspring—we find strong corroboration of these views. Retrogressive variations, manifested generation after generation, are to be found, it is true, in many organs, such as the skin, the eyes, the skeleton, etc.; but the commonest expression of all and by far the most frequent form of degeneracy is seen in a defective and abnormal constitution of the higher parts of the nervous system, that is, in the parts concerned with the functions of mind. The usual medical term for this manifestation of degeneracy is 'neuropathic diathesis'; and its physical basis is undoubtedly, as has now been shown by many exhaustive enquiries, an impairment of neuronc potentiality which is germinal in origin and may be transmitted generation after generation.

The manifestations of this neuropathic diathesis vary greatly in their degree and nature. In the slighter forms of impairment, as already remarked, there is simply a lessened durability and diminished power of resisting the stresses and strains of life; a weakening of nerve vigour, a proneness to psychasthenia, and a consequent inability for sustained competition. If more pronounced,

there is a tendency to early mental dissolution or dementia, to hysteria, epilepsy, insanity and other marked psychopathic disorders; while, if still more marked, there are grave defects of anatomical development, resulting in feeble-mindedness, imbecility, or idiocy. It has now been conclusively shown that, while some stocks evince no tendency to any of these abnormal mental states, there are others in which such conditions occur with great frequency for many generations. Some members of such a stock may be epileptic, others suffer from insanity or marked moral failing, while others may be feeble-minded or even idiots. Since the environment of such persons differs in no material particular from that of the mentally healthy section of the community amongst whom they live, it is clear that the failing is of the germ-cell and is inherited. In many family histories it is possible to trace a definite progressive accentuation of the impairment, and in some even to trace it to its origin. Thus, in persons suffering from the mildest manifestations, neuropathic antecedents are relatively uncommon; but a history of ancestral alcoholism or tuberculosis is frequently found. Amongst epileptics, evidence of the neuropathic diathesis occurs in about 35 per cent. of cases; in the insane this proportion reaches from 50 to 60 per cent.; while in the mentally defective it occurs in from 80 to 90 per cent. There is thus an increasing degeneracy, which reaches its culminating point in that condition in which mind has become so reduced as hardly to have an existence—namely, profound or absolute idiocy.

It has sometimes been objected that, since the particular defect of the individual is not identical with that which has existed in his ancestors, it cannot be regarded as 'hereditary.' This, however, is either mere hair-splitting or betokens a complete ignorance of the nature of the inheritance underlying these morbid conditions. Of course idiocy, insanity, epilepsy, etc., are no more inherited, as such, than any other human quality or defect. Inheritance consists, not in the transmission of actual qualities as we see them, but in the potentiality to develop those qualities under an appropriate stimulus. Similarly in degeneracy, what is transmitted is not epilepsy, insanity or mental defect, but a diminished developmental

potentiality of the nervous system, in other words, the neuropathic diathesis; and I am of opinion that here also the particular manifestations are in many cases determined by particular environmental factors operating during the period of growth.

It has been stated that the gross forms of mental defect represent the culmination of degeneracy; and hence it follows that individuals so suffering are usually characterised by serious abnormalities of anatomical growth and of physiological function in many parts of the body. These are known as 'stigmata of degeneracy.' The list of these 'stigmata' is a long one, comprising, among others, deformities of the brain, eyes, external ears, nose, palate, hands, feet, and many other structures. I must confess that the inclusion of some of the anomalies which have been described amongst the signs of 'degeneracy' (as I have defined it) seems hardly warranted. Apart from the fact that there are so many anatomical variations within the normal range that the abnormal becomes exceedingly difficult to define, many of those which are undoubtedly errors of development appear to me to be more a result of adverse conditions affecting the growth of the embryo than of a real germ-variation; and a single so-called stigma of degeneracy is not infrequently found in persons who present no other physiological or psychological abnormality. This is particularly the case with the external ear, also with the deformities known as hare-lip and cleft-palate. At the same time there is no doubt that developmental errors are far commoner in victims of the neuropathic diathesis than in the healthy members of the community; and the presence of numerous 'stigmata' is so commonly associated with other signs of germinal impairment which is transmissible—of true degeneracy, in fact—as to be extremely suggestive of that condition.

We see, then, that the chief expression of degeneracy occurs in that part of the organism which is at once the most elaborate, the most recent in phylogenetic development, and the most important—namely, the higher portions of the brain. But it is not usual to find such a person possessed of full or even average bodily vigour; and the majority of degenerates evince in addition a lessened power of resistance to disease and

a proneness to early death. Whilst a few persons suffering from the milder degrees may do good work, some even taking rank with genius, there can be no question that the great majority are distinctly inferior, in moral, mental, and physical fibre, to the untainted members of the community. It follows that the presence of any considerable number of such persons in the State must entail a serious diminution in the aggregate of vigour and great economic disadvantages.

What effect have these degenerates upon posterity? Individuals suffering from the more pronounced degrees of degeneracy—idiots and low-grade imbeciles—are usually sterile. Further, there is every probability that, if even the milder grades mated solely among themselves, there would gradually be produced such an accentuation of the morbid process that the disease would work out its own salvation by causing the extinction of the stock. But, as has already been pointed out, the initial impairment does not involve the whole community, and the mating is not thus restricted. Persons suffering from the initial and milder forms of degeneracy mate with the unimpaired, so that the question of the laws governing the transmission of the defect becomes one of great practical social importance.

Our knowledge regarding these laws is still very inadequate; but it may be said that, in the main, most, if not all, modes of inheritance may be referred to one of two groups. In the one the inheritance is 'blended'; in other words, the individual may be looked upon as the result of a mechanical mixture of the germinal material of his two parents. This is, perhaps, best seen in the various shades of skin-colour (mulatto, quadroon, octoroon) which result from the mating of a white with a negro. In the second group certain qualities or peculiarities of one germ-cell seem to dominate over antagonistic qualities of the germ-cell of the other sex, so that the individual 'takes after' his father in regard to some details, but after his mother in regard to others. As Goethe says:

'Vom Vater hab' ich die Statur,
Des Lebens ernstes Führen;
Vom Mütterchen die Frohnatur
Und Lust zu fabuliren.'

At the same time an individual who himself shows no indication of any parental peculiarity may yet pass it on to his offspring, constituting what is described as patency and latency, as is seen in *hoemophilia* and certain other diseases. It seems likely that what is commonly known as prepotency, dominance, and patency and latency, may be embraced within the laws which were first discovered by Gregor Mendel, Abbot of Br \ddot{u} nn, fifty years ago, and which are now known as Mendel's Laws. Mendel's conclusions, drawn from experiments on peas, were long unknown to the world; but their rediscovery has given an enormous impetus to similar enquiries, and during the last few years numerous investigations have been made with the object of ascertaining whether his results are applicable to man. With regard to some qualities this has been shown to be the case; and it now seems to be established that such abnormalities as brachydaetyly, colour-blindness, night-blindness and congenital cataract are transmitted in accordance with Mendelian laws. Is this so with the neuropathic diathesis, which we may certainly consider the most important form of degeneracy from the sociological aspect?

Researches which have been made under the auspices of the Eugenics Record Office of America proclaim that this is the case, and that 'the fact of the hereditary transmission of the neuropathic constitution as a recessive trait, in accordance with the Mendelian theory, may be regarded as definitely established.' But the difficulties and sources of possible fallacy attendant upon such enquiries are so great that one must accept these conclusions with considerable reserve. It is impossible to deal adequately with the question in this place, but it may be remarked that a person may be of neuropathic constitution and yet pass through life apparently normal, owing to the absence of any direct excitant to a mental breakdown; in other words, he may inherit a predisposition to insanity and yet, in consequence of his life being cast amid healthy surroundings devoid of strain, never become insane. The ascertainment of the number of offspring who are hereditarily affected thus becomes a matter of the greatest difficulty, and yet this is essential in order to prove that the transmission is in accordance

with Mendelism. My own experience is that, while all the offspring of two markedly degenerate persons are always defective, the children resulting from the union of a pronounced degenerate with a healthy individual tend to be, not some normal and some abnormal, but all of them of abnormal constitution. If one parent only bears the taint in slight degree, it is not uncommon to find some children affected while others entirely escape; but even here it is by no means rare for all the children to evince a distinct psychopathic failing. Whilst, therefore, it is hazardous to dogmatise on the subject—for the facts are by no means conclusive—the available evidence seems to suggest that the inheritance is more often of the blended than of the Mendelian type.

I have spoken of the pronounced grades of mental defect as being the culmination of degeneracy; but it is not always thus cumulative, and it is possible that the mating of a person suffering from a milder degree of germinal impairment with healthy stock might, after a few generations, lead to the eradication of the impairment and so to regeneracy. But the experiment would be somewhat hazardous for the individual offspring. Severe exciting factors might readily fan the slumbering spark into a violent flame; and this is probably the explanation of many so-called sporadic cases of insanity and even of mental deficiency. Such exciting factors may be supplied by injury during birth, infectious disease during childhood, excess or strain during adolescence or maturity, or indeed any untoward condition of the environment, whether of intra- or extra-uterine life. And, should the germinal impairment be still more pronounced, it seems highly probable not only that mating with healthy stock is powerless to neutralise the defect, but that there is the greatest danger of a considerable reduction of the mental vigour and durability of all the offspring and consequently of a marked decline in the net capacity of the community. It is by such means that I conceive that a nation, while still surviving, may not only lose its power to advance, but may be rendered incapable of successful competition against its more vigorous neighbours and so sink to a lower plane. And when we take into account the neutralisation of the force of natural selection which occurs in a civilised as

opposed to a more barbarous community, and which prevents the elimination of these unsound members, it is not difficult to understand how it has come about that nations which have reached a high degree of civilisation should in course of time have been overrun by a horde of barbarians. For with nations, as with individuals, it is the 'fit' who survive.

It may safely be said that the problem of degeneracy has now passed beyond the academic stage, and that its practical importance is recognised by most thoughtful persons. But its pressing nature is still unrealised; and it is, perhaps, not unnatural that, in the midst of the greatest war the world has ever known, it should be regarded as a question which can well await the return of peace. There could be no greater mistake. The military necessities of the country and the large number of casualties have already emphasised the importance of 'man-power' and directed attention towards the declining birth-rate and the conservation of child life. All this is quite right and proper; but it is an incontrovertible fact that the many medical rejections and the system of voluntary service have both led to these casualties being disproportionately incident upon the most fit, and that the general effect of the war has been to augment still further the previously existing tendency towards the survival of the least fit. And there is great danger that an indiscriminate increase in the birth-rate, a demand for quantity irrespective of quality, may still further contribute towards this result. Let us make no mistake. The ending of the war will not end international competition; and, if we are to maintain our national or economic supremacy, we shall need, not merely men and women, but the best men and women we can produce. If we are to do this, the problem of degeneracy must have a place in any scheme for increasing the birth-rate and building up the future man-power of the Nation.

A. F. TREDGOLD.

Art. 3.—THE SOUND OF A GREAT EXPLOSION.

ON Jan. 19, at 6.51 p.m., a great explosion—perhaps the greatest ever experienced in these islands—occurred at an important munitions factory in East London. The factory in question is well known, and it will therefore be sufficient if its position be represented roughly by the star in the accompanying map.

The interest of the explosion from a scientific point of view is indirect and lies in the evidence which it offers on the mode in which sound travels through the atmosphere.* In this explosion, as in so many others, the area over which the sound was heard is not continuous; it consists of two detached portions. One portion, of course, surrounds East London. It will be convenient to call it the 'inner sound-area.' The other lies far away to the north, and may be known as the 'outer sound-area.' Between the two, there lies a broad 'zone of silence,' in which, with one exception, all trace of the sound seems to have been lost. There is nothing novel in this fact. It has been well known since the beginning of the century, when the minute-guns fired during Queen Victoria's funeral procession revealed the existence of a silent zone for the first time. Many subsequent explosions, both artificial and natural, have exhibited a similar zone. The peculiarity of the recent explosion is that it occurred in, and manifested its effects over, a populous district, from which a large number of observations could be easily obtained.

The continuous lines in the accompanying map bound the two areas over which the sound was heard. They depend on an unusually large number of observations (571 from 391 places). It was essential, however, to show that the intermediate district was really free from all trace of sound, and I therefore made inquiries at many places within the silent zone and especially at those close to the boundaries as I had drawn them. Similar letters were also sent to places just outside both sound-areas. The position of these places (71 in number) aided materially in the exact delineation of the boundaries.

* Cf. the article on 'The sound of big guns' in the Q.R. for July 1916.

The inner sound-area, as will be seen from this map, is of rather unusual form. It shows a marked extension in two directions, one towards the east-south-east, terminating near Canterbury at a distance of 48 miles from the source of sound; the other running in a north-westerly direction through Hertfordshire and Bedfordshire, and ending just beyond Northampton after a course of not less than $66\frac{1}{2}$ miles. In comparison with its distortion along these two lines, the restriction of the sound-area in other directions is all the more remarkable. Towards the north-east and south, the boundary passes through points which are only 20 and 19 miles respectively from the origin. The total area included within the inner boundary curve is 3390 square miles.

Of very different form is the outer sound-area. It stretches in a broad band, in a direction a little south of east, from the neighbourhood of Nottingham to, and no doubt slightly beyond, the east coast of Norfolk. Its length, as far as the coast-line, is 131 miles, its greatest width is 44 miles, and the area covered by it is 5000 square miles, or half as large again as the other. Near its northern boundary lie the most distant places at which the sound was certainly heard—Bestwood (near Nottingham) and Stow (near Lincoln), which are respectively 117 and 128 miles from the origin.

For a great explosion, these distances are by no means excessive. Possibly, the amount of explosives lost was not so considerable as in other explosions; but on this point we cannot expect to be enlightened. At any rate, the distances are smaller than that attained by the sound-waves of the Wiener-Neustadt explosion on June 7, 1912, when 197 tons of gunpowder exploded and the sound was heard to a maximum distance of 186 miles.

The observations which I have received from the two sound-areas point to great variations in the loudness of the sound. The epithets used show that the sound may be readily divided into three grades of intensity. In the highest (A), the sound was evidently very loud. Such terms are used as 'a terrible explosion,' or 'louder than any bomb or crash of thunder.' In the next (B), the sound was moderately loud, as is clear from such expressions as 'a loud report,' 'heavy gun fire' or 'a heavy clap of thunder.' To the lowest grade (C), that of faint

sound, correspond such terms as 'distant guns booming,' 'the distant roll of thunder,' or 'a heavy gust of wind.'

The scale of intensity is clearly a rough one. Yet it is remarkable how closely the places corresponding to each degree of the scale are grouped together—so closely, in fact, that curves may be drawn separating places of one grade of intensity from those of another. These curves are represented by the dotted lines on the map. In the inner area, there are two such lines of equal sound-intensity (A and B) including the places at which the sound was very loud and moderately loud, respectively. In the outer, there is only one such line (B)—that of moderate strength. In each case the boundary includes all places at which the sound was faint.

There are two points of interest brought out by these curves. The first is the rapidity with which the intensity declined outwards in the inner area. The curve of highest intensity (A) includes only 104 square miles, that of moderate intensity (B) 950 square miles. Thus, the district included between the curve B and the boundary is nearly three-quarters of the whole inner area. It does not follow that the sound-waves really lost so much of their intensity after traversing distances so short. It is rather that, before starting on their journey over the silent zone, the sound-waves had already begun to rise, and that only secondary waves, as it were, spread out from their lower fringes so as to reach observers on the ground.

On the other hand, the intensity over the outer area was much more uniform. In no part of it was the highest degree attained, but the curve of moderate intensity covers a district measuring 2740 square miles or nearly three times as large as the corresponding part of the inner area. If we consider that the central portion of the outer area is nearly one hundred miles from East London, this surely is a strange result. And no less remarkable is the fact that, in more than one-half of the entire outer area, the reports were louder than over nearly three-quarters of the inner sound-area.

Between the two areas lies the mysterious silent zone. How much it varies in width is evident from the map. At the western end, the zone is 28 miles wide; at the eastern end, no less than 48 miles. All over this zone,

but for one place, the sound-waves crossed unheard. The exceptional place is Ipswich, where a sound was heard by one, and, so far as I know, by only one, person. There is no reason for discrediting the observation, simply because it is exceptional; and, in any case, the place is only ten miles from the boundary of the outer sound-area; and the observation was made in the highest part of the town. Again, in the narrow neck at the western and more lofty end of the silent zone are two places (Uppingham and Lilford), from which records of the sound come. But the observations at these places are not free from doubt, because the estimates of the time at both differ by about a quarter of an hour from the correct value, though the difference is within the error of many country clocks. There are, however, observations of another kind from this district. These will be referred to on a later page, for they have an important bearing on that difficult problem—the origin of the silent zone.

Again, from the country lying to the north, west and south of the sound-areas, there have come a few reports. Some of these deserve attention because the observed time does not differ widely from that which might be expected, taking into account the known velocity of sound. The observations, however, are unsupported by others in the vicinity, and the places are frequently reached by sound-waves from other distant sources. Thus, while we may surmise that the sounds may have resulted from the explosion in East London, we cannot regard their connexion with the explosion as proved.

All over both areas, the sound was a deep boom, so low that, according to several observers, it was almost more felt than heard. It is a remarkable fact, and one worthy of the attention of physiologists, that the sound was certainly heard by a man who is deaf to all but the loudest shouting. As a rule, the sound was merely a crash or heavy thud. In some places, it was followed immediately by a rumbling like that of thunder and probably due to the same cause. In the outer area, though a rumbling was observed occasionally, the sound was usually sharp and brief. Enemy air-ships have often visited both areas; and the sounds of their exploding bombs have been of service as types of comparison as

THE SOUND-AREAS.



[To face p. 54.]

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TILDEN FOUNDATIONS

well as standards of intensity. In some places, special constables were sent out and ordered the extinction of lights. Indeed, one-third of the observers in the inner area, and three-quarters of those in the outer area, at once assumed that a Zeppelin raid was in progress.

At several places within a few miles of East London, two reports were heard in quick succession. They were perhaps due to separate explosions. If so, the sound-waves of the second and slighter explosion soon faded beyond hearing, and the sound became a single crash or heavy thud. This character it maintained until the limits of the inner sound-area were nearly reached; and there, at a few places, the single sound was replaced by a double sound. Whether this change was general or not is unknown, for the sound-waves were even then preparing for their journey through the upper air across the silent zone.

When the sound-waves returned to earth once more within the outer area, all trace of the single sound had disappeared. Observers, it is true, occasionally speak of hearing only one sound. But this is clearly due to imperfect observation, for others at some of the same places heard two or three reports. The explanation, no doubt, is that the two reports occurred in quick succession, the interval between them being about half a second. Moreover, they were of nearly the same strength, so that the double report may well have seemed continuous. The same explanation probably accounts for the fact that two and even three reports were heard by different observers at the same place.

This explanation is confirmed by a map of the multiple-reports. It is then seen that double sounds were heard over nearly all the outer area, while triple sounds were also generally observed in this area, except near the western end, where the sound was distinctly fainter than elsewhere. Four reports were noticed only in the county of Norfolk—with one exception—and these were mostly within about seven miles of Norwich. In the neighbourhood of this city, observations of the sound were especially numerous, showing that the sound was probably louder there than elsewhere.

The interval between the second and third reports was about a second, and that between the third and

fourth somewhat less, so that all four were heard within a period of two or three seconds. As to their relative intensity, the first and second were nearly equal in strength, the first, if anything, being slightly the louder. Compared with either of this pair, the third and fourth were faint, and the fourth distinctly weaker than the third. Thus, it would seem that each report was fainter than the preceding, though the difference between the members of each pair was inconsiderable.

The multiplication of reports in the outer area is not easy to explain. It is possible, as already mentioned, that the main explosion was followed immediately by another. But this other, if it occurred, was not audible for more than a few miles, and, in any case, cannot have been responsible for two of the four reports that were heard in Norfolk. The only conclusion we can come to is that the sound-waves followed different routes in their journey from East London to the outer area. But, as to what caused the sound-waves to split up and forced them to take their several ways, we have no evidence whatever. We can but record the fact, and trust that later investigations may throw light on the problem.

To be audible to the human ear, the rapidity of vibrations must lie within certain limits. If they were to number fewer than 16, or more than 38,000, to the second, they would pass unnoticed by every ear. It is not to be expected that the vibrations of all the waves that emanate from a great explosion should be precisely those to which our ears are sensitive. There may be waves in which the vibrations are very rapid and which speed their way over the country undetected. There may be others in which they are too slow to affect the ear, but which may yet show signs of their passage in the shaking of windows, and in the quivering of trees, with the consequent disturbance of birds resting upon their branches. It should be remembered that strong sound-waves are themselves capable of producing similar effects. But, if windows should rattle, or if pheasants should crow in alarm, before or after the arrival of the sound-waves, we should be justified in regarding such disturbances as the work of other and inaudible air-waves.

It may be urged that the consideration of such waves lies beyond the scope of an article on the sound of a great

explosion. But the inaudible and audible waves are identical in their origin; they pursue paths which are nearly, but not quite, the same. And it is, indeed, this slight difference of route which throws, perhaps, more light than any other feature on the path followed by the sound-waves, and therefore on the origin of the silent zone.

Over the western parts of both sound-areas and of the silent zone, the air was nearly still at the time of the explosion. Yet, at many places, it was noticed that windows suddenly rattled, sometimes with violence, and then after a few seconds returned to rest. In the inner area, windows were shaken after the sound was heard in London, and at Barnes (12 miles from the munition factory) and East Acton (13 miles). On the other hand, at Upper Norwood ($11\frac{1}{2}$ miles) a window was blown outwards before the roar of the explosion was heard. Doors were shaken before the arrival of the sound-waves at Harpenden (28 miles), and windows at Luton ($32\frac{1}{4}$ miles). In the outer area, the shaking of windows preceded the reports at Great Ponton near Grantham ($99\frac{1}{2}$ miles) and Halton Holgate near Spilsby (115 miles). The evidence is by no means full. So far as it goes, it shows that, near the origin, that is, while sound-waves and inaudible waves kept close to the ground, the sound-waves slightly outran the air-waves, but that, at considerable distances, they fell behind in the race.

In the inner sound-area, pheasant-covers are somewhat rare; in the outer area, they are numerous and widely spread. As the waves passed through them, the birds flew suddenly from the trees on which they were roosting and fluttered restlessly from one branch to another. Cock-birds crowed or screeched, so noisily that their voices could be heard a mile or more. The interest of the observations lies in the fact that the pheasant-crowling seldom began with the arrival of the reports. In the covers of the inner area, the sound was heard immediately before the disturbance of the pheasants was noticed. In the outer area, the pheasants had the start by several seconds as a rule. Moreover, at not a few places in the silent zone and in regions far beyond the sound-areas, and just about the times when sound-waves might have reached them, pheasants flew from their perches in alarm.

The inference that they possess keener powers of hearing than human beings is not unnatural. But there is no evidence for such a conclusion. The little evidence there is on the subject tends the other way, for the deep sound that accompanies earthquakes is audible to man far beyond the limits of the pheasant's hearing, if, indeed, the pheasant's ear responds at all to such deep sounds. The inaudible air-waves, however, might affect them otherwise, if only indirectly by the movements of the trees on which the birds were roosting. Close to the boundary of the inner area, at Ascot ($31\frac{1}{2}$ miles) and Windsor (28 miles), the swishing of tree-tops was noticed by observers in the open air. Movements so considerable would be represented by at least a sudden quivering of branches in the outer area; and this would be sufficient to startle pheasants from their perches. There can be little doubt, I think, that the disturbance of pheasants, like the shaking of windows, was but a transitory effect of the passage of the air-waves.


It has been already mentioned that both window-shaking and pheasant-crowing were not confined to the sound-areas. They were observed to some distance outside both areas. At sixteen places within the silent zone, the same effects were witnessed; and it is important to notice that nine of these places are situated in the narrow portion at the western end of the silent zone.

I will now state very briefly the bearing of these and other observations on the origin of the silent zone. There are, of course, features of which no explanation can be offered, our knowledge of the atmospheric conditions being defective. We know, for instance, nothing about the direction and velocity of the wind in the upper atmosphere. The sky was overcast at the time; and pilot balloons could not be seen above two or three thousand feet. On the surface of the ground, however, the direction of the wind in the eastern parts of the areas was usually from the north-east, but at a few places from the east. From the movements of the clouds in the lower atmosphere, the wind there appears to have travelled from the same directions. In the east of Norfolk, the wind was rather strong, but it died down towards the central portion of the district; and, in the

west of both sound-areas and of the silent zone, the air as a rule was almost still.

It is well known that sounds carry but a short distance against the wind. The reason is that, for some distance above the ground, the velocity of the wind increases with the height. Taking the velocity of sound at 1100 feet per second, and that of the wind at ten feet per second near the surface and twenty feet per second at a height of eight feet, it is clear that the velocity of the sound-wave against the wind would be 1090 feet per second at the surface and 1080 feet per second at eight feet above the ground. The effect of this difference on the portion of the wave-front which is vertical at any moment is shown in the figure below. The slanting lines represent the positions of the wave-front at successive equal intervals of time. The result is evidently an upward tilting of the wave-front; and, as sound-waves always travel in a direction perpendicular to their front, it follows that the sound-waves in the direction against the wind take an upward course. The sound-vibrations in that direction thus become inaudible not so much from any enfeeblement in the vibrations as to their being lifted over the heads of observers on the surface of the ground.

DIRECTION OF SOUND.



DIRECTION OF WIND.

As we have seen, the intensity of the sound in the inner area decreased rapidly outwards, showing that the sound-waves soon began to leave the ground. The inaudible air-waves also rose, but to a less extent, for they remained strong, even to the limits of the sound-area. Having once risen well above the ground, sound-waves and air-waves then continued their journey over the silent zone, the sound-waves taking the higher course. This seems evident, for the sound was rarely, perhaps not more than once, heard in the silent zone,

while the air-waves, diverging downwards, shook windows and startled pheasants at several places within it. What heights the wave-paths attained we do not know, but they must have been least at the western end of the silent zone. For there the sound-waves returned to earth after their shortest aërial journey and the air-waves manifested their principal effects.

Several interesting problems must remain unsolved owing to our ignorance of the essential atmospheric conditions. The reason why the sound-waves and air-waves came back to the ground in the outer area can only be surmised. There was probably some change in the direction or the velocity of the wind at a height of not more than a few thousand feet. Nor is it easy to explain why the inner sound-area was so abruptly limited towards the south, and so distorted in the directions of Canterbury and Northampton. The repetition of the reports in the outer area is another feature worthy of attention. It is easy to say that the sound-waves split up and crossed the silent zone by different paths, less easy to explain what made them take their several ways.

For the solutions of these problems we must look to future investigations made in happier times. But many of the difficulties which attend such enquiries will remain. They are independent of official reticence. None can forecast an explosion nor provide us with a complete knowledge of the atmospheric structure at the moment when it shall occur. The best that we can do is to collect the facts when they present themselves, and thus provide the mathematical physicist with materials for the complete solution which he may some day give us.

CHARLES DAVISON.

Art. 4.—PRICES AS AFFECTED BY CURRENCY INFLATION.

ALTHOUGH the enormous increases in the cost of living since the autumn of 1914 have been tabulated by the Board of Trade, debated in the House of Commons, and discussed in the Press, very few serious attempts have been made to discover whether the upward movement of prices is entirely due to unavoidable causes, or whether some part of it is attributable to circumstances which it is within our power to ameliorate. The price of food is the concern of every man and woman in the country; and it is, of all subjects of pressing importance, the one which the people might themselves most easily probe to the roots. Discussions on the subject have, however, generally been based on the assumption that high prices are either absolutely unavoidable or are, at the best, only capable of such mitigation as might result from 'profiteers' being compelled to forgo a portion of their extra gains. Probably this neglect of an important subject is due in part to the fact that some of the more serious evils of high prices are mitigated in consequence of unemployment having virtually ceased to exist, and of wages having risen considerably, even if not in the same proportion as the cost of living.

In the course of the discussions which have taken place, the obvious reasons for prices rising have been fully explained. The most notable of these are restriction of production, caused by the withdrawal of great numbers of men for active service and for munition work; the necessity of feeding and clothing the fighting forces on a scale more liberal than that to which the men had, on the average, been accustomed in civil life; the narrowing of markets as a result of sources of supply being cut off; and the enormously increased difficulties of transport, particularly by sea. To these may be added the opportunities of effecting 'corners' in various classes of goods, which dislocation of trade has made possible, and also increased consumption on the part of the by no means insignificant number of civilians who have benefited financially by the war. These are the ostensible causes of high prices. They have always operated in the past when war has been

waged on a considerable scale; and, just as the present colossal struggle transcends all previous wars in magnitude and intensity, so might the effects on prices of the factors named be expected to transcend the effects of the same factors on prices during other wars. But this phenomenon need not necessarily blind us to the fact that other very powerful influences may be at work. The late President of the Board of Trade was clearly not satisfied that the ostensible reasons were a sufficient explanation of the upward movement of prices. 'The currency of the world was,' he said, 'inflated, and values were not now what they appeared to be.'

Although sovereigns and half-sovereigns have now practically been superseded in circulation by Treasury notes, our currency still remains on a gold basis, as also do the currencies of all the belligerents—of nearly the whole world in fact. It is an axiom of Political Economy that the price of anything is its value in relation to money. That being the case, a general rise in prices simply means that the value of money has decreased in relation to the value of all other articles. According to Adam Smith,

'gold and silver, like every other commodity, vary in their value; are sometimes cheaper and sometimes dearer, sometimes of easier and sometimes of more difficult purchase. The quantity of labour which any particular quantity of them can purchase or command, or the quantity of other goods which it will exchange for, depends always upon the fertility or barrenness of the mines which happen to be known about the time when such exchanges are made.'

Cairnes, writing in 1859, argued the point more fully in his 'Essay towards a solution of the gold question.' He explained the consequences which would ensue from the increased supply of gold then being poured into the world from the mines of Australia and California, on the assumption that all other things remained the same. The consequences which he feared were not, however, realised, because 'all other things' did not remain the same. Expanding trade throughout the world necessitated largely increased currencies; and, commencing with Germany in 1872, followed a year later by the United States, several countries of first-class importance

changed their standards from silver to gold. For these two reasons, vast quantities of the more precious metal were required for coinage; and the anticipated surplus resulting from mining activity in California and Australia not only failed to materialise, but the output of the mines was actually insufficient to meet the world's growing demand for gold. Consequently, the general tendency was for prices to fall until 1896, when the output from the Transvaal turned the scale in the other direction. Since then prices have, in the main, always moved upwards. Bagehot, who was perhaps the most illuminating of all writers on currency, was very emphatic. 'Money,' he declared, 'is a commodity subject to great fluctuations of value caused by a slight excess or deficiency of quantity.'

A very great increase in what Adam Smith rather quaintly called 'the fertility of existing gold mines' would, according to that writer, inevitably result in the cheapening of gold, and, therefore, in a general rise of prices. It is perfectly certain that there has been no great increase in the 'fertility' of the gold mines since the autumn of 1914; but it is equally certain that there has been, since then, an output of gold substitutes vastly exceeding in nominal value the wildest dreams of the possibilities of mineral production. By force of law, these gold substitutes, in the shape of British, Russian, French, Italian, and German paper money, rank in the countries of issue on the same footing as gold, and have had almost exactly the same effect on prices as the introduction into the currencies of the world of an equivalent amount of gold. Since the autumn of 1914, paper money in excess of the gold held in reserve for it has been issued by the belligerent States to the extent of over 1,500,000,000*l.* The gold won from nature during the last 500 years is estimated to be slightly less than 3,600,000,000*l.*, of which all but 700,000,000*l.* has been produced since 1850. Actual gold coin now in existence could not possibly exceed 2,000,000,000*l.*, so that the effect of the paper money recently brought into circulation has been to increase the gold currency of the world by something like 75 per cent. During the last thirty-three years the Rand has produced gold to the extent of 515,000,000*l.*, or very little more than the

nominal value of one-third of the gold substitutes placed on the world's markets since August 1914. In the light of these figures no investigation of the causes of existing high prices can be of much value if so important a factor as the output of paper money be ignored.

Prices were at their lowest in 1896. By that time Germany and the United States had completed the conversion of their standards from silver to gold; and the fresh supplies of the more precious metal which they required had become normal. Austria and India had begun, in 1892 and 1894 respectively, an active demand for gold for conversion purposes; but after 1896 that demand very considerably decreased, and, from the same year, the output of the Transvaal mines began to grow rapidly. This combination of circumstances gives us a unique opportunity of testing by the historical method the theory of Adam Smith, Cairnes, and Bagehot, that prices will rise if the supply of gold increases at a more rapid rate than trade in general. I append tables showing the world's output of gold and the index numbers of prices in the United Kingdom from the year 1896. The latter is taken from returns published by the Board of Trade. It will be seen that from 1896 to 1914 there was a fairly steady and, in the aggregate, a considerable rise in general prices.

OUTPUT OF GOLD.

Year.	Value in pounds sterling.	Year.	Value in pounds sterling.
1896	43,411,000	1906	85,342,000
1897	49,059,000	1907	84,949,000
1898	59,423,000	1908	91,156,000
1899	65,066,000	1909	94,254,000
1900	52,621,000	1910	93,222,000
1901	54,428,090	1911	95,738,000
1902	61,260,000	1912	93,227,000
1903	65,895,000	1913	97,000,000
1904	69,818,000	1914	96,000,000
1905	75,927,000		

INDEX NUMBERS (BASED ON THE WHOLESALE PRICE OF COMMODITIES).

Year.	Index Numbers.	Year.	Index Numbers.
1896	61	1907	79
1897	62	1908	78
1898	64	1909	79
1899	68	1910	81
1900	75	1911	82
1901	70	1912	85
1902	69	1913	85
1903	70	1914	85
1904	72	1915	108
1905	72	1916	136
1906	77		

So far, we have not considered rapidity of circulation. It is obvious, however, that if, during any given period, a sovereign changes hands a dozen times it performs twelve times as much work as another which only changes hands once. There is also the question of credit. It is well known, not only that modern trade is conducted to a far greater extent on a credit than on a cash basis, but also that credit documents can be, and are in fact, created to such an extent that they overwhelmingly exceed in amount the total money issued in the form of coin and notes. Because of the growth and development of the modern banking system, these two factors have acquired enormous importance since the middle of last century. So great is the capacity of banks to create credit that, for the last fifty years at least, writers on Political Economy have tacitly assumed that the amount of the currency has had very little effect upon prices, since it is nothing but a relatively small part of a circulating medium which is principally composed of credit documents. Acceptance of this view has probably led us, and not only us but our Allies and enemies also, to view without apprehension the enormous masses of practically inconvertible paper money which have recently been placed on the markets. It has also blinded us to the fact that some at least of the increase of prices from which we are suffering is due to currency inflation.

Few people nowadays desire to keep in their own pockets more money than is required for immediate needs; and all shopkeepers of any importance have banking accounts into which they pay surplus cash received from day to day. The result is that the great bulk of a nation's money is stored in the banks. The primary object of bankers can be summed up in a few words: it is to borrow money from the public and to lend it out again at a higher rate of interest. No one wants to borrow money from a banker except with the object of paying it to some one else; and, when the borrower pays it away, the receiver promptly places it in his own bank. It may not be the same bank as the one which advanced the loan to the original borrower, but, whether it is or not, the net result is that the aggregate amount of cash actually held by banks remains

the same; the only difference is that bankers' assets and liabilities have both been increased by the amount of the loan. And the position is the same if the Government is the borrower. At the last meeting of the shareholders of the London City and Midland Bank, the Chairman, Sir Edward Holden, made this point very clear. His remarks had reference to the operations by which money subscribed for the great War Loan came back into circulation; but they apply with equal relevance to the operations by which banks create credit again and again on the basis of the same stock of coin or notes. Sir Edward asked his audience to think of the revolution of a wheel.

The banks (he said) place in the wheel the payments they make for those customers who have subscribed for the loans; the wheel carries these payments to the credit of the Government with the Bank of England; and the subscribers receive their securities. The Government then place in the wheel cheques in payment for commodities received and services rendered, for conveyance to their creditors, and the creditors then use the wheel to carry their cheques to the credit of their accounts with their banks which reestablishes the banks' reserves.

The wheel is then in position for a fresh revolution. At the end of each circuit the banks hold the same amount of cash as at the commencement; the only difference in their position is that there is an increase in the amount which one group of their customers owe to them and an equivalent increase in the amount which they owe to another group of their customers. Now, the people who have borrowed from the banks have to pay a higher rate of interest than the banks have to pay to the people from whom they have borrowed. Each revolution of the wheel means, therefore, a definite profit to the banks; and, since the great aim and object of bankers is to earn the highest possible profits for their shareholders, it follows that it is to their interest to keep the wheel revolving quickly.

But we have seen that, although at the end of each circuit the cash in hand remains substantially unchanged, the liabilities of the banks have increased. It is true that their customers' indebtedness to them has also gone up; but that indebtedness is not, as a rule, immediately

realisable, while the money which the banks owe may be demanded at any time. The greatest asset which bankers have is the confidence of the public. There must never be any suspicion that banks will not be able to meet all reasonable demands made upon them for cash. It is absolutely essential, therefore, that the cash in hand shall never bear a very low percentage to the amount of the liabilities. Every revolution of Sir Edward Holden's wheel increases the profit of the banks, but it also lowers the percentage of cash reserves to liabilities. Consequently bankers try to make the wheel revolve as nearly as possible the greatest number of times that it can be made to revolve without reducing the percentage of cash to liabilities below the figure which experience has taught them to be necessary to ensure financial safety. It appears, therefore, that upon the basis of any definite sum in hard cash or notes is raised a structure of credit which may grow considerably, but to the growth of which there is nevertheless a clearly marked limit.

If the wheel of credit revolves very slowly, the percentage of the banks' reserves to their liabilities is extremely high. On the other hand, the amount which they have borrowed from some of their customers at a relatively low rate of interest and lent out to others at a relatively high rate is small. In such circumstances the profits of banks must be low. They might not even be sufficient to pay working expenses; and, in that case, banking would cease to be a profitable business. The wheel must, therefore, be made to revolve with at least sufficient speed to enable banking business to be conducted at a profit; and from this it follows that any definite amount of cash or notes in the hands of bankers must be the basis of a mass of credit of which the lower limit of size is clearly marked—just as the upper limit is clearly marked.

Bankers always keep a watchful eye on their liabilities, i.e. the credits which they create, in relation to their cash reserves. There is a high level of credit beyond which they dare not pass without jeopardising their capacity to meet all reasonable demands on them, and a low level the passing of which would mean having to conduct their business at a loss. Since the great bulk of a country's money finds its way to the banks, every

addition to or diminution of the national supply immediately makes itself felt by an increase or decrease of the banks' cash reserves. Every alteration of the quantity of gold or notes placed in circulation affects those reserves and, therefore, moves upwards or downwards the limits within which credit can be created.

Prof. Alfred Marshall has written :

'Human wants and desires are countless in number and very various in kind. . . . The uncivilized man, indeed, has not many more than the brute animal; but every step in his progress upwards increases the variety of his needs, together with the variety in his methods of satisfying them. . . . The price which people will be willing to pay for anything they want will be governed by their desire to have it, together with the amount they can afford to spend on it.'*

Demand is indeterminate so long as nothing is said about price. Mere desire of possession, without power of purchase, is 'ineffective' demand; but, when the desire of possession is coupled with capacity to buy, the demand at once becomes 'effective.' Millionaires may perhaps be in a position to gratify all their wants and desires in so far as achievement can be effected by pecuniary expenditure; but in front of the great mass of the people of all races is spread an alluring vista of desirable objects which they would certainly acquire for themselves if only they could obtain possession of the necessary money. They would be willing, in varying degrees according to individual temperament, to discount the future if only they could get present possession. Consequently, every increase of spending capacity is inevitably transformed into an equivalent increase of effective demand, and national effective demand extends *pari passu* with national purchasing power.

If fresh currency be brought into circulation, it immediately adds to the cash reserves of bankers. We must disabuse our minds of any idea that banks are philanthropic institutions. They exist with the avowed object of earning the largest possible profits for their shareholders; and in order to do that they must always endeavour to keep the mass of their credit creations at the highest possible point consistent with their own

* 'Principles of Economics,' vol. i, pp. 86, 349.

financial stability. The methods they adopt are immaterial to the argument. Possibly customers may be allowed more liberal advances on the securities they wish to pawn; perhaps the rate of interest may be lowered. The method chosen will be the one which will most commend itself at the time to a body of acute business men. But, whatever method be adopted, the result will be to apply to the conversion of ineffective into effective demand all the purchasing power in the shape of the credit which the banks know from experience they can safely build up on the currency. Prices depend upon a nice adjustment of supply and demand. But, if demand increases as a result of the introduction of fresh money, equilibrium must be disturbed unless there is a corresponding increase of the supply of everything for which money is exchanged. As national wealth cannot be created by the wave of a magician's wand, supply cannot keep pace with demand, and prices have to readjust themselves on the basis of an increased demand and a not correspondingly increased supply. Nothing but the withdrawal of a portion of the currency could possibly prevent prices from going up.

But, it may be pointed out, an increase of demand encourages trade and stimulates supply; and the more powerful the stimulus, the sooner supply will overtake demand and force prices downwards again. Then, to continue the argument, prices will be restored to their former level while everybody will have more money: trade will be more active, and the standard of living will be raised. This is an extreme but by no means uncommon illustration of an argument from the particular to the general. The argument will not bear scrutiny. If the demand for any one group of products exceeds supply, there is certainly an immediate tendency for capital and labour to be diverted to the industry which offers opportunities of earning abnormal profits; and the competition which results from that diversion of capital and labour sets in operation forces which at once tend to bring down prices to the old level. At any given time, however, the demand for products is spread over all industries in that proportion which the community, by its way of spending its money, has decided to be best adapted to its requirements; and, if there be a general

increase of demand, due to enhanced spending capacity, the community will distribute that increase over all industries in very nearly the same proportion as it had distributed its original demand. As a result, prices everywhere will increase. And, the rise being general and uniform in all trades, there is no object in transferring capital and labour from one industry to another—the motive power which, as we have already seen, causes prices to react in a particular trade after a rise peculiar to that trade alone. On the contrary, industry pursues the same course as before.

The only real effect is a general alteration of the relative status of the different classes of the community. People with fixed incomes, e.g. annuitants, always suffer. Employers may add considerably to their profits by refusing for a time to increase their workmen's wages. On the other hand, their profits may be less than before if their workmen are strong enough to get a larger increase of pay than circumstances warrant. National wealth remains the same, but it is distributed in a different manner; and in the redistribution the strongest and best organised members of the community always manage to filch something from their weaker neighbours. A new and extremely serious evil arises if, as at present, high prices are experienced during a period when a nation's expenditure is greatly in excess of its income. Each upward movement of prices increases the cost of carrying on the war, accelerates the creation of debt, and magnifies the burden which posterity will have to bear. And, in the ordinary course of events, the debt will not be repaid until the value of money has again risen to something like its old normal relation to the values of all other things. We are, therefore, now being forced to borrow when money is of relatively small value, with the knowledge that we shall have to repay it when it has become a much more valuable commodity.

A great deal has been written about the theory of value. John Stuart Mill, who developed it on the lines at present accepted by orthodox economists, was so satisfied with his work, that he declared that, whatever else in Political Economy was inconstant, the theory of value at any rate was definitely settled for all time. He asserted that the price of every article is determined by

supply and demand, and that, if the price of any particular article rose owing to increased demand, there was an immediate tendency for supply to overtake demand, and, therefore, for the price to go down again. The theory was developed and put into more scientific order by Marshall. Both Mill and Marshall argued, however, as though money was a non-variable. It is, on the contrary, liable to tremendous fluctuations; and, although Mill's theory is accurate as regards the proportionate level which the value of any one class of goods, except money, bears to other classes, the value of all goods in relation to money changes with each variation of the amount of the currency and the structure of credit raised upon it. Mill's theory is, in fact, merely a subsidiary one. It does not explain the great movements of price; all that it does is to explain how the values of different articles, except money, tend to maintain the same proportion to one another both before and after great changes in the general level of prices have taken place.

Competition among banks is keen, and this leads to uniformity of method. An examination of the accounts of any of the leading banks will show that the credits created generally amount to from three to four times the total of the cash actually in hand. That is to say, through the agency of the banks, a given amount of cash is the basis of a structure of credit approximately three and a half times as great as itself. Any increase of the currency automatically results in the creation of fresh credit to the amount of three and a half times that of the new currency. Money is immediately cheapened in relation to other articles, and prices go up. Seeing that the world's currencies have recently been swollen to the extent of 75 per cent. by the issue of paper money, a very considerable rise in prices from that cause alone must have occurred, unless the issue of the new money coincided with a drastic curtailment of credit. At the commencement of the war, credit did of course contract. Banks were compelled to keep in hand a much larger amount of cash in proportion to their liabilities than formerly. This sudden and stringent curtailment of credit rendered new currency necessary if business was to be carried on satisfactorily. The only course open was to issue paper money; and the plan was immediately

adopted by all the belligerent States. As, however, public confidence was restored, credit began to grow again; and its new growth was not on the basis of the previous gold currencies, but on the basis of currencies inflated by masses of paper money and swelling from time to time by the issue of successive batches of similar paper money.

It is sometimes argued that, even if the effects of Bank credit upon prices can be gauged almost as accurately as the effects of the actual currency itself, there still remain several forms of credit which are subject to no law. Book debts, promissory notes and bills of exchange are cited as examples. The argument is, however, entirely fallacious. Such forms of credit are merely vehicles for transferring the immediate control of money from one person to another. They are, in fact, nothing more than an extension of the system of paying by cheque. If I pay an account by cheque, all that I do is to transfer to the payee the control of money which a bank is holding for me. The cheque adds nothing to the currency; it merely saves me the trouble of fetching notes from a bank and taking them to my creditor. If I buy goods on credit, the shopkeeper may replace them in his stock by means of his own reserve of money; in which case he virtually transfers from himself to me the immediate control of the money represented by the goods. If, however, he has no reserve funds on which he can draw in order to replace the goods, he either borrows from a wholesale dealer by getting other goods on credit, or raises a loan from a bank on the security of the book-debt which I have been the means of creating. Similarly, the wholesale dealer either replenishes his stock of goods through the agency of his own reserve of money or by borrowing from his banker. Thus the inevitable effect is that, at one of the stages of the transaction, the control of money is transferred from some one else to me, or a Bank credit is raised.

And, as we have already seen, the amount of the Bank credits which it is possible to create varies with the amount of the currency. No shopkeeper will sell me goods on credit unless he believes that I will pay for them at some agreed or tacitly understood date. Virtually, therefore, I give him an unwritten and undated

promissory note or bill of exchange. If the transaction be a large one, the shopkeeper will proceed on more methodical and more business-like lines. He will want his promissory note or bill of exchange in writing, and he will want the date at which payment is to be made exactly stated. Having secured the document, the shopkeeper will follow almost precisely the same course as in the previous case. He may himself discount the bill by drawing on his own reserve of money; he may discount it at a bank; or he may replenish his stock of goods by buying on credit from a wholesale dealer. In any case the inevitable effect is, as before, that either the control of money passes from a person who had no immediate use for it to another who wants it at once, or a bank credit is raised.

When paper money is issued against a gold reserve, no impression whatever is made upon the currency. An instance of this is afforded by Bank of England notes. Under the Bank Charter Act 18,450,000*l.* worth of notes can be issued without reserve, but, in respect of all notes in excess of that amount, an equivalent value of gold must be withdrawn from circulation. Another instance is that portion of the issue of Treasury notes—about one-fifth of the whole—for the redemption of which the Government has earmarked gold coin. Treasury notes to the value of over 120,000,000*l.* have, however, been issued without any gold backing whatever. They are, therefore, a real addition to the currency, and they are, for the present at any rate, inconvertible in fact if not in name. So long as a country retains its commerce with the rest of the world, the issue of inconvertible paper is bound to have world-wide effects on prices. Naturally these effects are most marked at home; but they spread in diminishing degrees of intensity, just as a stone thrown into a pool of water creates a disturbance which in a modified form ultimately extends to opposite edges of the pool.

A mass of inconvertible paper introduced into the English currency increases bank reserves, thence credit, and so purchasing power. That purchasing power is translated into demand, and its application in the markets forces prices up. At once it becomes more and more difficult for English manufacturers to produce goods at

prices which will command a sale abroad; and exports decline. On the other hand, the higher prices ruling in England stimulate the sale here of foreign-made goods; and imports increase. An adverse balance of trade accumulates against England; English bills of exchange fall to a discount, and foreign bills rise to a premium. Gold has to be exported. If no further batches of paper money were placed on the market, the withdrawal of this gold would lower prices; on the other hand, it raises them in the countries to which it is sent. The movement of gold has, therefore, a twofold effect: by tending to lower prices here and by increasing them in the countries to which the gold is sent, it stimulates exports from, and checks imports into, England.

All the Allied countries in Europe have placed on the market successive batches of inconvertible paper money, which aggregate considerably over 1,000,000,000*l.* Each issue of paper money has forced up prices in the country of issue. An adverse trade balance has followed. In order to meet it, gold has been exported in large quantities to America and the neutral countries where, as a direct consequence, general prices also rose. That prices did not fall in the countries from which the gold was exported is attributable to the fact that fresh paper money was constantly being issued in more than sufficient quantities to replace the exported metal, so that, despite successive withdrawals of gold, there was still a constant tendency towards currency inflation. In consequence of this, prices are abnormally high everywhere. The currencies of all nations are glutted, those of America and the neutral nations with gold, and those of the belligerent nations with paper money.

The United States alone now holds considerably over one-fourth of the gold supply of the whole world. In the period from Aug. 1, 1914 to Oct. 1, 1916, she increased her stock by 150,000,000*l.*, i.e. by 40 per cent. Russia has issued more 'war' paper money than any other nation; and restriction of facilities for transporting goods is not, therefore, the whole explanation of the exchange difficulties with which Russia has had to contend. In normal times it takes 9½ roubles to pay a debt of 1*l.* in London; in January of this year no less than 17 roubles were required. Since Germany and Austria

are cut off from foreign trade, issues of inconvertible paper by those States have very little effect on the world's prices. On the other hand, Germany and Austria cannot export gold in bulk; and, in their cases, the constant tendency towards equilibrium of price all the world over is non-existent. Our enemies have, therefore, to bear the whole brunt of the consequences of their paper issues. If prices are higher in Germany and Austria than anywhere else, one of the principal reasons is that the currencies of those countries have been inflated to a greater extent by German and Austrian notes than the combined currencies of the Allied and neutral States have been inflated by the paper money issued by the Allied countries.

The problem of prices is twofold. On the one hand there is a marked diminution in the supply of food and all kinds of materials in consequence of military requirements and restriction of output; and, on the other hand, there is an increase of demand due to currency inflation. Following the German lead, serious attempts are now being made in England to control supply; and the organisations set up by the Government have the matter well in hand. Limitation of demand is, however, just as necessary as, and ought not to be more difficult of accomplishment than, control of supply. The gradual withdrawal of the 120,000,000*l.* worth of Treasury notes issued in excess of the 28,500,000*l.* for which the Government holds a reserve of gold is the first step to be taken. But, since the currencies of the world act and react on one another in the most intimate manner, and since Treasury notes form less than one-eighth of the whole of the inconvertible paper money issued by the Allies, not even the withdrawal of the whole of the 120,000,000*l.* worth of Treasury notes would be sufficient. It is essential that our Allies—particularly Russia, who has issued inconvertible paper money to the extent of about 600,000,000*l.*—should cooperate. And, even though we secure the full cooperation of all our Allies, we must not allow our hopes to be raised too high. Reduction of note issues by all the Allies would most certainly have excellent results. Demand would be reduced and prices would fall; but the problem of supply would remain untouched. There are not now goods enough to go

round; and the supply tends to become smaller. Nevertheless the supply is as nearly at its maximum as the circumstances of the labour market admit; if it is not, that is a matter for the Board of Agriculture, the Food Control Department, and the other organisations set up by the Government to attend to. The point that I wish to emphasise is that every increase of the currency augments spending capacity. By doing so, it stretches an elastic demand and gives an upward pull to prices, to which there is no check because supply is extremely inelastic. Conversely, every reduction of the currency would diminish spending capacity, slacken an elastic demand and allow prices to drop, supply remaining in its former rigid condition.

The immense quantity of additional gold imported by the United States during the war is by no means an unmixed blessing to that country. The cost-of-living problem has assumed alarming proportions there, as well as in Europe; and it is possible that America might be willing to relinquish part of her gold if she were satisfied that a reduction of the cost of living would follow. A loan of 100,000,000*l.* *paid in gold* to the Allies would substantially reduce America's currency and lower general prices. On the introduction of this gold into Europe it would, of course, be necessary to cancel a more than equivalent amount of paper money, in order that the desired object of reducing the currency and lowering prices in Europe also might be achieved. The adoption of such a measure would greatly benefit the general public both in Europe and in America; and, as the cost of all materials for carrying on the war would be reduced, the rate at which debt is being accumulated would be appreciably checked.

WALTER F. FORD.

Art. 5.—SOME ECONOMIC LESSONS OF THE WAR.

ABOUT three-quarters of a century ago, a fierce campaign was conducted by the liberal and idealistic French press of that period against a Minister who, in addressing a meeting of electors, summed up his whole political platform in the words: 'Work! Save! Get rich!' I freely admit that, in normal times, so materialistic a policy responds but poorly to the idealism which lies at the heart of all free peoples. But the times in which we live are not normal, and it will be long before they become so. For my part, I must say plainly, even at the risk of incurring the same opprobrium as did M. Guizot, that, at the present moment and at the moment when peace is re-established, there can be no duty more imperative, no duty more sacred, than that of adding to the material prosperity of one's country.

Particularly do we feel this in France. It is our duty towards the families who mourn such irreparable losses, to lead them back to the cares and occupations of everyday life and to preparation for the future which awaits our country. It is our duty to the survivors of those armies to whom we owe so much, to find immediate employment for them on their return to civil life. It is a duty each one of us owes to his country, to place her, as soon as possible, in a position to pay off the heavy debts which have been contracted for the prosecution of the war. Finally, it is laid upon us as a moral obligation to rally the hearts and minds of all to the one purpose in pursuit of which it will be possible to secure a continuance of that national unity which has been evoked by the war.

The difficulties in our path will be numerous and formidable. One need be neither economist nor financier to understand how deep and lasting must be the after-effects of such an upheaval as that in which we share to-day. Can we believe that the production of wealth will be recommenced to-morrow under the same conditions as in July 1914? We, in France, know only too well that it cannot. The industries of our invaded territories and of Belgium have been destroyed; they have been systematically plundered by the enemy. A long time must elapse, vast sums will have to be expended,

before those once prosperous industrial regions can resume their normal activities, again equipped with the machinery of production.

But let us suppose this first part of the task accomplished. We shall still require the raw materials of life and industry before we can begin to manufacture. Let there be no mistake, the war has caused a terrible wastage of such materials; and, if there are some which human activity can replenish almost at will, there are others which must wait upon nature itself, and are necessarily limited in their output. Such are timber, wool and foodstuffs. Thus, in the reestablishment of our industries, we shall be faced by a difficulty in procuring certain raw materials, and especially in procuring them at a reasonable cost. There will be a still further difficulty in regard to the supply of labour.

I do not know—and if I did, I could not divulge—the number of our workmen of all categories who have fallen on the field of honour and have thus been struck permanently off the roll. But in addition to these, who must certainly be counted by hundreds of thousands, there are those who have been wholly or partially disabled, many of whom will be obliged to seek other employment because they have lost an arm or a foot or an eye, and are thereby precluded from the exercise of their former callings. Moreover, those who have not been killed, who have not been disabled, will come back into civil life with a sense of grievance which it will not be easy to dispel. For after all they have endured, after three years of perils and sacrifices, they will have the right to expect special consideration and treatment; yet they will find in the factories, behind the lines, men and even women who, in consequence of the great and pressing requirements of national defence, have become accustomed to earning wages appreciably larger than the average rate earned before the war; and there will undoubtedly be a bitter dispute between Management and Labour as to whether the war rates of wages are to become the minimum of the future scale.

Thus it is certain that producers will have to face heavy disabilities. Nor must consumers imagine that the peace will bring back the conditions which they enjoyed before the war. In the first place the incomes

of many among them will be reduced, partly because the concerns in which their money is invested have suffered by the protraction of hostilities, and also because the time will come when the expenses of the war have to be paid; and, as the State possesses no other income than the amount which it deducts by taxation from the incomes of its citizens, it is the bulk of the citizens who will, in fact, pay the expenses of the war, less the proportion—I hope a considerable one—which we shall compel our enemies to pay.

At present the people of France do not feel this burden, for in this respect our policy has differed from that of our Allies. For over two years we were spending millions on millions without the Government demanding a single centime of taxes additional to those paid before the war. Only at the end of 1916 did they at last bring themselves to levy additional taxation, and then only on a very limited scale. But the time will come when the debts contracted, both at home and abroad, must be paid; and it is the French people who will have to pay them. Thus the consumer, with his diminished income, will most certainly not enjoy his former margin of expenditure; neither expenditure on luxuries, nor even savings, will be on the old scale.

Finally, the means of distribution will be profoundly affected. The wastage of shipping—not only in France but in all belligerent countries—is far beyond all that can be done to keep pace with it in repairs and new construction, now that the shipyards are absorbed by naval requirements. The protracted war will leave the mercantile marines of all the belligerents in a state of exhaustion. Freights will therefore remain high. The railways will be in similar case. It is only to be expected that they will raise their rates, for the price of coal and the wages of the workpeople have alike risen to such a level that they will otherwise no longer be able to make ends meet.

Yet another obstacle to the free circulation of wealth will doubtless appear in the shape of heavier and more extensive tariffs. Till lately we have been taught that there were free-trade countries and protectionist countries, and that the protectionist countries were placing obstacles in the way of the free exchange of goods by the imposition

of more or less arbitrary fiscal dues. But I have no hesitation in saying that after the war tariffs will be universal. In some cases the States which have taken part in the struggle will look to their tariffs for the means of alleviating the burden of direct taxation. Others will look to them as the means of protecting not only their old-established industries, but all those new industries which have been created during the war and which it is necessary to encourage if we are to realise the universal desire, manifested even in Great Britain, to ensure the economic independence of the Entente Powers as against the Central Empires, as a corollary to the preservation of their political independence against a repetition of the furious and barbarous attack of which they have been the victims.

It follows from all these considerations that we shall find ourselves face to face with a new world, a world in which the economic interests of the producer, of the distributor, of the consumer will be completely dislocated, will have passed beyond the range of the habits, the formulas, the systems to which we have been accustomed. They will be in a state of anarchy; and anarchy of interests is war.

How, then, shall we meet the challenge of this new world? What are the essential conditions of success in the struggle which lies before us? A big volume would be needed even to suggest solutions of all the problems with which we are faced at this moment. The economic question, as it presents itself to-day, touches every phase of national life. It touches alike the educational system and civil legislation, the fiscal system and the relations of capital and labour. All that I can do here is to attempt to disentangle two or three fundamental ideas, two or three guiding principles which must be grasped in good time if we are to solve the problems presented to us. These principles are of two kinds: those which affect the eventual treaty of peace, and those which relate to internal reforms. I will deal first with those which relate to the peace. But in order to understand rightly what manner of peace is required, we must first endeavour to understand what the war itself is.

If we can but rid our minds of all the side-issues

raised by many dissertations and controversies regarding the war, we shall, I think, recognise that never has there been a struggle more essentially economic, more exclusively commercial and industrial, than that in which we are participating to-day. It was economic in its origins, it has been economic in its methods, it is economic in its aims and ends.

Its origins! It needs, in truth, all the light-heartedness and optimism with which—both in France and in Great Britain—we are wont to regard the progress of events, to account for our not having listened in good time to the warnings that came to us from Germany herself. It was in 1906 that Prince Bülow, the predecessor of the present Chancellor, stated openly in the Reichstag that Germany's need of economic expansion was such as made war, a general war, probable and imminent. And whoever takes the trouble to consider what the economic development of Germany has been for the last thirty or forty years will easily see this for himself. Seized by an amazing attack of megalomania, such as we Frenchmen have never known even on the morrow of our greatest and most brilliant victories, and favoured, as we shall see presently, by certain exceptional elements of production, Germany launched out upon a system of over-production, which rendered new outlets, ever greater and more far-reaching, indispensable to the very existence of her industries and commerce.

It was precisely at the beginning of this century that certain States which had hitherto shown themselves indifferent to the progress of German power—I refer to economic power—came to the conclusion that this attitude of unconcern would end by endangering their own power, their own industry and commerce. It was then, for instance, that King Edward and certain British statesmen began definitely to remark the insidious and tenacious economic penetration of the world markets in general, and the British market in particular, by Germany. In the first years of the twentieth century, at the very moment when the expansion of German production called for larger and still larger outlets, countries which had hitherto stood by indifferent began to pull themselves together and try to stem the invasion of German products, to such an extent that

Germany was seized with the fear that her whole economic system might go down in bankruptcy. At the same time she had many reasons to fear an internal crisis; for, while her commerce was expanding in an unprecedented manner, the cost of living had increased by twice the extent that wages had risen. Thus, after ten years of such prosperity, the working classes were actually less well off than before, less able to procure the standard of life which they enjoyed at the beginning. Germany was, therefore, faced with the menace of an internal crisis at the very time when the restriction of her exports threatened to close down her commercial outlets. For Germany, war was a necessity, an inevitable development of her situation. We know in what circumstances it was declared.

So much for the origins of the war. Let us now turn to the means employed, and, in so doing, let us leave on one side all those military events which stir our blood or excite our hatred and confine ourselves to the stern economic reality of what has taken place.

What did Germany do in the early weeks of the war? She seized the most productive regions of Flanders, of Belgium, and of North-Eastern France; she took possession of an economic pawn. Why? For two reasons. First, she knew very well that, once she was in possession of this pawn, France would run the risk of remaining unarmed, of finding herself unable to manufacture the munitions necessary for a continuance of the struggle. Secondly, she desired to destroy systematically all the instruments of production, both in French Flanders and in Belgium, so that, when peace was reestablished, the French people would be compelled, in the absence of those instruments, to permit the free import of German products. No secret has been made of this intention. It was openly proclaimed by the German economic associations, in their manifesto of May 20, 1915.

And what have the Allies been able to oppose to this policy which is so clearly set forth by the German manifesto and by the progress of military events? One thing alone, up to the present, seems to have had a certain effect in Germany—the blockade. Its effect is not yet complete, it is not yet decisive, but every day it grows

in significance. The Continental Blockade, of which Napoleon dreamed as a weapon against Great Britain, is now being employed by Great Britain herself against the enemy of the whole Continent, the enemy of the civilised world.

So much for the methods of the war; we have yet to consider its aims. Let us see what the Germans themselves say on this point. On May 20, 1915, when Germany could still consider herself mistress of the military situation, the six great German associations of manufacturers, agriculturists and merchants presented to the Chancellor a memorandum in which they laid down the ends to be pursued in the present war—we should say rather, the objects for which it was waged. I will quote literally what they say with regard to the North-East of France and French Flanders:

‘All the means of economic power existing upon these territories, the larger and smaller properties alike, will pass into German hands. France will receive the proprietors and indemnify them . . .’

with what is left to her! This, then, is the object of the war. But it may be contended that this idea appeals only to the large employers, the speculators, the financiers, the merchants. Not in the least! If you read the German socialist papers, you will see that they are as much preoccupied with economic and industrial considerations as the capitalist press. A month or two ago, a German socialist paper, the ‘*Volkszeitung*’ of Mülhausen, was saying—‘Give back Alsace-Lorraine? Never!’ Why? For the sake of principles? On grounds of racial community? Not in the least. But because there are iron and potash mines in Alsace-Lorraine.

We have now seen what are the ideas the enemy themselves put forward as to the origins, the methods and the objects of the war. Well, just as we replied to the enemy’s use of asphyxiating gas by using gas ourselves, we owe it to our country, to the Allies at large, and to our dead to reply to their economic conceptions by a policy of the same kind. There is not space here even to mention all the economic questions which may come

up for consideration in the treaty of peace, but there is one which overshadows all the rest in its magnitude, in its historical origins, in the means which it assures us of subduing our enemy in the future—that is the question of iron and coal. No one who has studied the literature of the subject can fail to realise the imperious necessity that is laid upon us to gain possession of the whole iron mines of Lorraine and, when once we hold them, to make sure of the means of exploiting them ourselves.*

It so happens that the raw materials of metallurgical production have been unevenly distributed by nature on the Continent of Europe, inasmuch as the deposits of coal and those of iron ore are generally at a distance of some hundreds of miles from each other. This circumstance forms an obstacle to cheap production, because the coal has to be carried great distances to the iron, or the iron to the coal. There is one region and one only, that lying between the Moselle and the Rhine, which is provided at the same time with coal and with iron ore—with coal in fair though not extraordinary quantity; with iron in such quantity that the Lorraine basin, including both the French districts and those annexed in 1871, is the reservoir from which, at the present time, the whole Continent of Europe may be said to draw its iron.

In 1795, at the Peace of Basel, on the eve of the 19th century, France possessed both the whole of the iron and the whole of the coal comprised within the upper angle of the Rhine and the Moselle. In 1815, we lost half the coal. In 1871 we lost the whole of the coal and half the iron. If the results of the invasion of 1914 should unfortunately be perpetuated, we should be totally deprived of both coal and iron.

Now, if we look closely at the economic history of Germany during the last few years, we shall see that her military power and her general economic power are alike dependent on her metallurgical resources. The results achieved during the last thirty years by an active government policy, backed by a people who believed in

* For the technical treatment of this subject, see especially Engerand, 'Les Frontières lorraines et la force allemande,' Perrin, 1916; Driault & Scheffer, 'La République et le Rhin, le problème économique,' Tenin, 1916; and Alfassa, 'Le Fer et le Charbon lorrains,' Belin, 1916.

themselves and in their future, have been really extraordinary. In 1880, the German metallurgical output was only one-third that of Great Britain. In 1912, thirty-two years later, the German output exceeded the British by two-thirds. During the same period the United States increased their output by 800 per cent.; Germany increased hers by 600 per cent.; and, if she were to remain in possession of the basin of Briey, America too would be faced by the Germanic peril, for Germany would be incontestably the first metallurgical Power in the world. Before July 31, 1914, she controlled a little less than one-half of the total European output. If she were to retain Belgium and the north-eastern districts of France, she would dispose of two-thirds of the whole.

Of this I am profoundly convinced; if we do not succeed in crushing the metallurgic strength of Germany, we shall not crush the German military power. The attempt to do this by limiting armaments has failed in the past. Napoleon, after Jéna, when he was master of almost the whole of Europe, excepting Great Britain and Russia, imagined that he could keep Prussia quiet by limiting her maximum military force to 40,000 men. He did not foresee—it was perhaps impossible for him to do so—that this very limitation would be the foundation of the military system in Germany out of which the present war has sprung. It was because they were only allowed to maintain a standing force of 40,000 men that the Germans invented the universal short-service system of military training, which has brought under the colours millions of men, and has given them the power to throw into the present struggle such masses of reservists as had never been seen before. Whatever clauses the treaty of peace may contain, whatever safeguards may be provided, all will be in vain unless the claws by which we have been torn are pared; unless, that is to say, the enemy is deprived of the iron mines and, if need be, the coal mines, which have been instrumental in arming the scientific barbarity with which we have had to deal.

It is perfectly true that, in the normal condition of economic equilibrium, products which are complementary to each other, one of which is indispensable to the industrial employment of the other, have a natural tendency to come together, and that political frontiers

impose no insuperable obstacle to this process. This was the case to a marked degree with the minerals of Lorraine and the coal of Rhenish Prussia before the war. The exchanges of mineral products were numerous and important; and there was a certain amount of interchange of capital and directorate between many enterprises. Still, even from this point of view, the ownership of mineral deposits by one or the other of two neighbouring States is no matter of indifference to the political and military security of the State in question. Every one knows that the outbreak of hostilities is always preceded by a period of tension, more or less prolonged, during which administrative measures skilfully designed by the future aggressor may grievously impede, or even suspend altogether, productive activities and consequently preparation for war by the other party. Let me give a single illustration of the part which the political control of mining districts may play in determining military strength. In November 1914, when the Germans were in occupation of the basin of Briey and the industrial regions of the North and East, we in France were deprived of more than three-quarters of our blast-furnaces and consequently of our usual production of steel and iron. If Great Britain had not been able to assure to us the freedom of the seas, we could not have continued the struggle; we must have capitulated through sheer lack of armaments. If these districts were to pass permanently under German control, Germany could deprive us of the material necessary to our security if she contemplated aggression, without firing a shot.

But the question is much wider and more general than this: it is the question whether the duty of the Allies is not to direct their political actions towards such a control of natural agencies as will serve, in the fullest possible measure, the interests of peace and of humanity. We have seen that the almost incredible development of German metallurgical power is the basis alike of the Empire's economic prosperity and its military strength. Not only has it furnished to Germany, with exceptional ease, industrial equipment such as steel rails, structural girders, steel plates for shipbuilding, etc.; not only has it given her, thanks to the policy of 'dumping,' an abundance of heavy cargoes for the mercantile marine even

during periods of slack trade; but it has permitted her to accumulate an enormous mass of war material and munitions which for several months was on the point of giving to the German armies a decisive superiority over the combination of their enemies. To dream either of 'crushing Prussian militarism,' or of defending the Allies against a recurrence of the economic cancer of Central Europe, while leaving in existence the metallurgical situation previous to the war, is the purest folly. If this were done, but few years would elapse before a new world-crisis would break out in circumstances similar to those of August 1914, and with even greater danger to human freedom.

It must not be supposed that this is a purely French conception. Our duty and our interests are clearly set forth by the manifesto of the German Associations, already quoted. This manifesto states in the plainest terms that, if Germany had not taken possession of the mines in Lorraine, she would not have had sufficient metal available for the manufacture of the shells which are being hurled at the Allied armies to-day. It states specifically that since the month of December 1914, 60 to 80 per cent. of the iron and steel employed in the manufacture of these shells has been obtained from mines situated in the geological basin of Lorraine, from Thionville to Briey. And when the authors of this manifesto turn to a consideration of the future and demand that these mines should be left under German domination, this is the reason which they give—that iron and coal give a nation the mastery of the world.

Indeed, we may read in this document an exquisite expression of the touching candour, or rather the extraordinary cynicism, so often to be found in the writings of German professors themselves. The enemy must be weakened economically, say these good souls, because 'we can no longer find any security in treaties which, when opportunity is offered, will be trodden under foot.' What, then, are they to do? They are to make sure of the iron mines. They are to make sure of the coal mines. For here are 'decisive means of political influence,' worth more than 'scraps of paper.' It is not only a case of the actual enemy: 'Neutral industrial States are obliged to obey whichever of the

belligerents can assure their coal supply.' What more is wanted?*

The existence of these designs on the part of our enemies imposes on us Frenchmen and on our Allies the necessity of giving full weight to the same considerations. But it must not, therefore, be imagined that we are secretly nursing the idea of territorial expansion, that we desire to launch out once more upon that policy of conquest which has done us so much harm in the past, when we have allowed ourselves to be misled by dreams of glory and universal domination, only to be rudely awakened in the end. It must not be assumed that we, in our turn, desire to annex, against their will, people to whom French rule would be repugnant. We have no wish to create on our own frontier such a centre of unrest as Alsace-Lorraine has constituted for forty-five years on the flank of the German Empire. What we have in mind is something very different.

It is true that we need iron, and not only we Frenchmen but our Allies. The whole civilised world, which stands behind us in this great struggle, needs iron, in order to provide security against a recurrence of that aggression of which we have been the victims. Equally, we need coal, in order that we may make use of the iron. As has been happily said by M. Driault, 'After having seen what use Germany has made of the iron-mines, it is for this war to restore them to France, in order that France may turn them to better use.' We need coal, then, in order to work the iron ourselves; and, if all that coal is not to be found in the basin of the Sarre, it may perhaps be necessary to fetch it from somewhere else, even from Westphalia. But that does not mean in the least that we should occupy Westphalia and the whole left bank of the Rhine.

There are many eminent scholars in Germany who can always discover, when necessary, some legal colour or historical precedent to justify German acts. Let us, for once, look a little at the world's history for ourselves.

* Both before and after the fallacious offers of peace made by Germany on Dec. 12, 1916, the German press of all shades of opinion, political speakers of every party, Conservatives, members of the Centre, National Liberals, Radicals and Social Democrats have incessantly played the same tune and manifested the same ambitions.

It was chiefly for the benefit of Holland that a cordon of 'barrier fortresses' was established in 1713, to protect her from French aggression. Very well; let us also establish a 'barrier.' It was primarily for security against France that the neutrality of Belgium and Luxemburg was guaranteed. Very well, let us also demand guarantees of neutralised territory. And in so doing, let us not forget that Germany took care to compel Luxemburg to join the German Zollverein, and that she did not neglect to obtain possession of her railways, which were used—we all know for what purpose—in the first days of August 1914. Here, then, are precedents. Here are lessons for us. We do but follow tradition, we are strict conservatives, in demanding that the same precautions shall be taken against Germany as Germany has taken against us. We ask for barrier fortresses along the Rhine. We ask for the neutralisation of those districts which are unwilling to become Belgian or French. But we ask also for the economic control of those territories, because that is indispensable to our national life, and is the only real guarantee for a long and fruitful international peace. For that matter, it will at most be only a partial compensation for the enormous losses inflicted on us by the war and the invasion.

We shall, indeed, have an obvious opportunity, without any violation of accepted rights, to effect a radical redistribution of metallurgical power. It will be long before Germany can pay off the heavy debt of reparation into which she has plunged herself by her unjustifiable aggression and her continual barbarity. It is in accordance with old-established international law—the precedent of 1871 is there to prove it—that, in so far as she shall not have discharged her debt, she shall furnish territorial and other security therefor. The official pledges—state-owned mines and railways, customs, etc.—will certainly be insufficient. And just as we can and should think out, in this connexion, the organisation of an Allied control over the working of the great German ports and German commerce, so we can and should conceive also of the exploitation of the mining districts of Rhenish Prussia and Westphalia. The whole of Lorraine, with its annex the basin of the Sarre, will have passed

ex hypothesi to France. Here will be an opportunity of superintending the destination and employment of the coal which is extracted and the iron which is worked in such enormous quantities in these districts; we can prevent their being employed in the preparation of new wars or to facilitate the export of other products of German industry; we shall have legal international power to restore them to exclusively peaceful uses.

In this way we shall be leading up, through a period which must necessarily be very lengthy, towards that permanent solution which alone can protect Europe effectively against a return of the disaster from which she is suffering to-day. While leaving the inhabitants of these districts in full enjoyment of political and administrative autonomy—for no one of the Western Allies dreams of imposing on them an enforced subjection—they must be made the economic rampart of the West against Central Europe, as Luxemburg was made by Germany, after Sadowa, a rampart against France. They must be compelled to enter the economic system of the Allies. We must continue to control the exploitation of their minerals and the destination of their manufactured products in the interests of humanity at large, neutrals as well as Allies, instead of abandoning the material profits and political strength which can be drawn from them to the 'bandit Powers.' If the Governments and diplomatists of the Allies are not capable of realising, at the moment when peace is concluded, these fundamental facts of the situation, it will not be long before their eyes are opened by the march of events. It will not be long before they realise that, in reasoning and acting otherwise, they have been the dupe of philosophical, legal and literary conceptions belonging to another age than that in which we live.

Having dealt at some length with the matters which, as it seems to me, it is essential to include in the treaty of peace, I should like to say a few words on certain internal reforms which it will be necessary to make both in France and in Great Britain, in order that we may rise to the height demanded by the situation which we shall have to face.

Let us not deceive ourselves; we have to struggle,

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first of all, against an inveterate tendency of both the French and the British mind, that is to say an excessive individualism. Both we and you are jealous, immensely jealous, of our independence, of our privacy, of our freedom; so jealous that we sometimes allow a useful enterprise to fail, if it is set on foot by others than ourselves, rather than cooperate to make it a success. It is hardly necessary to insist on this point. A little reflexion will bring it home to each one of us; and fortunately there are signs of an awakening. Already some of our industries, and perhaps more of yours, have begun to act on a recognition of the fact that the future will necessarily belong to large enterprises, to large associations. It must belong to them because, on the one hand, it is necessary to reduce the cost of production, and, on the other hand, if we are to compete successfully in foreign markets, it is absolutely necessary, in order to take advantage of the incontestable superiority of our products, that our penetration of these markets should be organised and systematic.

A noteworthy example of this tendency in France is the fusion of the cooperative dairies of the region of Charente and Poitou, the result of which has been that, whereas twenty years ago they were making a butter that would not keep for twenty-four hours, their products now rank immediately after Normandy butter both on the Paris and the export markets. We have established satisfactory organisations for chinaware and many other products; and similar organisations are at this moment in process of formation in the dye industry and the manufacture of railway material. In these industries great and powerful groupings are coming into existence, representing, in each case, almost the whole of the enterprises concerned. I hope that we shall continue on these lines—not on the lines of the Prussian cartels, nor in the direction of State enterprise, of which I am no advocate, because the State is absolutely incapable of that spirit of decision which is essential to commerce—but on the line of spontaneous groupings which secure the best practical conditions of production and unity of commercial representation.

How great, in France at least, are the obstacles opposed to such progress by the inertia of tradition and

the mutual jealousies arising from a system of unrestricted competition may be seen from a recent unhappy instance. During the last weeks of 1916, M. Meline, then Minister of Agriculture, who was rightly concerned at the scarcity of manual labour arising from the war, set up a Commission to investigate the best means of extending the use of agricultural machinery. That Commission did not dare to recommend to the Government the immediate purchase of machines from French manufacturers, for fear that some amongst them might be favoured at the expense of others. The result was what might have been anticipated. The need was urgent and it soon became necessary to buy the machines abroad.

In striking contrast to this excess of individualism is the growth of economic organisation in Germany, which was so remarkable before the war and which is to-day receiving still further extensions. As always, the first object kept in view is the preparation for war. If there are any who doubt the imperious necessity which is laid upon the Allies to adopt an adequate commercial organisation, they would do well to ponder the conceptions of Herr Walther Rathenau, a Director of the Allgemeine Electricitätsgesellschaft and of the Imperial Department for Raw Materials, as reprinted in the 'Temps' of Dec. 24, 1916. The basis of Herr Rathenau's argument is the necessity of developing a 'service of raw materials' (*Rohstoffabteilung*) which shall become the nucleus of an 'Economic General Staff.' Herr Rathenau candidly admits that he would like to call it, not 'the service of raw materials,' but 'the service of war economics' (*Kriegswirtschaftsabteilung*). He is concerned that Germany should never again find herself 'insufficiently prepared' for war. 'All the future years of peace should be employed in this preparation, and that to the full height of our capacity.' For the accomplishment of this purpose he has three principal measures to propose: first, the construction and maintenance of enormous stores, under Government supervision; secondly, an official statistical research into the whole resources of the Empire; thirdly, the preparation of a general plan of 'economic mobilisation,' to be recast from time to time, according to circumstances.

Herr Rathenau works out this idea of economic

mobilisation in some detail. He calls for the preparation of 'marching orders' in some such form as the following :

'On the second day of mobilisation, you will go to such and such a house in the Behrenstrasse; there you will assume the directorship of such and such an economic war association which will at once be formed and the rules of which will be given to you. It will be for you to supervise the formation of this association, and to set up the various committees connected with it.'

The same thing is to take place in the case of machine factories and other industrial enterprises. They too are to receive their instructions :

'On the third day of mobilisation you are to give up such and such a part of your factory; such and such a machine is to be placed at our disposal. At the same time you will receive an order for so many articles of such and such a kind.'

Everything concerning the allocation of labour, including the question of exemption from military service, must be decided in time of peace. At the same time a political-commercial department is to be engaged in the conclusion of agreements with neutral countries and the formation of organisations in those countries in order to thwart 'violations by enemy countries of the laws relating to exports.' Special bureaux are also to be set up permanently for the purpose of centralising imports and exports during the war and maintaining the rate of exchange. Finally, Herr Rathenau sagely remarks: 'The question of after-war legislation will require very special attention, and I suppose that an Economic General Staff will be set up for the purpose of concerning itself actively in this field also.'

In the face of such preparations, and with such motives, on the part of the enemy, it surely behoves the Allies also to set aside everything which hinders the organisation of their economic resources. In order that we may do this to the best advantage the consumer as well as the producer must be willing to cooperate. I know the attraction of cheapness; I know the satisfaction of 'beating down' the price of a purchase. But there is no more absurd mistake which the consumer can make. To pay for any article what it is fairly

worth is to take out an insurance against ever having to pay too much for it. We in France should have suffered less from the economic consequences of the war—and I suspect it is the same with you—if both our Government and our people had not helped to kill a number of our industries by permitting cheaper foreign products to oust them from our markets.

There is another matter which concerns us most closely, but which may have some lessons for our Allies, and that is the necessity to clear our minds of the spirit of petty economy. At the present time a debate is going on which seems to me to illustrate only too well the French attitude to business affairs. In December 1914, the Government decided, and rightly, that the losses suffered by the invaded districts should be borne by the nation as a whole. We cannot yet estimate the amount of these losses, but I know that for Lille, Roubaix and Tourcoing alone they are reckoned at 900,000,000 francs. This is not only a matter of sentiment, though sentiment counts for much in this connexion. It is obvious that the restoration of industry in these regions will be a most important means of alleviating the burden imposed by the reestablishment of the economic equilibrium. It is to our interest therefore to give generously and to give quickly. Yet what do we find? A fairly satisfactory settlement has been arrived at with regard to the reconstruction and reequipping of the factories, but for over eighteen months a discussion has been raging on the question of raw materials. In Roubaix alone the Germans have seized raw wool to the value of 300,000,000 francs. The Government have offered to the manufacturers the value of the wool at the date when it was seized. The manufacturers reply: 'Yes, but that three hundred millions' worth of wool would now cost six hundred millions. If you give us only three hundred millions, we shall have to restart our industry with only half the raw material we possessed in 1914. Our production will be fifty per cent. less and we shall only be able to employ half the number of workpeople.' And no agreement has yet been reached.

This is, as one of our great northern manufacturers has called it, 'a policy of drop by drop.' At the Paris Conference on June 17, 1916, our Allies proclaimed their

willingness to share the cost of restoring the invaded districts, so as to revive their impaired economic powers. And now, when Great Britain, Russia and Italy declare themselves ready to share the burden with France and Belgium, the French Government is saying, 'There is no need for us to take all that you offer us. We are so much afraid of giving one penny too much to one of the war victims.' It is not in such a spirit of petty bargaining that the difficulties before us can be successfully encountered.

Short as is this sketch of future requirements, I hope I have made it clear that at the present moment there is no task more urgent, more acute, and I should like to add, none nobler, than that of devoting ourselves to the economic restoration of our country. But to fulfil this task we need to be deeply impressed with one fundamental necessity—the necessity of excluding, from our consideration of the economic problems of the future, the spirit of routine to which we were accustomed before the war. At this very moment, when the Socialists themselves begin to see that they have been the dupes of German Socialism and resign themselves little by little to the limitation of their international relations to those with comrades in the Allied countries, at the moment when the Allied Governments proclaim it to be a fundamental necessity for liberal Europe to develop a sort of economic federation with protectionist tendencies in order to protect itself against militarist Europe, there are, I am sorry to say, Frenchmen who dream of resuming, on the morrow of the war, their accustomed little trade, buying from the same people, selling to the same clients. Let them beware! Should they persist in attempting to tread again the old tracks they will surely suffer national excommunication, and will find themselves ordered off the soil of France.

ANDRÉ LEBON.

Art. 6.—THE ARTS IN EARLY ENGLAND.

The Arts in Early England. By G. Baldwin Brown.
Four vols. Murray, 1903-1915.

AFTER the departure of the Romans from Britain, the glimmerings of light thrown by contemporary historians upon the affairs of this country become almost extinct. Recorded facts about the immigration of Jutes, Angles, and Saxons are few and imperfect. Modern methods of archæological research have proved a valuable complement to, or even substitute for, written records, when those are few or lacking, but it is only in recent years that Anglo-Saxon archæology has been placed on a scientific basis. The conclusions deducible are far from being yet completely drawn. Mr Thurlow Leeds, by his study of the 'saucer brooches,' has recently exemplified the broad historical results that can be obtained by a methodical examination of the characteristics and distribution of a single type of personal ornament. The field of research still awaiting cultivation is large. The material exists in considerable quantity, accessible though scattered, and fairly well published. For upward of a century Anglo-Saxon antiquities have been identified and treasured, so that the number known is now great.

We are deeply indebted to our pagan forefathers' habit of burying personal implements and treasures with the dead. The rifling of their tombs followed the introduction of Christianity, and went on as chance dictated throughout the Middle Ages, but many a cemetery escaped in whole or in part; and, where the grave-mounds were small, they disappeared as noticeable features before many generations had succeeded. In parts of Kent and elsewhere in the south, settlements and cemeteries were mostly established upon high and relatively barren ground, which became common pasture when the lower forest or swamp-lands were reclaimed and turned into fertile farms. The spade, therefore, left such burials undisturbed; sheep and cattle grazed over the recumbent warriors and villagers of the immigration. Their age-long rest was at length interrupted in consequence of the enclosure of commons, and later the

making of railroads. Ground that had not been broken up for a thousand years and more was thus disturbed; and the arms, utensils, and ornaments of our forgotten ancestors were brought to light. Collections of such treasures began to be formed by systematic excavators in the latter part of the 18th century; and some of those collections, still bearing the labels originally attached to the objects composing them, may still be examined in local museums.

Douglas' '*Nenia Britannica*' in 1793 was the first important publication of results, and is still a valuable work. Bryan Fausett's observations, made between the years 1757 and 1773, eventually also saw the light under the title '*Inventorium Sepulchrale*.' Akerman's '*Pagan Saxondom*' was another important general work. All three were richly and well illustrated for their date. Papers in the publications of various archæological societies have appeared in great numbers; and by degrees the vagueness of the early students and excavators has been succeeded by a scientific method. It remained to coordinate the whole of this mass of material; and this has been the task which Professor Baldwin Brown has undertaken, and has been the first to undertake. Indeed, the scope of his work, not yet complete even in the four stout volumes now under consideration, is much larger than we have yet indicated, for he proposes to pass in review every work of Anglo-Saxon art of any importance, pagan or Christian, down to the time of the Norman conquest. Of the published volumes two are devoted to the arms and ornaments yielded by the pagan tombs; one volume to the existing remains of Saxon architecture, all of it of Christian date; and one (the first, which should, perhaps, have been the last) to the social life of the people. There still remain for future treatment the arts and crafts of Christian Anglo-Saxondom, and the whole mass of sculptured stones of contemporary date, in which Britain is richer than any other barbarian country. There are also the works of Celtic artists to be dealt with, though whether these fall within the Professor's scheme is not disclosed.

The volumes thus far published are obviously the result of many years' patient observation and research. They are widely comprehensive. The author appears to

have examined every object of any importance recovered from Anglo-Saxon tombs, wherever preserved. He has also visited and generally planned almost every church either wholly or in surviving part of Saxon origin. He has himself photographed almost all the objects reproduced, some of them in colour; his 166 plates reproduce about 2000 of his photographs and form an unrivalled *corpus* of early English antiquities. The amount of travel involved was great, for Anglo-Saxon relics are scattered far and wide. Almost every local museum in England preserves a few; and there are many in private collections, all of which have been visited. The churches described number about 150. Prof. Baldwin Brown's work, therefore, is a monument of industry, and at the very least a body of materials of high value and completeness. It is safe to predict that for many years to come it must form the necessary foundation for all students of Anglo-Saxon antiquity. We may add that every reliance can be placed on the author's statements and observations, which his established accuracy and caution—his almost over-caution—guarantee.

The study of Anglo-Saxon antiquity cannot be pursued alone. It is a branch of the antiquities of the barbarian invaders of the Roman Empire. Jutes, Angles, and Saxons came from the Continent and must be followed back to their homes. Influences and imports from Europe also followed and affected them after their settlement in England. The author's Rhind Lectures, delivered in 1909, are proof of the width of his study of the whole subject of Teutonic art, and show him wandering far afield, again with his camera, examining at first hand the treasure of Petrossa at Bucarest, a shield at Copenhagen, mosaics at Ravenna, Gothic buckles at Kiev and Odessa, a sword at Stockholm, jewellery at Petrograd, Buda-Pesth, Breslau, Innsbruck, or Paris. Thus equipped he could see in every object handled its broad relations to the civilisation of its day and the streams of past tradition—Persian, Roman, Teutonic, Celtic—which helped to determine its form.

The only general criticism the present reviewer has to make is that, after so much and such unexampled study and mature reflexion, the Professor did not frankly and fully accept his own conclusions, but preferred to

make the reader travel with him along the road by which he arrived at them. Thus we are taken to church after church and shown its plan and details; and only at the end of the volume is its chronological position revealed. Had the book been written in the reverse order it would have been much easier to read and understand. The best attainable chronological treatment is always the clearest. The group of approximately seventh-century churches might have been treated together, and their common features made the starting-point instead of the conclusion. These volumes would then have been handier for reference and more lucid as text-books.

The earliest identified burial in England of a Teutonic immigrant of importance is that of a chieftain and his wife, unearthed at Dorchester-on-Thames. The buckles and other ornaments found upon them, though generally attributed to the fifth century, may even date back into the fourth; and it is possible that the warrior may not have been an invader but a barbarian chief in the service of the Romans. Similar grave furniture has been found in Gaul with the bones of such auxiliaries. In any case the Dorchester warrior stands apart from the ordinary run of invaders and immigrants of the fifth and sixth centuries. Their remains, when grouped according to place of discovery, fall into stylistic divisions which exemplify so many art-provinces. The most distinct of these is the land of the Jutes—Kent, the Isle of Wight, and the Meon Valley in Hampshire. In Kent we meet with a people, or at least an aristocracy, artistically superior to the rest of the Teuton invaders. No such sharp line of division can be drawn between Angles and Saxons as between both of them and Jutes. The ornaments of the last-named closely resemble those admired by the Franks; and the cemeteries, for example, at Selzen on the Rhine and in the neighbourhood of Namur yield objects similar to those found in Kent. It is therefore concluded that the Jutes cannot have come to England direct from the neighbourhood of the Danish peninsula, but must have crossed from the Low Countries, and may have included a contingent of Frankish stock.

The grave-goods of Angles and Saxons may be closely

paralleled by those of Scandinavia and North German cemeteries. A common and prominent feature is the 'long brooch,' a massive safety-pin with a history reaching back to about 1000 B.C. or earlier, when some bronze-age genius first bent a long wire pin approximately double and twisted the head about into a catch by which the point could be caught. The brooch affected by Angles and Saxons has forgotten all about the wire from which it was drawn, and is a massive and ugly thing, about six inches in length and vaguely cruciform in shape. Such brooches are common in Scandinavia and reach back there to an earlier date than in England. They differ in form and ornament, according to both locality and date, but the fundamental resemblance is always maintained.

In the fifth century traces of Roman tradition are common in barbarian goods. Thus there are buckles and brooches incised all over with notch-shaped grooves bent about in spirals and the like, a style of decoration which was provincial-Roman in origin. Peculiar brooches of almost identical form have been found, for instance, in Hanover and Bedfordshire, and flat buckles in Gaul, Germany, and London (probably fourth century). This notch-grooving was also applied to other forms of long and round brooches, especially to those saucer-shaped embossed brooches so popular with the West Saxons. Objects of Roman workmanship are rarer in pagan graves in England than would have been expected of such systematic looters, but a few are found. It is even more surprising that so little trace of the work of the Celtic artificers of Britain should survive in tombs of the fifth and sixth centuries; and this is the more curious when it is remembered that the traditions of the pre-Roman Celtic school were actually maintained throughout the periods of Roman occupation and the invasions, and re-emerged in full perfection on the enamelled Anglo-Saxon bronze bowls of the seventh century, and in the wonderful Celtic manuscripts made in that and the succeeding centuries of revival.

By the sixth century the barbarian style was firmly established in the west of Europe. We need not here linger to trace its origins. Suffice it to say that the region inhabited for a time by the Goths north of the

Black Sea was its source, and that it took a more or less independent development in the north of Europe and in the plains of Hungary and thereabouts. Influences from these northern and southern schools kept reaching England by different routes, but to distinguish between them here would involve more space than is at our disposal. One feature, however, mainly characteristic of the southern stream, must be mentioned. This was the trick of inlaying a flat surface with a mosaic of garnets or glass-pastes, each fragment framed and held by metal cloisons, the effect of the whole being similar to that of *cloisonnée* enamel. Fifth-century examples from England are small objects, such as buttons or small round brooches, and they are almost exclusively found in Kent. In the sixth century work of the kind becomes commoner, and was evidently the product of local artificers; but whether they were Jutes or foreigners in the employ of Jutes cannot be decided. Kentish brooches of the sixth century are a kind by themselves. They are circular in form, usually about $1\frac{1}{2}$ inches in diameter. In type many of them resemble a round shield with a domed *umbo* in the centre. This frequently consists of a white substance, which may have been ivory or shell, but is always found so disintegrated that chemists have failed to identify it with certainty. In the circle surrounding this *umbo* are generally three wedge-shaped flat garnets, and between them is embossed work imitating filigree. The margin is adorned with zigzag or other mouldings. Numerous variations of this general design are found. The material is commonly silver-gilt on a base of bronze.

The contemporary round brooch of central England and the eastern counties was of the saucer-form above referred to, but the long brooch is more characteristic of Saxons and Angles. The more or less flat surfaces of these sixth-century long brooches (usually with oblong heads and a trapezoidal foot with rounded extremities) are covered with the animal ornament specially affected in the northern Teutonic area. This is usually both ugly and chaotic. The animals are drawn out and dismembered, and have their limbs so jumbled together that it takes an expert to identify them. Fashion played all manner of games with these brooches and their decoration, so that it has been found possible to arrange

them in a chronological series and to date the changes of type with fair accuracy. Long brooches of better style, often devoid of animal ornament and inlaid with garnets, come from Kent. These belong to the central European group, but they are rare, and some of them were obviously imported from abroad. The whole group of brooches may be cited together as best exemplifying the style and quality of Anglo-Saxon decorative art at this period.

Next in significance to the brooch come the buckle and the metal plates associated with it to adorn the belt. These in the sixth century in England were generally simple and rarely inlaid with garnets, but they became more interesting and displayed a finer art a hundred years later. The long pins with decorated heads, the bracelets and armlets, the rings, ear-rings, and pendants, all tell the same tale of poverty of invention and a mere continuance, with fading rather than waxing vitality, of the artistic traditions and methods brought over with them by the barbarian immigrants. Coloured glass beads were popular with these people, as with modern savages; but those of any merit were importations, often from as far afield as Alexandria. A few were precious survivals from Celtic days; many were made in parts of Gaul. Prof. Baldwin Brown has done something to group their types, but the whole class needs to be carefully examined. An identification of the place of origin of the different kinds would throw a good deal of light on the character, extent, and routes of European trade in those dark days. One wonders, for instance, whence came the crystal balls and the beautifully cut and polished, many-faced crystal whorls and beads which are found widely distributed between Warwick, Breslau, and Switzerland. They are obviously the work of a single centre. The discovery of a lump of crystal in Kent, from which a piece had been cut with a wheel, does not suffice to localise their manufacture in England.

A word must be said about the bronze vessels which have been discovered in barbarian graves. One type has an open-work foot and a pair of handles of characteristic form. Examples have been found at Needham Market, at Faversham, Wingham, and Sarre in Kent, near Worms on the Rhine, in Russia, and at Cividale in Friuli.

Exactly similar bronze bowls come from Cairo, Achmin, and other Egyptian sites. They were doubtless made in Egypt, because there they fit into a series of associated local products. Elsewhere they are unique. A bronze bucket with a peculiar foot, evidently made to fit into some kind of base, was found in Oxfordshire. It is immediately explained by comparison with a bronze pail and stand which are in the Cairo Museum (no. 9051), and find a consistent place in an Egyptian series but are also unique in England. Finally, in the British Museum is a stemmed cauldron, found at Taplow, which can be exactly paralleled by one from Egypt in the Berlin Museum (no. 1013), and resembles a whole group of Egyptian vessels, but no other from England or Western Europe. Our author appears to accept all these metal vessels found in England as of barbarian manufacture, and is thus led to value too highly the skill of the invaders. Such work was beyond their powers, and only came to them by trade from the Egyptian Manchester of those days, that is to say from Memphis. A few bowls of beaten bronze exist, which appear to have been made in England in the fifth and sixth centuries, and were fitted with suspension rings. These in the seventh century are adorned with enamelled plaques of Celtic type, and were therefore probably always the work of Celtic, not of Anglo-Saxon, artificers.

The kind of work still being made in the sixth century by Celtic craftsmen may be judged from the remarkable find of silver ornaments and mutilated pieces of silver-plate unearthed at Norrie's Law, near Largo, in Fife, and now in the Edinburgh Museum. Among these are a fragment finely embossed with bold spirals, a pin marked with a cross and delicately adorned with twisted wires, some penannular brooches, and a pair of escutcheons engraved with the peculiar thunderbolt design which occurs on some of the contemporary sculptured pre-Christian stones of Scotland. In workmanship they are all superior to that of the Anglo-Saxons.

A good deal of glass has been found in English graves of this date, but it is doubtful whether any of it was made in Britain. The forms are identical with those of glasses found on the Continent, where extensive glass-works existed on the Rhine, in Belgium and in Northern

France in Frankish days. Possibly itinerant glass-workers may have come to England, but it is more likely that the product was imported.

Toward the end of the century a local silver coinage began to be issued; and the series of Sceattas continued on throughout the seventh into the eighth century. To these coins Prof. Baldwin Brown devotes much attention, and he reproduces from his photographs a large number of examples. He claims that in design they are practically independent of foreign originals, and that they may be taken to show what a local designer was then capable of producing. That they vary widely is true. There is considerable freedom of invention and no little ingenuity. For the most part, however, they are not beautiful, not even very decorative. The Professor, I think, allows the interest engendered by minute study of these little objects to warp his æsthetic judgment and lead him to assign more merit to these rude designs than they deserve. Historically, however, they are of high importance, for their date is known. It is no longer possible for any one to assert that the Ruthwell and Bewcastle Crosses cannot be of seventh-century date because a sporting hawk is carved on one of them. Our author has indicated other notable agreements between those Crosses and the Sceattas; and, when his volume on Anglo-Saxon sculpture appears, he will doubtless have more evidence to produce.

The immigrants were invaders by force of arms; and not long after their establishment in this country they fell to fighting one another as well as extending their conquests at the expense of the British people. It is, therefore, not surprising that arms should be found in their graves, but rather that they should not be more numerous. Our author discusses the clothing and armament of the barbarian incomers at length, with much learning. The normal equipment of the Frankish soldier was the axe, the spear, and the round shield. Later the axe becomes rare, and the heavy two-handed one-edged knife or *scramasax* is introduced and becomes increasingly common during Carlovingian days. The same weapons are found in Britain. The shield was of wood and had an iron *umbo*, the form of which gradually changes and is a mark of date. Swords were only carried

by chiefs. They were long, straight, and two-edged. The best of them were finely decorated by the most skilful goldsmiths of the day. The finest examples have been found in the Frankish regions, but there are grave doubts whether they were of barbarian make. No English sword can be compared to them, though a few must have been very handsome weapons in their day and differ in design from continental specimens. Helmets are much rarer than swords. About a dozen continental examples are known, all of similar type—a decorated band round the head, from which rises a framework of four broad ribs joined by a plate at the top, the intervening triangular spaces being filled by plates riveted to them. English examples are from Derbyshire and Cheltenham, and a fragment comes from Leicestershire. They are not earlier than the seventh century, and nothing of them remains except the ribs and (at Benty Grange) the figure of a boar on the top, in metal, as described in *Beowulf*. This barbarian helmet developed into the conical Norman casque and, by unbroken succession, into the various types of mediæval military head-gear.

Thus far the subject is of mainly antiquarian interest. Anglo-Saxon craftsmen, or those of whatever race that worked for Anglo-Saxon masters or employers, made, so far as we know, little or nothing that can be called beautiful before the seventh century. Then a new spirit finds expression, and that not in England only but throughout the whole barbarian Western world. This seventh-century revival is insufficiently recognised. It was a very marked phenomenon, indicative of an important stage in the rebirth of European civilisation. It marks the close of the first march in the movement of the peoples, and coincides with the first period of settlement and relative repose in their new homes.

The chief art of the seventh century was that of the goldsmith, but architecture also took a new start. One result of the invasions had been to place in the hands of the leading families an immense store of jewels and the precious metals. The fine works of antiquity could not long resist their rough handling and did not appeal to their taste. But the value of the materials they could easily perceive. They demanded to have them fashioned

anew into more simple and striking forms. They liked glitter and colour, not delicacy and finish. Hence the style of the new school. A similar change of taste passed also over the Eastern Empire; and the golden altar, iconostasis, and ritual vessels of Santa Sophia, if superior in quality, cannot have differed much in character from the new treasures of the West.

The new art was essentially aristocratic; golden ornaments are not for the multitude. Barbarian princes were always on the move; and works of art, to appeal to them, had to be portable. Thus all the forces of the day united to produce a school of goldsmith's work, and the fact that one arose is accounted for. The best craftsmen were not humble individuals, but men of position, such as Eloy, Dagobert's Minister, afterwards sainted. It is more than probable that the leading goldsmiths of England enjoyed a similar social distinction, though we have to wait for Dunstan before we can cite a recorded instance. It is tempting to associate the development here with the coming of Christianity which immediately preceded it. Kent was the first district to be re-christianised; and in Kent the first development of the new art took place. But the products were habitually buried in pagan fashion in the graves of the rich, a habit against which Christian teachers set their faces.

If the best goldsmith in England at this time is not known by name, his works can be grouped together. A considerable number of fine objects, all of one style and obviously from a single workshop, have been unearthed in different parts of the country; but, whereas everywhere else they appear sporadically, in Kent they are found as a consecutive series. The best of these treasures is the Kingston brooch, which came out of the grave of a lady who must have been a Kentish Queen. It now belongs to the Museum of Liverpool. Other circular brooches, smaller but of equal excellence, are a pair in the British and Ashmolean Museums from Abingdon, and one at Cambridge from Faversham. Half-a-dozen more might be cited as approaching these in refinement of design and workmanship; and with them we must group some pendants, buckles, pin-heads, two or three necklaces, and the chain and fittings of a bag or purse.

We must here make the Kingston brooch sponsor for the whole group. Several attempts have been previously made to reproduce this in the colours of the original, and three of them lie before me at this moment. A comparison between them and our author's colour-photographs of the whole original and a portion enlarged shows the immense superiority of the new method in skilled hands. Without attempting to describe the brooch in detail, we may note in general that it is round, and of the *umbo* type, the central boss being of white material with a centre of *cloisonnée* jewellery. There are four smaller knobs symmetrically placed; and the remainder of the surface is covered with a mosaic of coloured stones and pastes, save for a few depressed spaces occupied by elaborate filigree dimly reminiscent of beast-forms. The cloisons are of gold; so are the front plate to which they are fixed and the back plate that carries an elaborately adorned pin. The space between the plates is filled with some composition, and the rim also is embellished. The combination of colours, the spacing and general composition, are refined and beautiful.

The object is a rare work of art, and suffices to set the artist who designed and made it on a high level. Was he an Englishman? Who can say? He was certainly resident in Kent, doubtless at the royal seat. His art, however, is not derived from Kentish practice of the sixth century, but is closely akin to that of a Rhenish workshop which turned out some level-surfaced *cloisonnée* brooches, of which one was in the Londesborough Collection, others are at Brussels, St Germain, Strassburg, Worms, and elsewhere. Several of them have the zigzag cloisons so generally used in the Kentish examples. The Kingston artist probably learnt his craft in this Rhenish workshop, but he improved upon his master, and elaborated and exemplified an individual style unsurpassed by any goldsmith of the day in any country of the West. The famous Uffila brooch from Wittislingen, in Swabia, is the best foreign example of this class, but its general form is ugly, and in detail it cannot be compared with the jewel of the Queen of Kent.

Though, in the case of this artist, we can trace a close relation to a continental school, the ordinary run

of seventh-century work in England differs markedly from that on the Continent. The Crowns of Guarrazar, the glorious casket at St Maurice d'Againe, the book-binding at Monza, the Cross of Agilulf—these and similar treasures of the same date differ altogether in style from contemporary English work; and in every one of them I trace the hand or teaching of a civilised, not a barbarian, goldsmith. One object found in Britain stands less apart from continental influences. It is the jewelled gold pectoral cross found in the grave of St Cuthbert of Lindisfarne. The traditions of Lindisfarne were Celtic. There is nothing Celtic about this cross, nor does it resemble any other English example of the date, several of which are known. It was probably a gift from abroad. The splendid Cross of St Eloy, which stood for so long over the high altar of St Denis, and still existed in the lifetime of some of our grandfathers, probably had no contemporary rival in England.

The circular and quatrefoil brooches beloved by Franks and Burgundians, set with flat stones, and presently with *cabochons*, and freely adorned with filigree, and the basket and cube-shaped ear-rings, some locally made, others imported—these and similar types of ornament are probably never found on English soil. England was in matters of art already a distinct province; and, with the revival of Celtic influence and intellectual vitality, the arts of England became yet further differentiated from those of the Continent. This does not mean that continental influences were now entirely banned. The introduction and spread of Christianity had a contrary effect; but henceforward, when continental workmen were employed or continental types were imitated, the work was done to suit the taste and intentions of English masters.

The revival of art which took place in the north of England somewhat later than in Kent, and definitely in connexion with the Christian Church, has left conspicuous traces. Roman traditions seem to have lingered on there more strongly than in the south. It is probable, too, that Roman cities and monuments had suffered a less complete destruction in Yorkshire and in the region of the Roman Wall than in Kent. The Northern Church, also, under the leadership of such men

as Wilfrid and Benedict Biscop, and infused with the enthusiasm and the superior learning of the Celtic establishments, was obviously more creative than the church in the south. Hence the greater variety and importance of art-products there, especially in the domains of architecture and sculpture.

Before turning away from the small objects of decorative art which have thus far claimed our attention, two remain which should not be passed over. These are the portable altar of St Cuthbert in Durham Cathedral, and the great Ormside bowl in the York Museum. Both are claimed as Anglian work.

St Cuthbert's altar consists of a now much-ruined silver plate, embossed with a simple decorative design. This was fastened down on to wood, and the intervening space filled with a composition just as the Kingston brooch is filled. The central circle contained four panels of interlaced work, and was surrounded by an inscription. A design of simple foliation filled each of the corners. The Ormside bowl is twofold; externally an embossed silver covering, internally a plain copper bowl with a decorated circular plate in the bottom. The raised decoration of the exterior consists of birds and foliage, of a character to support the attribution of the work to Alexandria. There are also some large *cabochons* attached by means of a ribbon setting, the base of the metal ribbon being surrounded by a twisted wire. Our author cites these settings as of barbarian character, but they are characteristically imperial, and may be found on Roman objects during several centuries before this date. So far as I know, *cabochons* thus set are only found on one other English object, but this comes from a neighbouring site, East Boldon, in the county of Durham. The buckle in question is reproduced on the author's plate 71. Had this bowl been found in any other country no one would have thought of ascribing it to England, yet its features resemble some of those on Anglian sculptured crosses of approximately the same date, so that there are good reasons for suspecting that it may have been of local manufacture. Even so it does not follow that the artificer was an Anglian. Workers in metal and stone have always been wanderers.

The Franks casket in the British Museum is admittedly Northumbrian work, which our author assigns to the last half of the seventh century. It is carved out of the bone of a whale. It does not need the Runic inscription to prove that it is barbarian work. Between it and the two preceding objects there is no trace of resemblance. Equally far removed from both is the decoration of the pages of the Lindisfarne Gospels—that wonderful manuscript which is one of the greatest treasures of the British Museum. Thus we find meeting in the north of England and working almost simultaneously artists belonging to three widely sundered schools—Coptic, barbarian, and Celtic. We gain nothing by describing them all as Anglian and regarding them as exponents of a local society.

The three objects last mentioned fall outside the limits of our author's plan for the volumes issued, but the architecture of the seventh and following centuries, which we now approach, has been studied by him with minute care. The earliest Saxon churches of which we possess remains may be grouped together as of broadly seventh-century date. Six of them are in Kent—St Pancras' and St Martin's at Canterbury, Lyminge, Reculver, Stone-by-Faversham, and Rochester. Of St Martin's we possess important parts; the other five are represented only by foundations. Further north we have the important church at Brixworth in Northants, the crypt of Ripon in Yorkshire, churches at Escomb, Monkwearmouth, and Jarrow in Durham, and in Northumberland the crypt at Hexham, and parts of a church at Corbridge, three miles away.

The Kentish group is associated with the mission of St Augustine. These were not the first churches built in England. Christianity had been introduced in Roman days, and lingered on in the Celtic parts of the country during the whole period of the invasions. But no Romano-Christian church has come down to us. We have only the plan of one left under the surface of the ground in the form of foundations, which were uncovered at Silchester in 1892. Existing churches in out-of-the-way places in the west may occupy sites which have been covered by churches in unbroken succession from Roman

times till now. Where churches had been destroyed by the pagans, Christian missionaries occupied the sites again when they could; but no existing Saxon church possesses any identifiable fragments of a Romano-British predecessor, unless it be that at Stone. Such a claim has been made for St Martin's, but must be rejected. St Augustine, indeed, found St Martin's in use by Queen Bertha and her family. No part of the existing fabric is of earlier date. A fragment of masonry of Roman character has been sketched by our author among the ruins of a church at Stone-by-Faversham, but he does not draw any conclusion from this feature, though it is evidently suggestive.

St Martin's and St Pancras' were both small churches; they consisted of a rectangular nave and an apse of almost equal width, but St Pancras' had also a western porch and a small square chapel added at the middle of the north and south walls of the nave. A pair of columns supported an arcade dividing the apse from the nave; and a similar feature existed in the small-aisled basilica at Reculver. A stone screen of this kind still exists in the Visigothic church of Santa Cristina de Lena at Oviedo in Spain. Lyminge and Rochester may have been similarly equipped. They resembled St Martin's in their simple plan, though the latter was the principal church of a diocese which started its activities thus humbly. Its nave was only 42 feet long and the apse was 19 feet in depth.

The cathedral erected by St Augustine at Canterbury existed till the fire in 1067. It is known to us by Edmer's description. It had an apse at each end, and may have actually included some remains of Roman work. Bede says that Augustine 'recovered there a church which was there of old built by the Romans, which were Christians, and did dedicate it to the name of our Saviour Jesus Christ, and there made a house for him and his successors.' Augustine's royal patron also built within the monastery, which still bears the missionary's name, another church, dedicated to SS. Peter and Paul. Within its famous *porticus*, the early archbishops were buried for a time. The place of their burial has been unearthed and displayed by the authorities of the Missionary College, which now occupies the site,

Passing northward to Brixworth, we come to the most complete seventh-century church in England. In design it followed the lines of a Roman basilica. Its nave measures about 60 by 30 feet. Moreover, a space about 30 feet square intervenes between the apse and the arcaded screen at the east end of the nave. There was a sunk passage for important burials round the exterior of the apse; and there was a porch at the west end and perhaps an *atrium* before it. The aisles which originally existed have been shorn away and the apse has been disfigured, but what remains is enough to indicate what is gone. Though very plain and heavy, it was a more ambitious church than those remaining in the south.

The crypts at Ripon and Hexham were both built by St Wilfrid before 678, and are well preserved, but they give little indication of the style of the churches to which they belonged. We possess written accounts of the church at Hexham, which was so notable a building that it was asserted not to have an equal north of the Alps. It was of Italian type, a long and lofty basilica with aisles and many columns. The capitals were sculptured, and so were other parts. There were many altars and chapels. There is little reason to doubt the statement that the fiery and much-travelled Wilfrid, who was very rich, brought stonemasons from Rome to help in his works. He is described as travelling about 'with builders and craftsmen skilled in almost every art.' He had seen the best building that was being done in Europe in his day, and he desired that what he built should rival the best.

His Anglian friend the learned Benedict Biscop was like-minded. To him was due the foundation of Abbeys at Monkwearmouth and Jarrow about the years 675-80. Bede relates how Benedict went to Gaul and brought masons home to build for him a stone church 'after the manner of the Romans, in which he ever took delight.' Prof. Baldwin Brown appears to decide that the lower portion of the tower and the west end of the nave of St Peter's at Monkwearmouth, which are built with 'extreme care and elaboration in detail,' may be surviving parts of one of Benedict's churches. 'The baluster shafts, the interlaced serpents, the roll mouldings, the cable mouldings, the carved frieze of animals,

the big statue in the gable, the balusters in the window-jambs' form 'the most extensive collection of carefully wrought details to be found in the whole range of extant Saxon buildings.' If they were the work of Benedict's Gauls, those masons must have been content to follow local designs. No one would be reminded of 'the manner of the Romans' by what remains visible at Monkwearmouth.

If the existing choir at Jarrow is the nave of Benedict's church, it must have been a very small building, about the same size as the little church at Escomb and of approximately the same date. The latter is on the whole very well preserved. The Professor's illustrations, reproduced from his own pen-and-ink drawings of exterior, interior, and details, may be mentioned as examples of his lucid accuracy as a draughtsman. The nave is narrow, long and high in proportion to its width, and has a massive appearance consistent with its plain simplicity. Ornament is lacking. There is little conscious art in all this, and even at Monkwearmouth there is not much; of Roman influence no trace.

These edifices, in fact, are more Celtic than Roman. They did not contemplate the presence of large congregations. Preachers seem to have exercised their functions mainly out of doors. Preaching-places were probably oftenest marked by stone crosses, of which many were erected during this period. Notable among them were the Ruthwell and Bewcastle crosses already mentioned. These remarkable sculptured stones have been a good deal discussed in recent years. Writers insufficiently acquainted with the broad movements in art-history have supposed that there was some inherent improbability of the appearance of such works in the seventh century near the Scottish border, whereas it is only there that they could be expected. Prof. Albert S. Cook of Yale and Dr J. K. Hewison of Rothesay have recently published works assigning a late date to the crosses. Their earlier date has been contended for by various writers in the 'Burlington Magazine,' and by Sir Henry Howorth in a comprehensive paper in a recent number of the *Archæological Journal*. Finally, Dr G. F. Browne, late Bishop of Bristol and formerly Disney Professor of Archæology at Cambridge, in his *Rede*

lecture for 1916 and in a much-enlarged and well-illustrated publication of it, has thoroughly examined the question of date from every side, and shown ample grounds for the belief that these crosses belong to the seventh century. Prof. Baldwin Brown's opinion is not doubtful, but only in a future volume will his discussion of the whole question appear. Then he will be able to depict these two crosses, not as isolated phenomena, but merely as the best-preserved examples of a considerable body of similar sculpture, otherwise mainly represented by mutilated fragments. He will also, as his present text indicates, be able to cite novel and important parallels for various characteristic features from minor objects of the decorative arts which previous writers had not observed. There is, in fact, hardly a feature on either of the crosses which cannot be found on some other English work of the seventh century, and in their totality there only.

The inroads of the Norsemen put an end to the promising art-revival of the seventh and eighth centuries. There followed of necessity an architecturally barren period. Destroyed churches may have been now and again patched up for present needs, but multitudes of them were abandoned. The commoner wooden buildings were burnt down, the stone churches disroofed, disfigured, and often utterly destroyed. Of buildings of the ninth and first half of the tenth centuries our author can only cite fifteen examples, more than half of them being possibly later. None of them is important. It was not till after the middle of the tenth century that settled conditions began to return and building of a permanent character could be generally resumed. A great number of the churches built in the century immediately preceding the Norman Conquest were afterwards replaced by Norman or Gothic edifices; but our author is able to cite as remaining in whole or in part (generally in part) no less than one hundred and thirty examples of this date. The style of architecture which they express is Romanesque. They are identified by such features as double-played windows, pilaster strips, mid-wall shafts, and the general character of their ground-plans.

Not Gaul but the Rhineland was now the region from

which English builders drew their ideas. Saxon architecture became a branch of Austrasian. Such is our author's contention, and he buttresses it with solid arguments. In Carolingian days the west of Europe owed no small debt to the culture that had survived in Britain. Alcuin of York carried Northumbrian learning to the important school he founded at Tours. Willebrord and Boniface were the first missionaries to Frisia and Central Germany. The connexion with the eastern half of the Empire founded by Charlemagne became closer as years went by. Intermarriages took place between members of royal families on the two sides of the North Sea; but, after the period of chaos due to Viking invasions, England was no longer the giving but culturally the receiving region; and this became markedly the case when the Ottos reigned in Saxony. How rapidly that country, on which Charlemagne had imposed Christianity with the sword, attained, so far as its governing classes were concerned, to as high a level of civilisation as was then possible in Northern Europe is one of the surprising facts of mediæval history. The art which might have been expected to blossom in England, driven thence, flourished at the court of Henry the Fowler and his immediate successors, met there an important stream of Byzantine influence, and thus founded the eastern branch of the Romanesque school.

The first existing Romanesque building of developed form is the convent church of Gernrode in Saxony. It dates substantially from the last half of the tenth century, and is a characteristic example of the style which was then supreme throughout the district now covered by Thuringia, Saxony, Westphalia, Rhenish Prussia, and the provinces of the Lower Rhine. We may agree with our author to call it Austrasian Romanesque. It owed something to Lombardy, as the proved presence of Comasque sculptors at Quedlinburg and elsewhere suffices to prove; but it differed broadly from the Romanesque of France and particularly of Normandy. When the Norman style came over to England at and shortly before the Norman Conquest, it found a totally different and, in fact, an inferior style in possession. This it deposed, substituting an influence from the south for an influence from the east; and we may be very

thankful that such a substitution was made. For, if it is best to face bald facts squarely, we may as well frankly admit that Saxon architecture in England in the century preceding the Conquest was poor stuff. Some of its surviving monuments are indeed picturesque in their present venerableness, but they owe their charm not to the ability of their designers, but to the kindly decorative hand of time.

A single characteristic feature of Austrasian Romanesque churches, which may be mentioned, is the common employment in them of a western tower or towers. Deerhurst and perhaps Brixworth are claimed by our author as introducing this feature into our architecture. Earlier Anglo-Saxon churches often had a western porch; now towers were in several cases raised on those porches, and formed an integral part of churches newly built. The same nave and chancel plan found in the earlier group was continued, and was, in fact, at a later day handed on to Norman and mediæval builders. Hence the square east ends of most English churches down to the present day and the frequent western towers. It was only in these late Saxon days that the cruciform plan was fully developed.

To the latter part of the tenth century our author refers such well-known churches as Barton-on-the-Humber, Bradford-on-Avon, Britford (Wilts), Deerhurst, Earl's Barton, Repton, Stow in Lincolnshire, Wing in Bucks, and Worth in Sussex. To the middle of the eleventh century he ascribes, for example, Sompting. Barton, in its original form, of which he gives a restored perspective, was a very German-looking building, with openings like Lorsch and the marked pilaster-strips which people have wrongly thought to be an imitation of half-timber structure. The same feature is even more prominent on the massive tower of Earl's Barton in Northamptonshire—an ugly pile if ever there was one. The interesting and not unpicturesque crypt at Repton may be somewhat earlier. Worth is exceptionally good. It possesses the finest of all the chancel arches of the period, and is remarkable for its eastern apse and its pleasing proportions. The church of Wing is basilican in plan, with a crypt. From its resemblance to Brixworth and Reculver, it has been commonly ascribed to the

seventh century ; but our author finds himself compelled to depress it in the chronological scale. Nor will he accept Bradford-on-Avon as built in the eighth century by St Aldhelm, William of Malmesbury to the contrary notwithstanding. Freeman called it 'probably the most ancient unaltered church in England'; but our author points to its double-splayed windows, its pilaster strips, its external arcading—he might also have cited its sculpture in the style of the Winchester school—as features absent from the early group of churches.

The German influence is most visible, perhaps strongest, at Sompting, the latest church we can here refer to. If, however, other towers had preserved their original roofing as it was built, the finger pointing to Germany might have been more generally perceived. Sompting tower is still topped with the German helm. St Benet's at Cambridge must originally have been thus finished. At Sompting, too, is a corbel-capital which finds its almost exact parallel at Trèves. The tower in its bold simplicity is certainly one of the finest that has come down to us from the hands of Anglo-Saxon builders.

The foregoing brief abstract gives but a slight idea of the detailed study upon which Prof. Baldwin Brown bases his conclusions. They may not all be accepted without demur by every critic capable of forming an opinion, but they will be received with respect. Our author's judgments are in no case founded upon general impressions but always upon comparison of actual details of ornament, structure, plan or the like, with others of known or deducible date. His chronology at the end remains tentative. Such ancient buildings have passed through the hands of many, not always pious, generations. They have been patched, reconstructed, added to, and repaired piecemeal. Their original form is not always discoverable. In many cases there remains plenty of room for difference of opinion. Still, the broad lines laid down by our author will not be displaced. In laying them down he has been guided by a multitude of carefully ascertained facts, gathered together not from books but by his own first-hand investigations.

Though he devotes little space to æsthetic considerations, it is evident that the interest of his study has not

imposed any false standard upon his judgment. Students are liable to confuse what has interested them with what is beautiful. The interest of discovery is accompanied by a pleasurable emotion, which does not come directly from the object investigated but from the process of research. The discoverer, however, is liable to mistake the source of his pleasure. Our author avoids that trap. 'The architecture thus produced,' he writes, 'had not consistency and method enough to constitute in the technical sense a style, but there were in it qualities which might have been worked out, under favourable conditions, into a style.' The work of the seventh-century builders had much promise, but it was cut short by the Viking invasions. 'This,' he says, 'is in accordance with the phenomena of Saxon history in general, in which seasons of brilliant promise are succeeded by long eras of national eclipse.'

The work of the Saxon mason is marked by a mingling of originality and force with clumsiness. He constantly betrays 'his amateurishness and want of discipline in the orthodox traditions of his craft.' Yet 'he could put his materials together in workmanlike fashion, for the very thin walls which he inherited from the Roman builders have lasted well through the centuries and can bear a considerable superstructure.' Such moderate praise is the highest that Saxon architecture deserves. Its interest is local. It was no factor in the general development of the art in Europe. As soon as the Norman style was introduced, the Saxon disappeared. In remote parts of the country it may have lingered on for a decade or two, but that was only because its rival had not penetrated there. No patron would have employed a Saxon architect when a Norman was available. We prize the surviving remains of Saxon buildings not for their beauty but for their antiquity. They are venerable, not fine.

MARTIN CONWAY.

Art. 7.—THE MINOR ELEMENTS OF SEA POWER.

IN an article published in the January number of this Review the hope was expressed that at a later date it might be possible to speak of the lesser known elements of the Navy, whose greater work in the war was then explained. The subject is one that requires a certain reticence of statement, where we deal with the practical work which the Navy is conducting. It possesses real importance, because knowledge of the multifarious activities of the Fleet is not sufficiently widespread, and it is therefore well to direct attention to the services of the Mercantile Marine, which, in a practical sense, has been embodied with it for the period of the war, and must not hereafter be regarded as a service apart. Without its lesser and auxiliary elements the Fleet would be destitute of essential means for its action; and without the services of the Merchant Navy the country could look forward to nothing but defeat.

These lesser factors of Sea Power may be taken to comprise the fleet and patrolling destroyers, torpedo-boats, submarines, mother-ships, airships, seaplanes, aeroplane and aircraft carriers, mining vessels, special service vessels, colliers, oilers, tanks, distilling vessels, workshop and repair ships, store ships, ordnance vessels, hospital ships, tugs, lighters, and a crowd of other craft. For a great deal of its special work the Navy also requires the aid of armed auxiliaries, boarding steamers, transports, patrolling vessels of many classes, motor launches, mine-trawlers and net-drifters, to name no others. The subject must also lead to some consideration of certain special features of the work of the cargo vessels under the Red Ensign, performing their ordinary duties in situations of hazard and peril created by the new agencies employed by the enemy.

The Navy is a great and complicated organisation. Large numbers of smaller craft belonged to it before the war, and the number has been multiplied many times over during the hostilities. Hundreds of these vessels are to be seen in the naval and commercial ports, or patrolling certain areas or lines, or moving in estuaries or internal waterways. Many of them scarcely betray, in their external appearance, their relationship to the

great service to which they belong. One of the most remarkable features of the war has been the extraordinary adaptability which the Navy has displayed in rapidly breaking down barriers of recent tradition and modern prejudice, and absorbing into itself all the best elements of the Mercantile Marine and the Fisheries; in training men, providing them with a nucleus of officers and specialist ratings, and thus creating such a force as the world has not before seen.

Practically through many centuries, and theoretically in all later times, the Mercantile Marine has been the reserve of the Navy, which really grew out of it as the trunk from the root. In early seafaring there was no distinction between merchantmen and ships of war. The former became warships when war service was demanded, being fitted with 'castles' forward and abaft, and provided with armed men. For centuries seamen sailed the ships, and gentlemen fighters fought them. When the warship became more specialised, it was still largely from the Mercantile Marine that the men were obtained. The sea labourers in the King's ships might have been ragged serving men or sturdy beggars, or even, as sometimes happened, the offscourings of gaols, before they came aboard; but the men obtained, usually by impressment, who had been bred to the sea from boyhood—the real sailormen, the 'prime seamen' as they were called, who could hand, reef, steer, set up and repair masts, spars and rigging, and handle boats—were indispensable, and were seized from merchant ships and fishing vessels, and more often from their homes in the ports. The Mercantile Marine gave skilled masters or navigators and trained pilots to the Fleet, and many officers came into the service 'through the hawsehole.'

But, as the Navy became highly specialised in modern times, this state of things came to an end, and the old and intimate relationship of the Naval Service to the Merchant Marine weakened and almost disappeared. That the Merchant Marine would become an essential auxiliary to the Navy in time of war, every one recognised; and its return to intimate relationship with the fighting service, though unforeseen, was natural and inevitable. The Royal Naval Reserve had come into being, and there were subsidised liners and merchant vessels on the lists.

A beginning had been made, in 1909, with a Trawler Section of the Reserve, which numbered 1500 officers and men at the beginning of 1914. But no one had predicted the enormous requirements and special demands of the present war, which, in form and character, differs from all other wars. It has witnessed the entry of the submarine into the hostilities as a commerce destroyer; and there has taken place what has amounted in practice to an obliteration of the distinction between the ship of war and the merchant vessel. Everything that could float came into the Navy, from the stately liner, built as a moving palace of the sea, to the sturdy tramp-steamer, the steam yacht and motor boat, and the humble fishing lugger. The Admiralty Transport Department progressively took up from one-third to one-half of the entire tonnage of the Mercantile Marine, and the number continued to increase; the vessels being employed as mine-carriers and layers, troop and horse transports, observation ships, balloon ships, and vessels for numberless other services. The Merchant Service Guild furnished officers drawn from the Merchant Service; and great numbers of Reserve men of many categories came in, with men taken into the Reserve or serving in their own ships, as well as many thousands of hardy seafaring men from the fisheries.

It was an herculean labour to create out of these diverse and scattered elements the homogeneous force which is the British War Navy of to-day. We cannot pay too great a tribute to the officers and men who have come into the Service. We cannot set too high a value on the services of those officers and men of the Royal Navy and its Reserve who have laboured without rest or pause to create the great force upon which we depend for much of the sea work of the war. We cannot forget the ceaseless work that has been in progress in the dockyards and private yards of the country in altering, reconstructing, repairing and fitting for their duties the countless vessels which have been brought into the service of the Navy. Nor can we forget the officers and men who go about the ordinary business of the sea in the terrible conditions of this war.

Although the Grand Fleet, in its northern anchorages,

controls the naval situation throughout the world, it rarely gives any public token of its existence. When an English coast town is bombarded, or a raid is made in the Channel, or vessels are sunk by submarine, the lesser elements of the enemy fleet are at work, and the lesser elements of our own Fleet are called upon to engage them. Such was the nature of the action in which the 'Swift' and 'Broke' so gloriously distinguished themselves. It was to provide a home for his destroyers and submarines that the enemy created a base at Zeebrugge, and brought thither, by inland communications which sea power could not reach, guns of the largest calibres to defend it. The question has often been asked, Why did not the Fleet destroy this hornet's nest? The reason is obvious. Zeebrugge has become more formidable than any of the forts of the Dardanelles, and is not a proper object of attack by battleships or battle-cruisers. There has always been misunderstanding in the public mind on such matters. When Sir Charles Napier was in the Baltic, in 1854, he was attacked at home because he did not destroy Cronstadt or Helsingfors. He had declined to play the enemy's game by thus endangering his ships. Captain (afterwards Admiral Sir B. J.) Sullivan, who was with the Fleet, put the naval view quite clearly in a letter written at the time, which throws light upon the situation that has arisen at Zeebrugge. A military operation was required to accomplish the task.

'We know (said Capt. James) that two guns have beaten off two large ships with great loss. Had Nelson been here with thirty English ships—we have had, English and French, twenty-seven—he would have blockaded the gulf for years, without thinking of attacking such fortresses to get at ships inside. Brest, Toulon and Cadiz were probably much weaker than these places. . . . I suppose there will be an outcry at home about doing nothing here, but we might as well try to reach the moon' ('Life and Letters of the late Admiral Sir Bartholomew James Sullivan, K.C.B., 1810-1890,' Murray, 1896).

Zeebrugge, however, has never been long left undisturbed by attack from the sea or the air. In August 1915 monitors were employed there, but the mounting of heavier guns on shore seems to have rendered the

employment of big ships dangerous. German destroyers, submarines and mine-layers continued to issue from the port, notwithstanding frequent attempts to damage the place. In May 1917 an enemy flotilla from Zeebrugge was encountered by a force under command of Commodore R. Y. Tyrwhitt, and chased by destroyers to within range of the batteries at their base. Two days later a very heavy bombardment of Zeebrugge was carried out under the Vice-Admiral commanding at Dover, the Royal Naval Air Service taking part and engaging in fifteen combats. Great damage was believed to have been inflicted. Yet a few days later a French flotilla encountered a force of German destroyers which had issued from the port. The history of the repeated attacks on Zeebrugge shows that, though some destruction may be the result of bombardment of the place, it is difficult, if not impossible, to destroy such a position by purely naval means, when it is defended by powerful modern concealed guns and protected by extensive mine-fields, through the secret passages of which destroyers and submarines may issue.

Undoubtedly British destroyers have played a very great and distinguished part in the war in this region and elsewhere. Flotillas of them are attached to the Grand Fleet for all its services and requirements. We know how gallantly they came into action at the Jutland Bank. Large numbers of them are employed in the Destroyer Patrol Flotillas, some of whose officers have recently been rewarded for their long and arduous work in all weathers and in many circumstances of peril. Because Ramsgate was bombarded, the Dover Patrol has been attacked in the newspapers by people who knew nothing whatever of the circumstances or of the character of destroyer work. It was revealed, as by a flash of lightning, when, in the night of April 20-21, a German flotilla suddenly loomed up out of the darkness, near Dover, and within five minutes, in an action of the most gallant character, two of the enemy vessels were sunk and a third was damaged or destroyed.

The work of these patrols has been carried on ceaselessly day and night ever since the war began; not only in the fine days of summer, but in the howling storms of autumn, in seas heavy and steep, into which the

destroyer thrusts her nose, quivering, pitching and rolling, while the briny torrent crashes over her fore-castle; or she lifts her bow and forefoot clear over the ridge of some mighty sea mountain to plunge downward into the seething hollow beyond, whence the salt surge, in masses too dense to be called spray, dashes against the charthouse or flies high over the bridge and funnels, or sweeps a foot deep over the upper deck; or again in the bitter days and nights of winter blizzards, in the teeth of north-east gales, when ice clothes every wire and stay, snow and salt whiten the bow and bridge and sheeted tubes and guns, and the cold penetrates to the bone. It is well to realise what our destroyers and torpedo-boats are doing for us in the war. Wherever troops or army stores are transported, they are acting as escorts; they regularly convoy ships in all our waters and out in the Atlantic; they are in the Mediterranean, the Adriatic, the *Ægean*; they are called upon to give protection to cable ships and coolie labour and other ships. Few people could have foreseen the enormous demands which would be made upon our destroyer flotillas by the many military enterprises in which we have engaged. It is doubtful if the United States Navy could have rendered more valuable service than in sending to us the flotilla of destroyers which recently arrived in British waters, or the Japanese in despatching their light forces to the Mediterranean.

From destroyers it seems natural to turn to the submarines. Of these vessels we hear very little. They have, nevertheless, been active ever since certain of them appeared to reconnoitre the Bight of Heligoland within three hours of the outbreak of war. They have surprised us at times by torpedoing German ships in the Baltic, and Turkish vessels in the Sea of Marmora and even at the Golden Horn. The submarines have been busy in seeking for targets, which the retiring enemy does not often offer to them. Indeed, it would be true to say that the very completeness of our sea command—command of the sea surface—has deprived our submarines of the opportunities they would have welcomed. Never have they met an enemy without giving him the best their armament could bestow. It may seem strange, but it is true that, of all our fighting ships, the submarine is the

only one that cannot, except in purely fortuitous circumstances, engage an enemy of its own class.

We come now to the *depôt* or mother-ships, which are essential to the services of the smaller vessels, unless, which may happen in some cases, these are attached to a port and are provided with a *depôt* on shore. The mother-ships are usually cruisers of an obsolete type, sometimes with guns removed, and always fitted specially for their service. Once they were smart ships, the pride of a squadron, but now, in humbler service, they do work as useful and as essential. They are small perambulating dockyards and store-houses. The lesser craft in war, especially destroyers and torpedo-boats, require constant care to maintain them in efficiency. In slight and accidental collisions or encounters with an enemy they may receive dents or be holed, and their plates may have 'started.' The mother-ship sends artificers on board, who have equipment for rivetting and making good damage with new plates, or, if the injury be serious, of patching up the vessel to enable her to proceed to a dockyard. Engine and boiler troubles are made good by the skilled men in the *depôt* ship; and slight defects arising in gun-gear, torpedo-tubes, searchlights, wireless and electric equipment are undertaken. Reserves of torpedoes and shells may be supplied from the same source, with many miscellaneous kinds of stores, whether necessary to the ship or personal to the men, ship chandlery, haberdashery, and so forth. Medical officers are attached to the mother-ships and are responsible for the health of the men in their flotillas. Submarines may have a more intimate relation to their mother-ships, because, in port, officers and men do not customarily live on board the submarine craft.

The Royal Naval Air Service lives in close relation with the vessels employed in the long-coast patrols maintained by destroyers and auxiliaries. They have done good service together on the Belgian coast, at the Dardanelles and elsewhere. The naval airmen flew before the war. There was the Air Department at the Admiralty, directed by Captain Murray F. Sueter; and the Naval Wing of the Royal Flying Corps had its 'Central Air Office,' its Flying School at Eastchurch, and

its stations at Isle of Grain, Calshot, Felixstowe, Yarmouth, Fort George, and Dundee, and its airships at Farnborough and Kingsnorth. Since that time development has been enormous, and there is now the Fifth Sea Lord at the Admiralty charged with supervision of the Royal Naval Air Service, and representing it on the Air Board. What establishments the Naval Air Service has now one may not say.

When the Germans arrived on the Belgian coasts, the Naval Air Service became very active in 'spotting' for the guns of the monitors; and they made a methodical photographic survey of the entire coast from Nieuport to the Dutch frontier, from a height of about 12,000 feet, correcting it by constant observation as the enemy developed his earthworks and mounted his guns, and in despite of hostile aeroplanes and shells. Since that time naval seaplanes and aeroplanes have frequently made bombing expeditions to Zeebrugge and other places, flying mostly at night. Early in April last attacks were made on ammunition dumps at Ghent and Bruges by seaplanes of the Royal Naval Air Service. Later in the same month three naval machines bombed German destroyers off Zeebrugge and it was believed sank one of them. How the Air Service began its work has been described in an amusing fashion by a semi-official scribe; and, because it illustrates both the work and the character of the naval flying officers, an extract shall be given here:

"I can't see where they're pitching," said the Navy-that-Floats, referring to the shells of the monitors bursting twelve miles away. "What about spotting for us, old son?"

"That will I do," replied the Navy-that-Flies. "And more also. But I shall have to wear khaki, because it's done out here; by everybody, apparently. Also I must have the right machines, and lots of 'em."

"Wear anything you like," replied the Navy-that-Floats, "as long as you help us to hit those shore batteries. Only—because you wear khaki and see life, don't forget you're still the same old Navy, as it was in the beginning, is now, and ever shall be."

"The Navy-that-Flies added "Amen," and said that it wouldn't forget.

'It garbed itself in khaki [the Royal Naval Air Service does not habitually wear khaki], but retained the ring and

curl on the sleeve, and the naval cap (with the eagle's wings in place of the crown and anchor in the badge), *plus* a khaki cap-cover. Wherever its squadrons were based they rigged a flagstaff and flew the White Ensign at the peak. They erected wooden huts and painted them Service grey, labelling them "Mess-deck," "Wardroom," "Gun-room," etc., as the case might be. They divided the flights into port and star-board watches, and solemnly asked leave to "go ashore" for recreation. Those who strayed from the same stern paths of discipline suffered the same punishments as the Navy-that-Floats. And at the conclusion of each day's work the Wardroom dined, and drank to their King, sitting, according to the custom and tradition of the naval service.'

For water-tube boilers distilled water is necessary; and distilling ships, provided with extensive condensing and pumping plant, are employed to supply vessels at sea. Colliers, which once were the uncomfortable attendants on fleets to supply them with fuel, are now partially displaced owing to the introduction of ships driven entirely or in part by oil. Tank-vessels and oilers of special classes are now required for the service of the Fleet and of the destroyers and other flotillas. A great revolution has been made in the life and work of the Navy by the substitution of liquid fuel for coal. Fleets and vessels are now in a larger degree independent of dockyards and ports, since vessels can often be provided with oil pumped by powerful plant into their tanks and double-bottoms by sea-going oil-depôt ships. The Germans have found considerable advantage in this, for any innocent-looking neutral can pump oil into a submarine.

If the mother-ships of the flotillas may be described as little floating dockyards, the term may be applied in a larger sense to the workshop or repair ships. A dozen years ago, the necessity of building craft of this class was foreseen. They were designed with the purpose, partly of making less necessary an extensive engineering repair plant in battleships and large cruisers, but mainly with the object of decreasing the dependence of fleets and squadrons upon the dockyards. These floating factories carry a large and powerful engineering workshop plant; and there are few repairs which they cannot undertake at need. The store-ships of the Navy transport every imaginable kind of store required by

warships and their personnel; and the ordnance vessels are specially fitted for the transport and supply of war-like stores. It will be seen that these and other classes of ships are essential parts of the naval organisation. We hear nothing of them in the war, but they carry on an immense and indispensable toil for the Navy.

We may turn now to the great work of the Mercantile Marine and the Fisheries. Some may question whether they are rightly described as a 'less-known element of the Navy.' They are certainly an element not always regarded as belonging to the Navy, but henceforward to be inalienably associated with it; and their work and service deserve to be placed on record. Without our Mercantile Marine the Navy, and indeed the nation, could not exist, said Sir John Jellicoe at the Fishmongers' Hall in January. We had been dependent upon our merchantmen for the movement of our troops oversea. Over seven millions of men had been transported, together with all the guns, munitions, and stores required by the Army. The safeguarding of these transports from attack had been carried out by the Navy; but we had had to draw upon the *personnel* of the Mercantile Marine, not only for the manning of the transports, but also very largely for the manning of the whole of the patrol and mine-sweeping craft. Nearly 2,500 skippers were employed as 'skippers R.N.R.' The number of Royal Naval Reserve executive officers had increased almost fourfold since the outbreak of war. As Sir John remarked,

'It is impossible to measure fully the debt which the country owes to our mercantile marine. In the old days it used to be said that there was jealousy between the Mercantile Marine and the Royal Navy; but, whatever may have been the case then, there is no room now in the Navy for anything but the most sincere admiration and respect for the officers and men of the Mercantile Marine. I think I know sufficient of those officers and men to believe that the feeling is reciprocated. Those of us who have been closely associated with the officers and men who man our armed merchant vessels and patrol craft have realised from the first day of the war how magnificent were their services, how courageous their conduct, and how unflinching their devotion to duty under the most dangerous conditions. The value of the services of the

officers and men of the Mercantile Marine goes also far beyond their work in armed vessels. When one thinks of the innumerable cases of unarmed ships being sunk by torpedo or gun fire far from land, in a heavy sea, with the ship's company dependent upon boats alone for their safety, one is lost in admiration of the spirit of heroism of those who not only endure dangers and hardships without complaint, but are ever ready to take the risks again and again in repeated voyages in other ships.'

Reference has already been made to the Destroyer Patrols which are ever watching our coasts, patrolling the seas, looking for enemy vessels, and hastening to the aid of ships which, attacked or sinking, make their wireless call. Many hundreds of ships, taken for the Mercantile Marine and the Fisheries, steam yachts and vessels of various classes, motor boats and armed motor launches, are employed in similar work. They share the trials of war, wind and weather with the regular naval patrols. The King has paid noble tributes to the officers and men of the Mercantile Marine who have done so much for England. Sir Edward Carson, First Lord of the Admiralty, speaking at the Aldwych Club, directed the attention of the country to the magnificent work performed by the mine-sweepers of the auxiliary patrols. He spoke of the growth of the force employed in these operations from the beginning of the war, when something like 150 small vessels were engaged in patrol work, to the numbers now employed, which had increased to over 3000. He said he wished the whole nation could understand what mine-sweepers were doing.

'The thousands of men engaged in this operation are the men who are feeding the whole population of this country, from morning till night, battling with the elements as well as the enemy, facing dangers under the sea. A mine-sweeper carries his life in his hands at every moment, and he does it willingly.

Largely composed of men of the Mercantile Marine or of fishermen, they have carried out their perilous work under all conditions of weather and frequently under fire. They have been constantly patrolling and sweeping estuaries and channels, a single patrol gathering up the strange harvest of as many as twelve horned mines within a week. They have laid out, examined and

extended nets and other defences. They have escorted vessels through mine-fields and boarded vessels to examine them. They have controlled the movements of shipping and the lighting of coasts. They have reported and encountered enemy airships. They have also constantly been employed in the perilous work of dealing with the enemy's submarines, a certain number of which they have destroyed. They have worked in reliefs day and night at sea, though sometimes driven to port by the fury of the elements. As Admiral Bacon has said, in reference to the security with which thousands of merchantmen had passed through the waters in his control, 'no figures could emphasise more thoroughly the sacrifice made by the *personnel* of the patrols, and the relative immunity ensured to the commerce of their country.'

The archives of the Admiralty will yet make known the many services of the auxiliary patrols. One incident, in which an officer of the Royal Naval Reserve displayed fine seamanship in the saving of life, may be recorded here. It was on the north-east coast, in March 1917, when a furious gale was blowing which had driven the trawlers and drifters to ports, except one that foundered in the heavy sea, with the loss of several of her men. A message was received that a French barque in distress, at first conjectured to have been attacked by a submarine, was being towed to port by another vessel, but with little hope of saving her. Destroyers and drifters, braving the fury of the storm, though a neighbouring lifeboat at a port on an exposed part of the coast was unable to put to sea, went to her assistance. The towing vessel had sprung a leak, and, being herself in danger, had had to cast off her charge. The barque had anchored on a rocky lee shore, but was swept by the seas and drifting to destruction, for her anchors would not hold. The rescuers bore down towards her, in imminent peril of collision, standing on and off, and made repeated efforts to pass a tow line on board, which at last was accomplished by means of a rocket. But the barque's windlass broke, and she was washed by tremendous seas from stem to stern and was evidently doomed to destruction. Finally the skilful seamen—using oil-bags to still the waves—succeeded in rescuing every man on board the

French barque, which was then abandoned and left inevitably to drift on the shore. This incident is illustrative of the work of the auxiliary patrols, and is but one of many like episodes of heroism and good seamanship which could be recorded.

The technical methods by which these brave mine-trawlers conduct their work may interest many people, but description cannot go too far. Some description of mine-sweeping procedure has, however, been published; and the enemy is well acquainted with all our methods previous to the war. In the 1914 issue of 'Nauticus'—the 'Jahrbuch für Deutschlands Seeinteressen'—appeared an exhaustive chapter on the development and situation of mine-sweeping systems, with many diagrams. It is interesting to note that the description extended to the sweeping of floating contact mines, accompanied by the remark that by Art. I. of the Second Hague Conference, such mines were forbidden unless they became inoperative within an hour of breaking away from their moorings. The observation was made that the failure of certain Powers to subscribe to the article in question placed in a sharp light the diminished effect of international conventions. No suggestion was made of the methods since employed by Germany in setting mines adrift without any anchorage at all.* The British organisation was described and reference made to our 'rapid and explosive sweep.' The conclusion was reached that mine-sweeping systems would not stand still, but would develop with the progress of armaments generally.

Mine-trawling is based on the system of trawling employed in the fisheries, which, before the war, had reached a high degree of technical efficiency; and in the application of that system the men had attained great proficiency. Their skill has made them extraordinarily successful in trawling for mines. The trawl net is generally of the bag-shaped variety, the size varying with the dimensions of the vessel using it. An average size would be about 100 feet in length, with a spread of from 80 to 90 feet. The principal features in fishing trawlers

* It is worthy of remark that, in the same volume, the Admiralty scheme of mounting defensive guns in the sterns of merchant vessels was denounced as an outrage upon International Law.

were fore and after 'gallows,' with fairleaders, a towing-block, a powerful steam-winch and towing-warps. A trawler would pay out hundreds of fathoms of heavy wire warp, the handling of which called for great skill and dexterity. It was not a very difficult thing to adapt the method of trawling for fish to the sweeping for mines. The main difference is that a fishing trawler works alone, while in mine-sweeping the boats work in pairs. What had been done by the towing-warp is now accomplished by the sweeping-wire.

In mine-sweeping the two trawlers, steaming abreast at a certain interval, drag a weighted steel hawser, which, upon striking the mooring of a mine, brings the mine to the surface, where it can be exploded by gun-fire from a destroyer or by rifle-fire from an armed trawler or motor boat. The sweepers have encountered perils and hardships which have never been recorded. Mines have exploded and destroyed both vessels and crews; and fishing trawlers, pursuing their peaceful occupations, have often incurred the same risks.

Let us now consider the Mercantile Marine. Mr Balfour, as First Lord of the Admiralty, speaking in the House of Commons on the Navy Estimates, on March 7, 1916, directed attention to the work of ships and their companies, drawn from or belonging to the Mercantile Marine, which were engaged in the work of the Navy and the nation. He referred not only to the service of ships working under the White Ensign, but to that of transports and ordinary merchant and cargo vessels, and their officers and men, conveying our imports and exports, and the supplies required by the Allied armies. 'On them,' he said, 'we depend, not less than on our armed forces, for maintaining the necessary economic basis upon which all war must ultimately be waged.' There were thousands of officers and men whose ships had been sunk under them by mine and submarine, but they had cheerfully signed on again and were not to be driven from their ancient heritage of the sea. It is indisputable that we depend upon the Mercantile Marine for our national existence. To a very large extent our food and raw materials are in its charge; and in this war it brings hundreds of thousands of tons of munitions

of many kinds required by the Allies. Statesmen and seamen have proclaimed these facts loudly since the outbreak of war. When, therefore, we consider the elements of sea power, maintained by the Navy and used by the Mercantile Marine, we must give to the merchant branch of the Sea Service the position it deserves, as an absolute and even primary necessity of the country.

Much had to be done at the outbreak of the war to organise our maritime resources for the trial they were to undergo. It was necessary for us to set them upon a war footing, and to provide them in larger numbers with guns of increasing power. The Royal Commission on the Supply of Food and Raw Materials in Time of War, 1904, had reported that they were not satisfied that the means of communication between the Royal Navy and the mercantile fleet were then so organised that on the outbreak of war they would be found sufficient to enable information to be conveyed to merchant vessels at sea of the ports where they would find protection, or that the orders to merchant ships would be understood. A beginning had been made with the necessary organisation; but to some extent, the war, which developed new features in the laying by the enemy of mines in open waters and the use of submarines for the destruction of ships, merchandise and food, found us unprepared. The Admiralty, however, rapidly realised what was required; and a series of instructions began to appear, sometimes of a public nature, sometimes issued privately to merchantmen and liners, as to the routes they should follow, and the procedure which, in particular circumstances, they should adopt. Organisation progressed within the Admiralty to meet the new situation; and the Trade Division of the Admiralty War Staff has carried on a work of the utmost value and importance for the welfare of the Mercantile Marine, concerning which very little is known to the public.

The Report of the Royal Commission, which was printed in 1905, was no doubt considered attentively by the Germans, in the light of other information and of the known demands of the war. They learned from it that our raw materials might last for twelve months in the case of jute, but only for two or three months in

the case of foreign and colonial wool, and less in that of foreign iron ore. They were informed that frozen meat in London rarely exceeded one or two months' imports, that bacon in retailers' hands would suffice for ten or twelve days, cheese for about a month, and butter in the hands of retailers for seven to ten days. As to wheat, from all sources, calculated on the basis of normal conditions, they were told that we had stocks which would not fall below six-and-a-half weeks' supply, this minimum being reached in August. These estimates and others led the Germans to believe that by sinking our merchant vessels wholesale, and compelling neutral carriers to keep to their ports, we should within a few weeks be reduced to famine. To Prince Bülow and all other German writers of modern times, our dependence upon foreign supplies is the Achilles' heel of this country and consequently of the British Empire.

The Merchant Service has suffered cruel losses and hardships but, aided by the means devised by the Navy, it has shown that the situation is not such as the enemy hopes and believes. The record is a painful one, but is illuminated by the heroism and resource of the sea. It was in 1885, when war with Russia was believed to be imminent, that various liners were first taken up by the Government to be converted into armed cruisers. The 'Britannia,' of the Pacific Steam Navigation Company, was one of the first of them, and was sent to the Pacific station of Coquimbo. The White Star 'Teutonic' and 'Majestic' were specially constructed in view of their possible employment as armed merchant cruisers; and the 'Oceanic,' 'Etruria,' 'Umbria' and others appeared in the lists. These liners were intended to be taken into the fighting Navy in the event of war, their speed being their chief factor of value; but, when warships became capable of maintaining the same speeds, the necessity of retaining the ocean greyhounds as subsidised cruisers disappeared. When Mr Winston Churchill initiated the arming of merchantmen with 4.7 in. guns mounted at the stern, for the express purposes of self-defence—it being stated that 'there is good reason to believe that a considerable number of foreign merchant steamers may be rapidly converted into armed ships by mounting guns—the object was different. Objection was raised

in some quarters at the time, chiefly on the ground that the distinction between a warship and a merchantman would be swept away; that this would create difficulties at foreign ports in time of war; and that enemy commanders might be disposed to regard the captains of armed merchantmen, using their guns, as pirates. It is doubtful, however, whether any other policy than that of arming mercantile vessels was possible. There was a recurrence to the older days of navigation, when deep-sea sailors were fighting men, and when trading ships had often to defend themselves and were ready to do so at their peril. The East India Fleets were organised for fighting purposes; and Commodore Dance of that service, in February 1804, by disguising his ships as ships of war, and hoisting the man-of-war pennant in three of them, at the same time assuming a bold and aggressive bearing, drove away the French Admiral Linois, who, though in command of a squadron of some force, shrank from engaging him.

Our defensive armaments were intended originally for protection against armed enemy merchant vessels, and not against submarines. The enemy submarines do not attack our merchant ships because they are armed, but in pursuance of the 'blockade,' which is designed to reduce us by famine. Their armament is in effect a deterrent from submarine attack. Sometimes, by skilful manœuvring, an unarmed merchant vessel may escape her assailant. Such was the case of a 10-knot cargo vessel (the 'Destro'), which, by cool and judicious handling, was able to elude a submarine possessing a speed of 5 or 6 knots superior to her own, which had opened fire upon her, and ultimately was obliged to abandon the chase. Much more frequently have unarmed ships fallen victims, often in conditions of the most cruel hardship, to the enemy attack. It is of vital importance that our merchantmen should all be defensively armed, provided with guns of sufficiently large calibre, manned by trained gun-crews, and supplied also with wireless telegraphy, smoke-producing apparatus, and every other device which may enable them to deal effectively with their assailants. This work is certainly being proceeded with as rapidly as possible. What calibre of guns these vessels are receiving may not be stated here. Admiral

Lacaze, French Minister of Marine, recently stated in the Chamber that by next October all French merchant ships will be armed each with two 4-7-in. guns. He said that officers of the French merchant marine were being trained as gunners, and that even armed trawlers had successfully shelled submarines.

The importance of effective armament arises from the consideration that it will place the enemy at a disadvantage. It may, and probably will, compel the attacking submarine to submerge, in which position she loses her speed, is less certain of her object, and can employ only torpedoes to attain her purpose. There is reason to believe that many of the enemy submarines serving as commerce destroyers are fitted for the use of smaller torpedoes than are employed in the large tubes of the boats built for the attack of warships. In such case they will carry a greater supply of torpedoes than would otherwise be possible, though German officers always use them with the utmost economy and only for surprise attack. They employ gunfire wherever they think it may be effective. A merchant vessel well armed can in most cases elude submerged attack when she becomes aware of the position of her enemy.

The very fine performance of an Ellerman steamship of 6122 tons (the 'Karoo'), in an action which lasted some three hours, so fully illustrates the conditions in which our merchantmen engage our enemies, and of the methods of the submarines, that an account of it will be instructive. The vessel was proceeding in April upon a certain track, and manœuvring in a manner intended to preclude attack. No submarine or periscope had been seen, but a skilfully handled submarine was evidently lying in wait, and the captain of the ship, who was on the forecastle head at the time, observed the track of a torpedo approaching from abaft the port beam. He immediately hailed the bridge 'Hard-a-port!' and, the order being promptly carried out, the ship began to swing, causing the torpedo to pass wide astern. A second torpedo coming from the same direction missed the target by a distance of only 30 or 40 feet, owing to the fact that the ship was swinging on her helm as it approached. The German submarine, having thus failed in the use of her torpedoes, owing to the skill of her opponent, came to

the surface, as the English captain had expected. Meanwhile he had altered course to bring her astern. Now, a submarine on emerging has to get her gun into position or condition for action, and remains helpless against attack by gun-fire, or, it may be, by ramming, for a period which may be estimated at from five to ten minutes.* When the assailant of the 'Karoo' broke surface, fire was opened upon her, and a number of rounds were got in before she could bring her own gun into action. The merchantman drew ahead, but the submarine had better speed, and soon gained upon her, keeping her under accurate fire at a range of 8000 to 9000 yards, which was greater than the range of the gun she carried. Thus was illustrated a situation which has occurred not a few times in naval history. In the battle of Tsushima Rear-Admiral Niebogatoft was placed in the fatal predicament of being in action with an enemy who had the speed of him, and could choose his own range outside the reach of the Russian guns; and this situation gave the unfortunate officer the alternatives of submitting to destruction or of surrender. He chose the latter; not so the captain of the British merchantman. Whenever the enemy submarine approached within range, deceived on occasions by a smoke screen, he opened deliberate fire, but the wary Germans would thereupon drop astern and continue to shell the Englishman with high explosive and shrapnel from a safe distance. The aim of the Germans was most accurate, and the ship was continuously straddled and frequently hit, though her commander watched the flash of the enemy's guns, and endeavoured to dodge their fire. A good deal of damage was done on

* Before the war the Krupps had a 12-pr. gun for submarines on a disappearing hinged mounting, and another on a permanent mounting external to the hull. The outside gun, when the boat submerged, was closed at the muzzle with a tompon and at the breech by a water-proof covering; and the delicate appliances, sights and shoulder pieces were stowed below. With either gun there must be a notable interval between the emerging of the boat and the opening of her fire. The Krupps estimated that five minutes or less should suffice, but it is doubtful if that speed of operation has actually been attained at sea. That a bigger gun than the 12-pr. is now mounted appears to be certain, and longer time will certainly be required to operate it. The Krupps had a gun firing a 21-lb. shell, designed for mounting in larger vessels, but possibly now used in submarines.

board by the shelling, and the ship was holed. The situation began to look serious, and the confidential documents were therefore thrown overboard; but S.O.S. signals soon brought two destroyers to the scene, and, as they approached, the submarine wisely submerged. The captain and officers of the British vessel had given proof, in this gallant action, of cool determination and consummate seamanship, and well deserved their reward.

Gallant as was the action described, it did not result in the destruction of an enemy submarine, as has happened in some other cases that might be cited. Not all German or Austrian submarine officers possess the same courage, resource or ability. A ship called the

'Bellorado' was attacked in March last by gunfire, whereby her master, chief officer and a seaman were killed, but her gunners put a shell into the submarine which, there is the best reason to believe, sent her to the bottom. Another ship (the 'Dunrobin') was attacked in the same way in September 1916. She turned her stern to the assailant, and carried on a lively action for some time, resulting in such injury to the enemy that his fire was silenced:

'At this point a T.N.T. high explosive shell was fired at him in the vicinity of his conning tower, causing, as it seemed, a vast internal explosion, smoke rising to a height of thirty feet. After the smoke had cleared we could see that his conning tower had been damaged, and now, having his exact range, we fired three common shell, each of which was seen to be also a direct hit. At this juncture his after end rose high out of the water, and he plunged very rapidly head first, disappearing at an angle of about 45 degrees.'

A recital of fighting episodes is not intended to be included in this article. Those which have been narrated are given in order to show what is the nature of the fighting service of our cargo vessels—our so-called 'tramp steamers'—in the course of the war, what are their requirements, and how high is the professional skill required for the successful handling of them in the presence of an enemy. We cannot think too highly of these trading mariners who have taken upon themselves, for the good of the country, in her high necessity, the weapons of the warrior, and have won, or lost, in

many an unexpected and unequal fight with the enemy, who has lain stealthily in wait, in the 'ambush' of the sea, ready to destroy them. Admiral Mahan said that

'the harassment and distress caused to a country by serious interference with its commerce will be conceded by all; it is doubtless a most important secondary operation of naval war, and is not likely to be abandoned until war itself shall cease; but regarded as a primary and fundamental measure sufficient in itself to crush an enemy, it is probably a delusion, and a most dangerous delusion, when presented in the fascinating garb of cheapness to the representatives of a people.'

Our merchant seamen will understand the truth of this penetrating judgment. It contains fundamental truth also for the Germans.

This survey of some of the elements of Sea Power might have gone much further. The Navy is so great an organisation, its agencies are so many and so various, it is so complete a world in itself, that a volume would not suffice for a description. Enough has, however, been said to show that the exercise of the high strategic functions of the Fleet is based, not only upon the operation of its battleships, battle-cruisers and cruisers of other classes, which filled such a large place in naval discussions and arguments before the war, but upon a wide array of lesser factors to assist, support and extend its action. We have also seen in how real a sense the two branches of the Sea Services, the Naval and the Mercantile, are working together and have become, for the period of the war, at least, parts of a single organisation.

JOHN LEYLAND.

Art. 8.—ALBANIA AND THE ALBANIANS.*

NEARLY forty years ago, on July 26, 1880, Mr G. J. (afterwards Lord) Goschen, then Ambassador at Constantinople, made himself the eloquent exponent of the cause of Albania in a telegram † sent to Lord Granville. This telegram contained the following remarks :

‘As ancient and distinct a race as any by whom they are surrounded, they [the Albanians] have seen the nationality of these neighbouring races taken under the protection of various European Powers and gratified in their aspirations for a more independent existence. They have seen the Bulgarians completely emancipated in Bulgaria and made masters in Eastern Roumelia. They have seen the ardent desire of Europe to liberate territory inhabited by Greeks from Turkish rule. They have seen the Slavs in Montenegro protected by the great Slav Empire of the north with enthusiastic pertinacity. They have seen the Eastern Question being solved on the principle of nationality, and the Balkan peninsula being gradually divided, as it were, among various races on that principle. Meanwhile they see that they themselves do not receive similar treatment. Their nationality is ignored; and territory inhabited by Albanians is handed over in the north to the Montenegrins to satisfy Montenegro, the protégé of Russia, and in the south to Greece, the protégé of England and France. . . .

‘If a strong Albania should be formed, the excuse for occupation by a foreign Power in the case of the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire would be greatly weakened. A united Albania would bar the remaining entrances to the north, and the Balkan Peninsula would remain in the hands and under the sway of the races who now inhabit it. Otherwise the Albanians might be an insuperable difficulty at a time when troubles should arise. A population in great part Mussulman would be a source of the greatest difficulty to the Slav or Greek countries round it. . . . I consider that, in proportion as the Albanian nationality could be established, the probability

* The author of this article, his Excellency Ismail Kemal Bey, the chief of one of the oldest families of Albania, was a distinguished functionary of the Ottoman Empire for over fifty years and governor of various provinces. He became head of the Provisional Government in Albania when his people proclaimed their independence in 1912.—(EDITOR.)

† Accounts and Papers, 1880. Turkey, No. 15. Vol. LXXXI.

of European intervention in the Balkan Peninsula would be diminished.'

This remarkable exposé shows the justness of view and the perspicacity of an English statesman who so long ago not only realised and defined the status of Albania and her just position, but foresaw events, and the political injustice which was to cause them—events which would serve as the tinder for setting the entire world in a blaze. What is the country, and who are the people, of whom these things were said?

Between the Adriatic, the Pindus, the range of the Balkans and the Dinaric Alps, on the dividing line between East and West, where history has witnessed the meeting of so many wandering peoples and so many nascent civilisations, Albania stands like a formidable rampart.* Protected from foreign invasion on three sides by its circle of mountain peaks, and on the fourth by the sea, Albania was formerly inhabited by a race whose origin dates from Pelasgic times. Though not strangers to the civilisation of the Greeks, this race nevertheless preserved its own character and the pride of its pre-Hellenic origin. In the second century B.C. the country

* Its extent and boundaries were defined by Lord E. Fitzmaurice, who in 1880 wrote to the Foreign Office as follows:

'(May 26, 1880.) The district covered by this geographical expression [Albania] falls mainly within the two vilayets of Scutari and Janina, but extends also in an easterly direction beyond the watershed of the mountains dividing the streams which fall into the Adriatic from those which fall into the *Ægean* Sea, and includes portions of the vilayets of Bitolia or Monastir, and of the vilayet of Pristina or Kossovo. The extension of the Albanian population in a north-easterly direction towards Pristina and Vranja is especially marked, and is fully acknowledged, even upon maps such as that of Kiepert, generally regarded as unduly favourable to the Slav element, and that published by Messrs Stanford in the interest of the claims of the Greek Christian population. . . . The vilayet of Kossovo, with the exception of the Serb district extending eastward from Mitrovitz, may be said to be Albanian.

'(July 22, 1880): Every map that I have seen of those districts (the greater part not only of the Kossovopolye, but also of the Metochia, and indeed the whole country up to the line of the Rivers Bistritza and Drin, and of the district of Ljuma, including Ipek and Prisrent) marks them as Albanian and not as Slavonic, always excepting the Kossovopolye. It is no doubt true that these districts at the end of the 17th century were still mainly inhabited by Serbs, and once did form part of the old Serbian kingdom, though M. Hahn is inclined to think that the aboriginal inhabitants were Albanians whom the Serbs dispossessed at a still earlier period of history.'—*Accounts and Papers*, 1880. No. 15. Vol. LXXXI.

became the refuge of all the Macedonian and Epirote tribes who, refusing to bow before the Roman domination, fled before the legions of Æmilius Paulus. In its outward aspect, the country of Albania is somewhat forbidding. But, once in the interior, one finds sites and contrasts of great beauty and charm. Between two mountainous chains of barren heights, which from afar seem unattractive enough, there lie pleasant valleys and extensive plains of great richness and fertility. Behind that curtain of rocky peaks and steep acclivities there stretch wide expanses of field and forest covered with green or gold, according to the season. At the very threshold of gloomy gorges or narrow defiles in the mountains, one comes suddenly upon delicious oases covered with rich vegetation. Thundering torrents pouring down the mountain side are replaced a little further on by limpid brooks noiselessly meandering through aromatic valleys, while great clumps of evergreen trees and bushes are scattered on the emerald hill-side. Along the sea coast, bays of limpid blue and serene, bottomless gulfs lie at the foot of mountains whose peaks are bathed eternally in the drifting clouds.

Such is the country where for centuries have lived the 'Shkupetars' (the 'Men of the Eagle'). Dwelling in a sort of isolation, they were variously grouped under the generic name of Macedonians or Illyrians, according to the caprice of different conquerors. But they themselves, profoundly indifferent to these arbitrary arrangements, which did not interfere with their race, their language or their national character, seemed hardly to be aware of the fall of Empires or the changes of frontiers. Proudly they preserved the independence of which no power could deprive them. On the fall of the Roman Empire, they reappeared on the world's stage to prove that they were of a race whose solidity time could not affect, and whose national genius custom could not pervert. Since those days, whenever an attack has been made upon their liberties, they have been found as intrepid as in the far-off times when they followed Alexander the Great or Pyrrhus; and to-day they display the singular and interesting spectacle of a nationality preserved pure and undefiled through the centuries, in spite of so many successive conquests by Romans,

Byzantines, Normans, Bulgarians, Serbs, Italians and Turks.

In spite of the religious and other consequences of the Turkish domination, the Albanians have remained faithful to the customs and habits of their ancestors. The three principal objects of an Albanian's devotion are his honour, his family, and his country. The notion of honour is inculcated in him from the earliest age. He prefers death to an insult that has not been wiped out. No consideration of interest stands higher in his estimation than the 'bessa' (or word of honour). In the presence of the corpse of father or brother, he will respect the very murderer to whom he has given his 'bessa' on receiving him in his house. The stranger will enjoy the united protection of all the inhabitants of a village or the members of a tribe if one of them, even the most humble, has given his word of honour. Closely connected with this sense of honour is that of personal dignity. It has been erroneously stated that Albania is a feudal country. But feudalism is incompatible with that sense of personal honour and independence which is characteristic of the Albanian, and which is carried to such lengths that the humblest consider themselves the equals, man for man, of the highest. Obedience to the chief is simply a form of showing respect, a duty inculcated in every one from the earliest age.

Family ties are very strong among the Albanians. The head of the family is lord of the household, but not its despot. He it is who directs all the affairs of the community and executes the decisions taken in council. The sons and grandsons, even after marriage, continue to live together in a group. There are families whose members, living together under the same roof or in the same enclosure, number sixty or eighty people. Each region of the country consists of a considerable stretch of territory in which the different villages are considered to be composed of members of the same family. But the word 'family' in Albania has a much wider meaning than elsewhere. By the word 'fisse' is understood a group of families descending from a common stem, while by the word 'far' is meant the closer relationship existing among the members of one or several of these families; and these family ties are so much

respected that the inhabitants of the same village, whether Mussulman or Christian, never intermarry. The depositary of local authority is by right the oldest member of the principal family; and his councillors are the older men of the other families. Among certain tribes, like those of the mountains of Upper Albania, the real chiefs are the 'Voivodes' and the 'Bairaktars' (or standard-bearers); and the council consists of the elders, whose number varies according to that of the families. After them come the 'Dovrans' (or guarantors), and the 'Djoibars' (a kind of bailiff). The chiefs and their councillors or, in the mountainous parts, the 'Voivodes' and the 'Bairaktars' watch over local interests and apply the law. The 'Dovrans' meet and consult with the council whenever a crime has been committed or local interests are in jeopardy. It is they also who issue the call to arms in case of need. It is the task of the 'Djoibars,' chosen from among the bravest and most influential of the families, to carry out the decisions of the Council.

Nowhere does woman enjoy more consideration or influence than in my country. As wife her individuality is completely subordinated to the authority of her husband, but this is not the case as regards her acts in common or public life, for she is always consulted on questions relating to family or country. She is less proud of her beauty, her birth, or her wealth than of the number of her sons and their merit, which she considers redounds to herself. The mother of a number of children is an object of veneration. In spite of these privileges the Albanian woman is never seen in public with her husband. She carries her Stoic qualities so far that she is never present at the departure of her husband on warlike expeditions. But should the country be in danger, either through invasion or by an arbitrary act of the Government, it is the women who first raise the alarm and urge their menfolk to defence or revolt.

The Albanians, who value highly both the ties of relationship and the pleasures of friendship, find many occasions of strengthening these bonds and of observing the traditions attaching to them. For instance, the new-born child is presented to the chief of the family and to all the members, the oldest of whom chooses his name. When the child is seven days old, all the relatives

and friends are invited to a dinner, where a special sweet dish made for the occasion is served. Another intimate ceremony, which is carried out with a certain amount of pomp, is the cutting of a lock of the child's hair in the course of its first year. The father chooses a friend to do this—a Christian if the father be a Mussulman, and *vice versa*. The lock of hair is placed in a purse with a golden or silver present and is kept as a souvenir. This act is supposed to create a spiritual relationship between the family of the child and the friend, and by it they contract obligations towards each other of mutual aid or vengeance in case of outrage. This kind of alliance is held in especial honour among the mountaineers, where Mussulmans and Christians both call it the Saint-Nicolo.

Every young Albanian has a foster-brother (called 'vlam'), either of the same religion as himself or a different one, who is considered as an actual member of the family and takes part in its joys and griefs and its vendettas. There is no instance of such a tie having been broken through animosity or treason; and in many parts these engagements are considered so sacred that the children of the two families do not intermarry. The ceremony of contracting this relationship of the 'vlam' differs in different parts of the country; but usually the two foster-brothers, after taking vows of fidelity before relatives and witnesses, cut each other slightly in the finger and then suck each other's blood.

My object in this brief sketch of Albanian customs has been to show that two virtues preside over the public life of my compatriots, not only in their domestic arrangements, but also in their history and their demeanour towards peoples and sovereigns with whom they have had relations of friendship or hostility. These two virtues—fidelity to their word of honour and the religion of patriotism, with which goes the love of independence—have never ceased to guide them through all the reverses their country has suffered. Though Albania, in the course of her long history, has often had to give up her own government, she has never abandoned her independence. During centuries of effacement under foreign rule, she submitted in order that her very existence should not be compromised; submission was necessary

for her preservation. But she never was the first to violate her oath of fidelity to her suzerain. She waited for the other party to the contract to break faith; then, released from her engagement, and having never lost sight of her aspirations, she profited by the opportunity to recover what she had lost.

We must go back some time in the history of Albania to show how this double principle has always guided her attitude and her acts. When Turkey, under Murad II, had conquered the other Balkan States, she was stopped by the unexpected and stubborn resistance of Albania. At that time the beloved and respected chief of my country was John Castriote. Faced with the alternative of continuing a doubtful struggle against the Sultan's overwhelming forces, or of accepting a friendly arrangement with him, he adopted the latter plan, which guaranteed the autonomy of his country. He even sent his four sons to Adrianople, then the capital of the Empire, as a sort of hostages; and for ten years he remained scrupulously faithful to his pact. George, the youngest of these sons, whose warlike deeds later became the subject of national legend when he fought under the name of Scanderbeg, was thus from his infancy at the court of Murad II, who gave him an excellent education and showed great consideration for him. George Castriote returned the Sultan's kindness with a sincere attachment. But when John Castriote died, and the succession should have gone to his son George, the Sultan, instead of sending the young man to Albania, sent his own troops, who seized Croia, the capital. The independence of Albania was at an end; but so, too, was the fidelity of George Castriote. Profiting by the defeat which the Hungarians had inflicted on the Turkish troops at Morava, he left for Albania with 300 men. He was received with enthusiasm, not merely by his own people at Croia, but by all the other chiefs, and was acknowledged supreme chief of Albania.

For thirty years Scanderbeg filled Europe with the tumult of his arms and the glory of his name, in a long struggle against the Turkish power, hitherto regarded as invincible. On the eve of his death he entrusted his son, still a minor, to the Venetian Republic, convinced that he could not do better for the heir to his throne or for

the security of his country. But his trust was grievously misplaced. Instead of protecting his son, Venice delivered his country to Turkey; and once more the Ottoman Empire obtained by treaty what she could not obtain by force of arms. Once more Albania was forced to recognise the suzerainty of the Sultan and to take the oath of fidelity to him. Since that time, although the Albanians have never given up their passionate desire for independence, they have been the only Balkan people really attached to the Ottoman Empire, always ready to support it, always happy to help strengthen it and to profit by its strength. But whenever the Albanians have become aware that, instead of growing stronger, Turkey had weakened herself, and hurried to her ruin, they have risen in an effort of self-preservation with the unanimous cry, 'Let her commit suicide if she wishes; we intend to survive.'


The attachment of the Albanians to the Empire must not be attributed to the influence of the Mussulman religion, which the great majority of the population accepted when Albania was incorporated with Turkey. The reason must be sought in a higher order of national interest. Although in a general way the influence of religion on the minds of the people cannot be denied, nor the power that Islam has had in the assimilation of races, Albania is an exception to the rule, so general in the East, that religion constitutes nationality. In Upper Albania, from the shores of the Adriatic to the Serbian frontier, the large majority of the population is Mussulman, while a portion is Catholic; in Lower Albania, they are Mussulman and Orthodox. Yet, faithful as are all to their respective religions, and often ardent and austere, they make no distinctions among themselves on account of their faith, nor do any of the population arrogate to themselves on these points superiority or privilege.

The Sultans, happy at having at last come to the end of so stubborn a resistance, and relying more on the courage of the Albanians than on the wealth of their country, were satisfied to annex Albania, entering into undertakings to respect her laws and customs, and to leave the command and the administration to the Albanian chiefs themselves. The most capable among these Albanian chiefs, attracted to the capital, and loaded with favours and honours, began to occupy the highest

civil and military posts. Nor were the Albanians slow to appreciate the advantages which the Empire assured them in guaranteeing them against all possible aggression on the part of others. And, since the Sultan's Government, on its side, valued the services rendered by this virile people in the consolidation of Ottoman authority in the Balkans, a mutual and sincere confidence was established, which, except for certain temporary misunderstandings, increased during the whole time in which the politics of the Porte were inspired by the enlightened principles of the last true statesmen of the Empire.

In the last fifty years, this state of things has undergone a great change. In the first place, the death of Aali Pacha, and the noxious and incoherent policy of his successor, Mahmoud Nedim Pacha, and thereafter the political and territorial changes brought about in the Balkan Peninsula as a sequel to the Russo-Turkish war of 1877, were the first signals of troublous times for the Albanians. These last-named events showed them that they could not face the future for their country with the same sense of security as they had felt in the past. The Treaty of Berlin, which gave international sanction to the rights of the Balkan nationalities, added to the defence of these rights made by the British delegate, Lord E. Fitzmaurice, before the International Commission at Constantinople for the elaboration of the organic law of the vilayets of Turkey in Europe, were events that calmed the minds of the Albanians without absolutely reassuring them. The spectre of future dismemberment continued to torment them.

The fall of the Beaconsfield Cabinet and the naval demonstration undertaken on the personal initiative of Mr Gladstone, with the object of assuring the immediate handing over to Montenegro of country torn from Albania, shook their confidence in Great Britain. My countrymen, who had always reposed their faith in the desire for impartiality and equity entertained by the Liberal Governments, especially that of Great Britain, were more concerned at the fear of being abandoned by this latter Power than by the amputation their country had sustained for the first time since its incorporation in the Ottoman Empire. Happily this apprehension did not



last long. Mr Goschen, who had been sent to Constantinople as Ambassador Extraordinary, undertook, as I have said above, to defend the rights and interests of the Albanian people. The verbal assurances he gave to our compatriot, Abeddin Pacha, Minister for Foreign Affairs at that time, and his official reports to Downing Street, were of a nature calculated to reassure the most sceptical of Albanians as to the British Government's real political views and their desire to see justice done to our people.

Unfortunately the Porte, whose interest it was to bring about the unity of the Albanian territories and to fortify the ethnical element, was the first to adopt the opinion of those who had an interest in seeing the country disunited and enfeebled. Thenceforward the Albanians began to see clearly and to take into account the new situation created in the Balkans, and the danger menacing their national existence. From this period, too, irrespective of their region or religion, they manifested more clearly their conviction of racial individuality, as distinct from that of the other peoples of the Balkans, and affirmed more and more their decision not to be subjugated by any foreign Government, Greek or Slav.

Abd-ul-Hamid, whose chief preoccupation was always his own personal safety, had appreciated the faithful character of the Albanians from his youth up, and did his utmost, in his usual way, to obtain personal benefit from the fact. The person of the Sultan, his palace, and even his harem, were entrusted to Albanians. In the Ministries and in the civil and military services, Albanians occupied the highest and most distinguished positions. Despite these favours, my countrymen never renounced their national sentiments or their legitimate aspirations, although they religiously observed the oath of fidelity to the Ottoman dynasty which their ancestors had taken. During this reign of thirty odd years they never let slip an opportunity of showing their desire to be what they had been before their submission to the Turk. The smallest political event in the East found an echo in Albania, when the people of the country would meet either in a populous centre or in some distant and inaccessible mountain pass to discuss matters, and thereafter present their claims to the Sovereign himself. It

must be confessed that Abd-ul-Hamid followed every Albanian movement very closely, and, whether from personal or political reasons, never failed to pay the most serious attention to the demands and susceptibilities of these subjects.

The last phase of Macedonian affairs, and the decision taken by Europe regarding the organisation of this country, seemed to the Albanians likely to compromise their national unity. They began in consequence to feel acute anxiety, wondering what fate was in store for their country. It was at this critical juncture that the Young Turks asked for their aid in the execution of their political programme—which at the first blush seemed to conform with Albanian national aspirations—of uniting all the various ethnical elements under the same flag of justice and equality, and thus checkmating foreign envy. Ten thousand armed Albanians met at Ferizovic on July 15, 1908, and sent to the Sultan a famous telegram, which produced a greater impression upon him than the remonstrances of all the Turks or all the diplomatic representations of Europe. I was at that time in Paris. On July 22, Muhijeddin Bey, the Turkish Chargé d'Affaires, woke me up at one o'clock in the morning to show me a telegram from the Sultan, which was to the following purport:

'If time had allowed, I would have sent my confidential man, Ilias Bey, to Ismail Kemal Bey, to confer with him as to what had best be done at this critical moment. Go to him immediately and beg him to give you his written opinion, which you will forward to me by telegraph.'

I handed the Sultan's representative my reply, which advised his Majesty without a moment's delay to promulgate the Constitution, that being the only efficacious remedy and the only sure way of grouping round his throne all the peoples of the Empire. And, as I understood the morality and mentality of the Young Turks, as well as their motive for the political course they were pursuing, I also recommended his Majesty to take all necessary measures to prevent aggression on the part of the adventurers in power, and to attract to himself without their intervention the confidence and help of the Albanian

population. Two days later the Constitution was promulgated; and in obedience to a fresh order of the Sultan, a report setting forth my plan, which I had laid before the *Chargé d'Affaires*, was forwarded to the Sovereign by the same channel.

The Albanians soon discovered the real intentions of the Committee of Union and Public Safety, and perceived the gulf that lay between their own political conceptions and the Unionist programme. By union the Albanians understood a grouping of different races under the flag of the Ottoman Constitution, which would strengthen the Empire by the union of all its peoples, guaranteeing to each its national existence. The Committee, on the other hand, only thought of uniting all the different races by forcing them to deny their origin; and, in proportion as their position in the Government was confirmed, so their ambition to carry out this programme increased. The first consequence of their course of action was the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary and the proclamation of Bulgarian independence.

During my stay at Valona, my native town, I learned from a reliable source what the directing idea of the Committee was, and how the central committee of Salonica had contrived to bring about this political change. Their object was to ensure the triple advantage of (1) obtaining popularity for themselves throughout the country, (2) discrediting the former statesmen, of whom they wanted to get rid at all costs, (3) using this political liquidation as a means of ridding the country of foreign influence, so as to be able to apply their policy of racial unification with the utmost vigour. On my return to Constantinople I hastened to put Kiamil Pacha *au courant* of what was going on, and urged him no longer to tolerate the working of the revolutionary committees, the existence of which constituted an anomaly and a grave danger for the establishment of a regular government. Unfortunately the old Grand Vizier committed the blunder of trying to use this as a bogey to frighten the Sultan.

The Committee, growing bolder, and without waiting for the termination of the negotiations with Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria, seized power by a *coup de main*. The first act of the first Unionist Cabinet was the

promulgation of the famous draconian law on the Bands, the sole object of which was to legitimise a criminal attempt on Albania. The Young Turks, who saw in the Albanians merely a Mussulman people having no political ideal beyond a desire to avoid the payment of taxes, were convinced that by management and the exertion of pressure they would become docile and common Ottomans, and would serve as an example for the other nationalities. Nursing this hope, they made, in a space of less than two years, four expeditions against Albania. But the Albanians, who had in the course of centuries past resisted the power of so many Empires, and who had not been lulled to sleep even in the time of Abd-ul-Hamid, were not terrified by these efforts. On the contrary, the aggressive policy of the Young Turks was the leaven that caused their national sentiments to revive and flourish afresh. The successes which the armies of Djavid and Chevket obtained here and there over the Albanians only stirred to flame the embers of revolt.

The Albanians, however, whose enthusiasm never carries them beyond their natural character, gave, even at this critical moment, proofs of political moderation and foresight. While their blood was flowing copiously for the defence of their national rights, I in my capacity as leader, with my Albanian colleagues, made every possible effort, both in the public sittings of Parliament as at private meetings with Ministers, to bring the Turkish Government and Chamber back to reason and to a sense of patriotic duty by showing the true sentiments which animated the Albanians in general towards the Sultan and his Empire, and pointing out the danger of a senseless struggle. But all our sincere warnings remained unheeded.

In the summer of 1911 I went to Cettinje to join the chiefs of the Malissori, who had taken refuge with their families in Montenegro before the threats of Chevket Tourgout Pacha. I ought here to express our gratitude to King Nicolas, who aided me in my task by his friendly welcome, and helped the families who had taken refuge in Montenegro with kindness and humanity. After a brave resistance, all the delegates of the Malissori signed, at a meeting at Gertché, a memorial drawn up at my instigation, which contained the twelve points of the national claims, renewing once more at the same time

their assurances of attachment to the Ottoman Empire. Unfortunately, this period of appeasement was but short-lived. The new Chamber, whose election had been imposed with a view to strengthening the position of the purely Young Turk Government, recommenced the game of taking back with one hand what they had given the previous day with the other.

Troubled by this fresh attitude of the Porte, and being convinced that the war with Italy would lead to a general war in the Balkans, enveloping Albania from all sides, I addressed a circular from Nice, whither I had retired, to all the Albanian centres, reminding them of the imperative necessity of being ready to face any eventuality. These gloomy previsions, and the general discontent caused by the Tripolitan war, forced Albania to a general rising. The savage obstinacy of the Young Turks in their attempt to absorb the nationalities had made our resistance inevitable and compelled us to fight for our national life. Challenged and attacked as we were in our existence as a people, though we felt how much this struggle would be contrary to our unabated desire to stand by the Empire, had we not above all things a right to work out our own salvation? The general rising and the triumphal entry of the chiefs of all the tribes into Uskub put an end to the extravagant and criminal power of the Young Turks and brought about the dissolution of the Chamber. Our patriotic aims were attained, and from this time onward we returned to our allegiance to the Empire.

Leaving Valona again for Constantinople, I was visited, on my arrival at Trieste, by Colonel Beckir, who told me that Prince Mirko of Montenegro wanted to have a conversation with me at Porto-Roso, near Trieste. When I saw him, the Prince showed me a telegram from the King, his father, inviting me to meet him at Antivari, and discuss the part that Albania could play in the war against Turkey and the advantages she was likely to derive from such participation. This interview, however, did not take place. I considered it to be premature, and thought it better, in every respect, as I explained in my telegraphic reply to King Nicolas, that I should first approach the new Cabinet, the principal Ministers in which were personal friends of mine, in order to try to

arrive at an understanding. But, when I made these advances, I found I was simply butting against a blind obstinacy that refused to recognise the gravity of the situation, or to consider the menaces that I left them to guess at, without betraying the confidences which I had received at Porto-Roso. The Porte considered that palliative measures would meet the case, and refused to take the energetic steps required. And as, in view of this attitude, the Balkan Allies had declared war on Turkey, and the Bulgarian armies were in occupation of Kirk-Kilissé, while the Serbs had seized Uskub, I realised that the time had arrived for us Albanians to take vigorous measures for our own salvation.

The Grand Vizier, Kiamil Pacha, pressed me to stand by him and offered me a portfolio in his Ministry. In other circumstances I should have accepted this post of honour with pleasure, but now a higher duty forced me to decline it. My place was no longer there, and I owed my services entirely to my own country. Kiamil Pacha finally bowed to reasonings the urgency of which he could not but recognise; and we separated with mutual regrets. On my return journey I arrived at Bucarest, where there was a large Albanian colony. As the result of a meeting we held there, fifteen of my compatriots decided to go back with me to Albania. I telegraphed to all parts of Albania to announce my arrival, and declared that the moment had come for us to realise our national aspirations. At the same time I asked that delegates should be sent from all parts of the country to Valona, where a national congress was to be held.

At Vienna I received a telegram from a personal friend at Budapesth, who invited me to go thither in order to have an interview with a highly-placed personage. My first visit at Budapesth was to Count Andrassy, where I met Count Hadik, his old friend and former Under-Secretary of State, who told me that the person I was to see was none other than Count Berchtold. I met the latter the same evening at Count Hadik's house. His Excellency approved my views on the national question, and readily granted the sole request which I made him, namely, to place at my disposal a vessel which would enable me to reach the first Albanian port before the arrival of the Serbian army.

As Valona was blockaded by the Greek fleet, I was glad to disembark at Durazzo. There we found awaiting us two Greek warships, which had been there since the previous evening. Our captain was very anxious about us, not without cause; and we shared his concern. But the officer who came on board, after making a scrupulous examination, in the course of which he found nothing but a few arms in the possession of my companions, left me free to land, and our vessel continued her journey.

We found the people of Durazzo in total ignorance of all the events that had been taking place. Deceived by the sparse news which reached them through prejudiced channels, they believed that the Turkish army was victorious, that it was in occupation of Philippopolis, and was marching on Sofia and Belgrade. They did not even know that the Serbs were at their very gates. Our arrival occasioned some excitement in the town, which was fomented by the Turkish element, joined by a portion of the local population, consisting mostly of Bosnian immigrants, who spread the report that we were *agents provocateurs*. This special and local feeling had not prevented Durazzo and the dependent districts from appointing their delegates to the national congress; and these left for Valona with me and my little band of Albanians from Bucarest.

We travelled on horseback, and, before arriving at our first stopping-place, I learned through a notable of the neighbourhood, who came to meet me, that orders had been telegraphed by the Turkish Commander-in-Chief at Janina to the local gendarmerie to arrest me and take me to his headquarters. We accordingly changed our route and passed the night in another village. The next morning the chief of gendarmes who was to have carried out this arrest brought me a telegram from the same Commandant at Janina, which asked the local authorities to receive us with honour and do what they could to help us on our journey. This, however, far from calming our fears, rather confirmed the alarming news I had heard the previous evening; and so, avoiding the route on which we were being watched, I took a safer one, and we finally arrived at Valona. Here our reception was quite different from what it had

been at Durazzo. A holy fire of patriotism had taken possession of my native town, and public enthusiasm and delight greeted us everywhere. In a short space of time I found myself surrounded by eighty-three delegates, Mussulmans and Christians, who had come from all parts of Albania, whether or not they were occupied by the belligerent armies.

The Congress was at once opened. At its first sitting—Nov. 15-28, 1912—it voted unanimously the proclamation of independence. The sitting was then suspended, and the members left the hall to hoist upon my house—the house where I was born, and where my ancestors had lived—amid the acclamations of thousands of people, the glorious flag of Scanderbeg, who had slept wrapped in its folds for the last 445 years. It was an unforgettable moment for me; and my hands shook with hope and pride as I fixed to the balcony of the old dwelling the standard of the last national Sovereign of Albania. It seemed as if the spirit of the immortal hero passed at that moment like a sacred fire over the heads of the people.

On the resumption of the sitting, I was elected President of the Provisional Government, with a mandate to form a Cabinet. But I considered it proper that the Ministers should also be elected by the Congress, and so I waived this prerogative, only reserving to myself the distribution of the portfolios. The Government having been constituted, the Congress elected eighteen members who were to form the Senate. I notified the constitution of the new State to the Powers and the Sublime Porte in the following telegram:

‘The National Assembly, consisting of delegates from all parts of Albania, without distinction of religion, who have to-day met in the town of Valona, have proclaimed the political independence of Albania and constituted a Provisional Government entrusted with the task of defending the rights of the Albanian people, menaced with extermination by the Serbian armies, and of freeing the national soil invaded by foreign forces. In bringing these facts to the knowledge of your Excellency, I have the honour to ask the Government of his Britannic Majesty to recognise this change in the political life of the Albanian nation.

‘The Albanians, who have entered into the family of the

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peoples of Eastern Europe, of whom they flatter themselves that they are the eldest, are pursuing one only aim, to live in peace with all the Balkan States and become an element of equilibrium. They are convinced that the Government of his Majesty, as well as the whole civilised world, will accord them a benevolent welcome by protecting them against all attacks on their national existence and against any dismemberment of their territory.'

I had but one dominant thought, now that I was given presidential power, and that was to organise the small extent of country that remained to us, and to show the Great Powers that Albania was capable of governing herself and deserved the confidence of Europe. As to the future Sovereign, the interest for the moment did not lie so much in the choice of his personality as in the principle which was to decide the choice between a European and Mussulman prince. My own views frankly favoured a Christian and European; and in this I was supported by all the Albanians as well as by the political considerations that had to be taken into account. Only a European Sovereign could properly guide us in the great European family we were entering. The question of religion did not enter into consideration in this preference for a European, since all the three cults practised in the country—Mussulman, Catholic and Orthodox—had equal and complete liberty, no rivalry or preeminence being possible.

The Sublime Porte, immediately on receiving our notification of independence, set itself in opposition to our aspirations. The Grand Vizier, in a telegram replying to my note, tried to impose on us, as Sovereign, a member of the Imperial family. According to him, Albania could only be saved by being the vassal of the Ottoman Empire, with a Prince of the Imperial family. On what Power, he asked, did she expect to rely? On Austria? On Italy? Let her not forget, he added, the example of the Crimea, for which independence under the protection of Russia was but the prelude to complete subjection. My reply was that Albania relied neither on Italy nor Austria, but on the rights of the Albanians to exist and have a nationality of their own, as well as on the duty of the Powers to respect nationalities. I added that Turkey could not but be a bad advocate of the cause

of free nationalities, and that Albania would prefer to defend her cause herself, but that, on the other hand, when the final solution came, she would do all she could to prevent the new situation from being an obstacle to good relations with the Sublime Porte. So ended what I may call the first candidature to the Albanian throne, which was followed by others that had no weight at all with the Albanians, who placed their confidence in the Great Powers.

In spite of this attitude of the Porte, and of the menace of the Turkish armies, which still occupied a portion of the country, we spent our time in organising the administration and maintaining order in the portions left to us. The silence of the Great Powers and their indifference in face of Serbia's invasion and devastation of our land, at the same time that Greece was blockading and bombarding the town of Valona and the littoral, disgusted us. A little later, the Greek fleet having cut the cable which was the only channel of communication with the outer world, we were completely isolated and deprived of all knowledge of what was taking place beyond our borders.

One evening towards the end of March, 1913, we learned that a vessel flying the British flag had anchored in the port and announced that the blockade was suspended. We were naturally delighted with the news. Next morning I learned that this vessel was the yacht of the Duc de Montpensier (younger brother of the Duc d'Orléans); and a little later a messenger came to me from the Duke carrying a letter in which his Highness informed me of the object of his visit, namely, his desire to become a candidate to the throne of Albania. There followed an invitation to lunch on board the yacht. I accepted, and after luncheon the Prince and I had a long conversation. He confided to me his intentions very frankly. I assured him I was happy and flattered, both for myself and on behalf of my country, that a Prince of the French Royal house should aspire to the difficult but honourable task of reigning over Albania. But I was forced to add that, as the blockade had kept us in total ignorance of what was our exact situation *vis-à-vis* the European Powers, we regretted we were not able to take the decision, even if it were one in conformity with our wishes.

Next day his Highness came to pay us a visit at Valona. He made a tour of the town, in which he was able to notice the excellent impression he himself made—a sympathy which later caused all the more regret to the people and myself. I left with the Prince on his yacht on April 1, 1913, for the purpose of conferring with the Powers. He left me at Brindisi, and continued his voyage to Venice. I went successively to Rome, Vienna, Paris, and London. No understanding had been come to and no decision taken on the question of this candidature, which would have been so welcome to the Albanians; and there the matter ended.

My object in making this journey was to fight the cause of the territorial integrity of Albania with the Powers, but especially in London, where the Conference was deliberating on the settlement of the Balkan question. I also wanted to hurry on the selection of the future Sovereign, which would help to ensure the stability of the national Government and remove all internal difficulties which the continuance of provisional conditions necessarily engendered.

In Vienna Count Berchtold, in our first interview, allowed me to perceive how slight was the hope that Albania would be permitted to preserve her territorial integrity, in spite of her rights and in spite of the efforts he had himself made. It was the first painful blow to me, but worse was to come, for on the day when I left Paris for London came the news of the surrender of the town of Scutari by Essad Pacha to the Montenegrins. This disaster, which took place while the fleet of the six Great Powers was manœuvring before this port in order to force King Nicolas to raise the siege, jeopardised the integrity and almost even the existence of Albania. The question of the candidature to the throne was by this fact necessarily relegated to a secondary place; and all my efforts had to be devoted to the territorial question.

On my arrival in London the same evening, I was happy to find myself again in the sympathetic atmosphere to which I was accustomed there, and I gathered renewed strength for my political struggle for the rights of the peoples of the East. The sincere sympathy shown by the British press and people towards our national cause, and the kindly welcome extended to me by Ministers and

Statesmen of this great country, led me to hope that our indisputable rights, which were in no way incompatible with the political interests of Europe in general, or of our neighbours in particular, would be acknowledged by the Conference. Never was a nobler task offered to the Great Powers; never was a solution so necessary; and never had we had such hopes of obtaining it as at this moment, when the Powers were for the first time called on to form a Congress, whose task was not only to conciliate opposed interests, but also to act as an international High Court of Justice.

Of all the Balkan questions treated at this Conference, in my view the foremost, the most interesting, and, above all, the most eminently European, was that of Albania. We thought it possible to hope that a people so worthy of interest by reason of its antiquity, its valour, and the services it had rendered to Europe, first by defending it against the invasion of the Turks, and then by resigning itself to a docile submission when it had become the pivot of European equilibrium, might have been allowed to become master in its own house and to retain its national independence. The Albanians, delivered from the Turkish yoke, of which they had for centuries been less the instruments than the victims, would have been happy to recover their liberty and independence, and therewith the repose of which they stood in such great need. They had no other claims to make, no other pretensions to put forward. They desired that the work of restoration should take place for all the Balkan peoples as for themselves, that hatred and envy should cease, that all legitimate rights should become sacred, and every unjust ambition or enterprise meet with its condemnation in a guarantee of solidarity on the part of the Great Powers. Sure of the justice of our claims, we awaited with entire confidence the verdict of the Conference of the Powers.

But the sympathy shown to me in my mission was the only consolation offered to Albania's broken heart when we learned the decision which the Conference of London had taken. More than half my country's territory had been attributed to Serbia, Montenegro, and Greece. The most flourishing towns and the most productive parts of the country having been taken away, Albania was reduced almost to its most arid and rocky portions. Thus

plunged again into deep depression at seeing the future of our reborn country so darkened, we were comforted by being told that we had had to be sacrificed to the general interests of Europe. Resigned but not despairing, I returned to Albania buoyed up by the single hope that more favourable conditions would at some future time permit Albania to realise her legitimate desires.

On my return to Valona in June 1913, the Provisional Government redoubled its efforts to organise the country and maintain order. It was a task which might well have seemed impossible, but was facilitated by the Albanian character, whose patience, foresight, and unflinching patriotism in the midst of all these complications and anxieties cannot be too highly praised. It was thanks to the virtues of this race in a country of which the frontiers were still undetermined, where the political statutes promised by Europe were awaiting their fulfilment, and where a frantic propaganda was carried on with the object of provoking trouble—it was thanks to these virtues that my Government succeeded in bringing stability to the State and assuring it a normal administration.

But despite the satisfactory results in the present, the future was dark and uncertain so long as the question of the future Sovereign remained unsettled. I therefore addressed a pressing appeal to the Powers in the following terms :

‘If the Provisional Government of Albania, which has for eleven months been struggling with innumerable difficulties, has been able to maintain order and relative tranquillity in a country harassed on all sides by enemies who have sworn its destruction, it does not claim for itself the merit, which in fact is due only to the patriotism and the resignation of the Albanian people.

‘But this provisional state of affairs cannot be continued indefinitely without encountering insurmountable difficulties. We believe we have reached the extreme limit of the people’s patience, and we hasten to submit to the consideration of your Government the unanimous wish of the people and the Government for the designation and enthronement of the Sovereign, whose mere presence will suffice to unite all classes of the population in the work of consolidating Albania and organising her administration.

'In the hope that the guaranteeing Powers will take our request into serious consideration, the Provisional Government would be ready to take any steps necessary to hasten the happy result which Albanians await with such impatience.'

It was a short while after this telegram had been sent that the name of the Prince of Wied was first mentioned in connexion with Albania, vague rumours concerning his candidature being spread about. These rumours soon became more definite, in a way that recalled a curious campaign started on behalf of Prince Ahmed-Fuad, of Egypt, by the 'Zeit' of Vienna; in this case the propaganda was launched in the form of a highly dithyrambic article in the 'Oesterreichische Rundschau' (also published at Vienna) over the famous pseudonym of the Queen of Roumania. 'Carmen Sylva,' more poetess than ever, after having evoked Albania vainly clamouring for a Sovereign, in the style of a recitative of the 'Nibelungenring,' proposed to her as guide the scion of an ancient race dwelling on the Rhine. She then gave the genealogy of the Prince of Wied, and his history since his childhood. The prospect of confiding the destinies of Albania to this unknown celebrity did not particularly enchant me, but what troubled me more was the propaganda that began openly in favour of this candidature, in which money and presents were distributed with cynical effrontery. I asked for official information as to this candidature, and being informed that it was not under consideration, I no longer hesitated to take rigorous measures against the propaganda or to expel the agitators. But, though the reply to my question was so emphatically in the negative, destiny had doubtless willed otherwise, since I was officially notified a little later that the six Powers had come to a unanimous decision regarding the choice of Prince William of Wied, and that nothing remained except to ratify it by the formality of a popular election. The Albanian people, unshakenly confident in the decisions of Europe, sent their votes at once to the Provisional Government, which communicated the result to the Powers.

However, though all was arranged, the Prince of Wied gave no sign, at any rate in the direction of Albania. We expected him to arrive every day. His

departure was announced, but he did not arrive. These inexplicable delays were utilised by the Young Turks, who recommenced with even greater energy than before their campaign in favour of a Turkish Prince. I then appealed to the Commission of Control, begging them to draw the attention of the Powers to the urgent need for the enthronement of the new Sovereign. In case particular reasons were delaying the arrival of the Prince, I asked that a Commissioner should take over the Government in his name, or that the Powers should instruct the Commission itself to assume authority on their behalf. In my opinion some such arrangement was the only way of straightening out the internal difficulties and terminating the intrigues which tended to cause disorder in the country. My request was at last approved by the Powers; and the delegates came to notify me that they were authorised by their respective Governments to assume the power if I maintained my view on the advisability of this step. The following protocol was signed on the spot:

‘This 22nd of January, 1914, the International Commission of Control has met in the presence of his Excellency Ismail Kemal Bey. The President of the Provisional Government, being persuaded that the only means of terminating the condition of disruption and anarchy ruling in the country is to constitute a single Government for the whole of Albania, and that in the present circumstances this end can only be attained if he places the power in the hands of the International Commission of Control representing the Great Powers, has repeated the request that he has already made to the International Commission of Control, in the presence of the Ministers, to take over this task and accept the placing of the power in their hands. The International Commission of Control pays homage to the patriotic sentiments which have dictated the actions of his Excellency Ismail Kemal Bey, accepts this delegation of power, and, duly authorised by the Great Powers, assumes the administration of Albania in the name of the Government it represents.

‘Valona, Jan. 22, 1914.’

Signed: ‘Ismail Kemal, Nadolny, Petrović, Krajewski, Harry Lamb, Léoni, Petriaew.’

As soon as I had handed over the power to the Commission I left for Nice in order to take a well-earned

rest. I naturally followed from this distance with intense interest the march of events in my own country. It was not long before I learned—and I did so with great pleasure—that the Prince of Wied had at last made his solemn entry into Durazzo. I was, however, extremely annoyed that he had chosen for his capital one of the towns which was the least appropriate for the Royal residence, and the numerous disadvantages of which I had already pointed out, disadvantages which had been understood and recognised by the Foreign Office in London. But for the moment this dark spot disappeared again from the horizon; and I did my best, in the bottom of my old Albanian heart, to look forward with hope to the new era. After long and cruel years of waiting, after so many alternations between hope and disappointment, I tried to forget my own impressions, and suppressed any latent disposition towards anxiety, thinking only of the thrilling spectacle of our first king setting foot upon the sacred soil of my Fatherland, and of the imposing fleet which the six Great Powers gave him as an escort. My gratitude went out to Europe, which had confirmed Albania in her national existence by thus giving her a Sovereign that she had herself chosen.

It was only later that I learned the details of this memorable day. The Prince of Wied was accompanied by the Princess, his wife, and their children. His Court consisted of a marshal and a doctor (both Germans), a private secretary (an Englishman), and two Ladies of Honour. His bodyguard, which one might have expected to find of some importance, consisted of a couple of rather ferocious dogs. On board the vessel which brought him the Prince had the ten million francs which Austria and Italy had advanced him in anticipation of the seventy-five millions which the other Powers had not yet decided to pay. He was received with enthusiastic acclamations by the population, while salvos of welcome were fired in the port. His first act, even before disembarking, was the nomination of Essad Pacha as Minister of War and first general of Albania; and Essad accompanied the new Sovereign on shore.

William of Wied's short reign, which was richer in grotesque episodes than in incidents tending to the reorganisation of a renascent State, displayed the little

care that the Powers had taken in the choice of this Sovereign of a country whose happiness depended on a fortunate selection. We had hoped that the tact and wisdom of the Prince might have balanced the losses in territory that we had sustained, and that his advent might give a great impulse to the prosperity of the country. Instead of that, the situation became more and more complicated, and in a short while grew actually critical. One morning I received a short telegram from Valona which gave me cause for absolute consternation. The house of Essad Pacha had been bombarded and the Minister himself thrown into prison. This brief intelligence, without further explanation, seemed to me so extravagant that for the moment I refused to believe it. I hurried to the Austrian and Italian Consuls at Nice, and got them to telegraph urgent messages for me to Rome and Vienna in order to get confirmation of this news, if true, and to discover its meaning. The reply I received left no further room for doubt. A little later I learned the details of the affair from other sources.

I had always foreseen that Essad Pacha would find himself in an extremely awkward position at Durazzo. This town, of less than 5000 inhabitants, had been the centre of the intrigues and hostility against the candidature of Wied as a European Prince, as well as of the revolt of Essad against the Provisional Government. Essad, who had suddenly, by means of a suspicious *volte-face*, been promoted Minister of this same Prince who was so undesirable to his compatriots, could only meet with unpopularity and contempt. The feeling against him grew rapidly more bitter. The popular demonstrations throughout the country assumed a threatening character; but, instead of trying to calm the people, when this agitation was at its height, the Prince met them with cannon. Instead of dismissing his unpopular Minister in a regular and legitimate manner, the Prince, acting under some influence which I am unable to fathom, again had recourse to violent measures and adopted a line of action unprecedented in the annals of government. Essad's house being blockaded and bombarded, his wife appeared at a window shaking a sheet as a flag of truce. The bombardment ceased; the Italian Minister intervened; and, thanks to him, Essad Pacha was able to

leave without incurring further danger. Guarded by sailors, the family left and were put on board the Austrian guardship, from which they were transferred to the Italian *stationnaire*, on which Essad sailed for Europe after giving his word of honour not to return to Albania.

In view of these extraordinary happenings I considered it my duty to return at once to Valona. Just as I was going to take the train at Nice, the Italian Consul came to me with a telegram from the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, San Giuliano, in which he asked for my opinion on Albanian affairs and on the measures that ought now to be adopted, as the situation was becoming more and more alarming. He asked me to discuss the matter with him, and accordingly I went to Rome, where San Giuliano and I came to an understanding as to the measures to be adopted.

At Valona, where, as soon as I arrived, I learned the details of what had taken place, I also found out that Durazzo was surrounded on all sides and no communications were taking place between it and the rest of the country. The supreme authority and jurisdiction of our Mbret was thus confined to this small and insignificant town. A few days later I left for Durazzo with fifteen notables of the district, in order to submit our views on the situation, which were in agreement with those of San Giuliano, to the Prince. In a *tête-à-tête* interview which I had with him, I told him the conclusion we had come to and the measures we deemed necessary. The Prince impressed me as having no proper idea of the state of affairs, and as being oblivious of the exceptional gravity of the moment. He seemed incapable of making an observation or putting a question arising from his own personal thought. While I was explaining the different ways that might be adopted to get him out of his difficulties, he never once asked me how I thought of putting them into practice.

The next day the Prince received the fifteen notables from Valona. He did not let us leave, however, without giving some sign of his solicitude for the country. A meeting of all the Albanian chiefs then in Durazzo was called at the Palace. The Prince opened it himself with a few words in French, explaining why he had summoned

us, and inviting us to give our opinions personally on the situation of the country. We had had no preliminary discussion, as is usual when one is called upon to give opinions in such circumstances, but we did as he wished, I myself speaking first instead of concluding the series of speeches, as I ought to have done in view of my position. The Prince thanked us, and said that, when he had had our remarks translated and had studied them, he would inform us of his decision. We waited for several days, but, as no further communication reached us, we returned to Valona.

In view of the aggravation of the general situation of the country and the evident incapacity of the Government at Durazzo, a public meeting of the inhabitants of the town and district as well as of refugees from other parts of the country in the hands of the enemy was held in the Grande Place of Valona, with a view to taking measures to save the country. After a long discussion it was decided to form a Committee of Public Safety, under my Presidency. We informed the Powers and the Prince of this decision, in an address which stated that representatives of Valona and a dozen other places had met and voted the formation of a Committee of Public Safety with the object of asking the guarantor Powers and the Prince to transfer the Government provisionally to the International Commission of Control, as representing the Great Powers, and to take all measures that the circumstances demanded. The message, signed by thirty delegates, appealed to the justice of the Powers and begged them to entrust the Commission with this task without delay, adding that it was

'the only measure in our opinion that can keep the legitimate Sovereign on the throne, ensure national unity and territorial integrity, and save from destruction more than 100,000 human beings who, fleeing from fire and sword, had left their burnt and devastated homes and taken refuge in the only corner of Albania which remained free, the town of Valona and its neighbourhood.'

I have reached the last moments of this painful and futile reign. Shut up, as I have said, in his unlucky capital, the Prince had lost all authority, and his sovereignty was non-existent. There remained none of

the ten millions that had been advanced to him and which he had stupidly wasted on such things as the creation of a Cour de Cassation (High Court of Appeal) when there were not even Courts of Law ; the appointment of inspectors of public education in a country where there were no schools ; and the maintenance of Ministers appointed to foreign countries who calmly remained at home. Though he sent his Minister of Finance to Rome to obtain fresh subsidies, both Rome and Vienna turned a deaf ear. Like a speculator whose business has failed, William of Wied realised that there was nothing left for him to do but to depart. The great war had begun and was soon to cover the whole of Europe. The fleets of the Powers left Durazzo to the mercy of chance, and the Prince followed them on a small Italian yacht that had been left at his disposal. In spite of their experiences in these three months, my countrymen watched him depart with sadness, as if he were a hope that was perishing, a dream fading away. He had done nothing towards trying to understand them. He had not made a step to reach their hearts, which had been so confidently opened to him.

It only remains for us now to await the day when the representatives of civilisation and humanity, and especially those great nations which are fighting for the rights and liberties of peoples, will unite and decide on recognising our rights, which have so far unhappily been disregarded on the sole plea of trying to avoid that which was inevitable. We are convinced that a measure of justice accorded to us will be of advantage not merely for ourselves, but also for those who sought for their own aggrandisement in our destruction. The reconstitution of the Balkanic *bloc* and the guarantee of its independence will be one of the most efficacious factors for the peace of the East and of the world. This Balkan edifice can only be consolidated with and by the consolidation of Albania, which forms its fourth supporting column.

ISMAIL KEMAL BEY.

Art. 9.—SPAIN AND GERMANY.

El socialismo y el conflicto europeo. By A. Fabra Ribas.
Valencia: 'Prometeo,' 1916.

WHEN Admiral Cervera's expedition to Cuba proved to be but a forlorn hope, and Spain, in the summer of 1898, after scarcely two months of actual hostilities, saw her fleets destroyed and her armies routed, and was compelled to sue for peace, she was astounded at her own weakness, and fell into a state of languor, unexpected in a nation that had given, during several centuries, such proofs of indomitable energy. Two great mistakes caused this deplorable state of mind. Firstly, Spaniards did not ascribe the loss of the last Spanish colonies in America and Asia to Spain's iron-handed policy, to her maladministration, and her stubborn reluctance to grant those dominions a better government, though this was long since demanded, not only by the colonies themselves, but by enlightened Spanish statesmen like Maura, Labra, Pi y Margall, Salmeron, and a few others. They laid, on the contrary, all the blame of American intervention in Cuba on Europe's indifference to their cause, for, according to them, the European Powers ought to have declared war on the United States. Secondly, they ascribed their naval and military disasters not to their rulers' improvidence in failing to provide the country with better means of coping with a superior foe, but to their own national decay, and, instead of seeking its remedy, strangely pronounced it to be beyond redemption.

This second error was aggravated by an extraordinary political campaign which completed the decay of the daring spirit that had led Spain in the past to fill so many glorious pages in the history of Europe and America. From such a suicidal tendency, and notwithstanding her bitter experiences in 1870 and 1871, France was saved by a sound sense of truth, an ardent patriotism, and an unflinching decision to maintain her position among the world's Powers. With Spain, most unfortunately, the reverse happened. Misfortune steeled the French, and weakened the Spaniards. Spain, because she could not beat the United States, six or eight times stronger than herself, renounced, at once, all claim to future greatness.

The Treaty of Paris was hardly signed when Joaquín Costa, an honest, learned and eloquent man, but prone to exaggeration and extreme radical views, violently upbraided his countrymen for their lack of 'national virtues' and the loss of their 'racial manhood.' In speeches, pamphlets and books, he declared that the Spaniards were no longer capable of any great action; and this damning statement was repeated throughout Spain in public meetings and the daily press. Costa's meaning was good. An upright Aragonese, he only intended to awaken the dormant Spanish soul. But disappointed patriotism, spite, and shame, maddened him; and he went further than he probably desired. Some good things he said; he advised the Spaniards to reconstruct their finances, to start public works, to irrigate their lands, to increase the number of their schools, so as to put an end to the deplorable spectacle of Spanish illiteracy. But, at the same time, he persuaded them to abandon for ever all idea of becoming again by land or sea a strong power, to give up all dreams of political expansion, and, in order never to fight, never to have another quarrel, 'to shut with a double key the Cid Campeador's tomb,' lest the memory of his deeds might lure them some day into military adventures. On Feb. 8, 1911, Costa passed away at his modest country house in Aragon, mourned by all Spaniards, from the King to the humblest subject, but without realising either his great popularity, or the harm he had involuntarily inflicted on Spain. Byron said wrongly:

'Cervantes smiled Spain's chivalry away;
A single laugh demolished the right arm
Of his own country';

but of Costa it can be said justly; and, though his soul was no less noble and chivalrous than Cervantes', his indignation at his country's defeat demolished, not with a laugh but a curse, Spain's right arm.

Could he return to life, he would surely regret the present neutrality of Spain, for in one of his books he pointed out Germany as Spain's enemy, as the enemy of all Latin countries, as the greatest obstacle to Europe's political happiness. But undoubtedly his utterances, after 1898, combined with other causes, did much to

produce his country's, unanimous decision to remain neutral in this, the most tremendous war in history.

How far Spain has followed the first and wiser part of his advice is evident in the nation's wonderful material progress, in her ever-increasing prosperity and her brilliant intellectual renaissance. But his admonition to avoid all military enterprise they have followed too strictly. There is no country on earth in which war, for no matter what cause, is more unpopular. Spain's participation with France in Morocco, and her Moroccan zone of influence, were discussed and settled in 1905 at the Conference of Algeciras, amidst the indifference of the Spanish public. Prior to that, Señor Maura, when head of the Government, could hardly raise any enthusiasm for the reconstruction of the Spanish fleet. In 1909 military intervention at Melilla was urgently required. A call for the reserves caused a revolution at Barcelona; and Señor Maura fell from power. A few years ago, the revolutionist Pancho Villa perpetrated a wholesale massacre of Spaniards in Mexico, and threatened to assassinate many more; but not a single voice was heard in Spain demanding energetic measures. The Spaniards were only saved from extermination by the diplomatic intervention of the United States. Can anybody doubt that the Cid Campeador is well buried, and that there is not the slightest intention of reopening his tomb?

It would be unjust to believe, with Costa, that the race has lost its manhood, and allowed cowardice to overgrow its ancient spirit of heroism and knight-errantry. The Spaniards are as energetic as ever. Some recent utterances in Costa's vein, made by Spanish writers like Mariano de Cavia, Miguel de Unamuno, Roberto Castrovido and others, are the result of patriotic disappointment at not seeing in the 20th century a revival of the laurels of Lepanto and Pavia. The Spanish army behaved gallantly at El Caney and Santiago; the Spanish sailors, knowing well beforehand that they were going to face certain death, fought bravely under Montojo and Cervera in the Spanish-American war. In Africa, just now, though the Moroccan venture is universally disliked, the Spanish army is constantly giving proofs of courage, endurance and discipline. But Spanish pride cannot stand defeat; and this makes the Spaniards

despondent. When Gonzalo de Paredes and his picked followers met Bayard and his knights in battle near Barleta, and they came back to Gonzalo Fernandez de Córdoba, reporting a gallant but indecisive fight against the French, the 'Great Captain' (*el gran Capitan*), as the Spaniards call him, turned his back on Paredes and said: 'When I sent you to the field, I believed you were better.' The stricture was unjust; but, if individual characters are hard to amend, centuries only can correct a nation's errors. For the time being, Spain is disgusted with war. She believes that her past glory has cost her too dear, and she desires repose.

All important political parties in Spain are agreed on the point of neutrality; * and only two small factions, the little group of Carlists led by the bombastic Señor Vazquez Mella, and the Republican group, known as 'Radicals,' led by the far-sighted Don Alejandro Lerroux, are, more or less academically, in favour of intervention, Señor Mella on the German side, Señor Lerroux on that of the Entente. Señor Mella believes that Spain ought to contribute to the destruction of England, in retribution for the defeat of the 'Invincible Armada,' her share in the independence of Portugal, and her refusal to permit European intervention in 1898. His positive aim is the recovery of Gibraltar. The Carlists of his stamp (for there is another Carlist group headed by Señor Melgar, strongly siding with France and England) seem to believe that Germany will hand over Gibraltar to Spain after her victory, in compensation for Spanish support. Señor Lerroux, on the contrary, believes that Spain ought to fight on the side of France and England, because those countries represent the great interests of democracy and civilisation, because Germany is sure to be defeated, and because, if Spain remains neutral, she will find herself, when peace comes, isolated and friendless in the world. Similar ideas have been eloquently expressed by Señor Alvarez, leader of the ex-Republicans

* In a speech delivered on April 29, 1917, in Madrid before some 20,000 of his followers, Señor Maura declared that the 'unanimous' decision of the Spanish people was to keep aloof from the war; and he laid much stress on the questions of Gibraltar and Tangiers. As to a rupture of diplomatic relations with Germany, Señor Maura declared emphatically that there was no cause for it.

called 'Reformistas,' who, however, like the two other groups referred to, represent but a small minority in the Spanish political world. Señor Maura, who now leads a Conservative section, believes that the moment will come when Spain must interfere; the exact time and occasion he refrains from indicating. He holds that Spain's geographical position ought to incline her to the Allies; but, before taking this step, she should negotiate with England about Gibraltar, and with France about Tangiers.

These minorities, and the overwhelming majority of the large parties called Liberals and Conservatives—led respectively by Conde de Romanones and Señor Dato—and the 'Democrats,' led by Señor Garcia Prieto, Marquis of Alhucemas, the present Prime Minister, approve a policy of understanding with France and England. This, they affirm, was determined in several diplomatic conversations held at Cartagena with the English in 1902, and confirmed on President Poincaré's visit to Spain in 1913. But it is well understood that such agreements are not to involve Spain in military conflicts, a point on which ninety per cent. of the Spaniards are unyielding. The recent fall from power of Conde de Romanones affords an eloquent proof of the national determination on this point. The Premier believed that the repeated outrages against Spanish vessels committed by the German submarines required a stronger attitude towards Germany, since Spain's mild notes have received no attention at Berlin, and in the case of the 'San Tulgencio,' sunk without warning, her captain reports that the flag was insulted. But Romanones being unsupported, only two courses were left open to him—either to yield to Germany or to resign—and he adopted the latter.

It is very doubtful whether a proposal to side actively with Germany would find more than a dozen notable supporters in Spain. The most cultivated and intellectual Spaniards—Galdos, Picon, the Archbishop of Tarragona (Don Antolin Lopez y Pelaez), Labra, and all the others already mentioned—sympathise with the Allies, the majority among them mainly with France. Pablo Iglesias, leader of the organised socialists, is also sympathetic. Yet all these advocate a 'friendly neutrality,' and, when the question of active support is discussed,

they sadly confess, more or less openly, their gloomy lack of confidence in Spain's ability to be a useful ally, either by land or by sea. Such is the conclusion arrived at by Señor Fabra Ribas in his book on 'Socialism and the European Conflict,' when discussing Spain's position. He ardently wishes to see his country on the side of humanity, freedom and civilisation, but only giving moral support and providing the Allies with such material products as they require. When explaining why Spain should not fight, he points out her military impotence; and Costa's pessimism recurs in his remarkable book.

The Germans, naturally, have turned this state of national languor to their own advantage. Their propaganda has been actively carried on in the Spanish book-market since 1914. Translations into Spanish of fiery Pangermanist works have flooded the bookshops of Madrid and every provincial capital. Like true products of German industry, they are cheap, bad and showy. Generally printed at Barcelona or Valencia—or feigned to be so—on cheap paper, they are bound in gorgeous cloth, with gilt ornaments, and the Prussian eagle stamped on motley covers. Naturally, Prince von Bülow and General von Bernhardt were among the first German writers to appear in this guise in Spain, followed by an army of *Herren Professoren* declaiming on Germany's 'greatness' in science, art, industry and commerce, Germany's 'organisation,' Germany's 'invincibility,' Germany's 'providential mission,' and Germany's 'duty and right to teach and rule the world.'

Besides these, several volumes have appeared, written, or pretending to be written, by Spanish admirers of the 'colossal empire.' They repeat the worn-out charges against England, launched from Berlin during the last three years. The authors of such 'Spanish' books are, as a rule, the same persons who wage a furious Germanophile campaign in the Spanish daily press. According to them, or to their inspirers, England deliberately provoked the European conflict, lured France and Belgium into a conspiracy to attack Germany, and caused the ruin of Spain by her constant envy and hatred of the Spanish nation from the 15th century down to our own

time. They dilate on these topics with a stubbornness worthy of their Teutonic masters. It is curious to see how they distort the history of Spain to suit their purposes. Philip II, for instance, is the greatest of Spanish kings to their minds. Why? For his Catholic ideas, perhaps? Not in the least; for his rivalry against England. The present German Kaiser—who is far from being a Catholic—they call 'Philip II's heir and executor.' They hate the wise and liberal monarch Don Carlos III. Is it because he expelled the Jesuits and attempted to introduce reforms in the American colonies? No; merely because the saying is ascribed to him that Spain could be at war with the whole world, but ought to remain at peace with England. ('Con todo el mundo en guerra, y en paz con Inglaterra.')

What have the Allies' friends done to counterbalance this Germanophile propaganda? Their books—less, perhaps, in number—are the real works of Spanish minds, without foreign influences and suggestions, and undoubtedly better. 'Los cuatro jinetes del Apocalipsis,' by Vicente Blasco Ibañez, will keep a distinguished place among the best productions of that ingenuous and forcible novelist, the author of 'Sangre y arena.' It is one of the most interesting novels which the war scenes in France have inspired. His 'Historia de la guerra europea,' which competes with the Spanish translation, ably made by Señor Ruiz Contreras of Hanotaux's similar book, is no less commendable. Alberto Insúa, a young and popular romancer, has begun a series of stories, full of psychological insight and pathos, on the subject of the invasion of France; and Alvaro Alcalá Galiano has proved himself a redoubtable polemist by exposing German methods and intrigues in 'La verdad sobre la guerra,' and 'España y el conflicto europeo.'

But the most notable of all Spanish books about the war, for its startling revelations and its staunch defence of England and France, is 'El socialismo y el conflicto europeo,' by A. Fabra Ribas. This writer arraigns the German social-democratic party, exposes its treachery to the French, British, Belgian and Russian socialists, puts to shame its leaders, reveals the importance of their treachery, and proves, beyond doubt, the responsibility of the Austrian and German Governments, as authors of

the European conflagration and their complicity with the German social-democracy. To my mind, the celebrated 'J'accuse,' by 'A German,' now read in all languages, is the only book of its kind in Europe comparable with this for the strength of its arguments. Yet it seems less original. While the German author avails himself of the official documents published by the European Governments, the Spaniard, without disregarding that class of proofs, presents others, no less convincing, from the secret records of the International Socialist party, and relates what he had seen and observed among the Germans. His work has the apparent defect of being too partisan. It is written not for the general public, but for the active members of the Spanish socialist party, and devoted to their interests. But just in this apparent narrowness of purpose lies one of its principal merits.

Fabra Ribas was a prominent member of the now divided, nay, the almost extinguished, 'International,' and is well known as such both in the belligerent countries and in Spain. He has been, and still is, an editorial writer in 'L'Humanité' of Paris and 'El Socialista' of Madrid, and was, before the war, a contributor to the 'Vorwärts' of Berlin. M. Grigor Alexinsky, the socialist ex-deputy to the Duma for Petrograd, has written a preface for his book. Fabra Ribas has known personally many of the dead socialist leaders, and knows all the living ones of whom he speaks. He resided in Germany four years, teaching the Spanish language, and has made the acquaintance of many persons in all classes of German society. He denounces the German military class as a social plague, and has studied it, on its own ground, as well as the German social-democracy. He taught Spanish in the High Military School at Berlin, and had, among his pupils, officers whose names have been often quoted since, and not certainly for praiseworthy deeds, in the campaigns against Belgium and France. At night he worked some hours in the 'Vorwärts' office, and visited during the daytime, for the purpose of giving lessons, the houses of aristocratic and well-to-do families. Knowing thus what may be called the two extremes of German life, the highest—excepting the Court in its official

functions—and the lowest, what he says on the tyranny of the Government, on the prejudices, insolence and narrow-mindedness of the military, and on the people's tameness and submission to its rulers (a submission which in August 1914 baffled in a few hours so many expectations based on the energy and capacity of the German Socialists) is not, indeed, new, but is highly important, as the testimony of an eye-witness who, at the same time, is a neutral.

It appears evident from the facts adduced by Fabra Ribas, who was in Paris on July 31 when Jaurès was assassinated, and was with the great orator in his last moments, that the man who cut the life of that upright and earnest believer in universal brotherhood saved him from a bitter disappointment. The French Socialists had many reasons to suspect the good faith of their German partisans, but, nevertheless, they fulfilled their share of the task imposed on them, as regards the French Government, by the International Socialist Bureau, with unflinching energy and loyalty to their cause. That task, which Jaurès carried out until the very day of his death, was to induce the French Government to put pressure on the Russian to exhaust all peaceful means before entering upon a war with Austria-Hungary. The Austrian and German Socialists were to apply similar pressure at Vienna and Berlin. Fabra Ribas confesses that the mission was not a difficult one for the French. It consisted—such are his words—‘in convincing one already convinced,’ for the French Government desired nothing but peace, and the Russian shared the same feelings.

The Socialists in France, England and Russia could do nothing, in July and August 1914, beyond watching their Governments and approving their conduct. But the German and Austrian Socialists have done much more. They had pledged their word to oppose the war and to create for their Governments, in order to fulfil this promise, as many difficulties as possible. Far from doing so, they supported those Governments in their criminal attitude, and removed the main obstacle in the way of war, namely, the opposition of the socialist masses. At the International Socialist Congress held in Brussels on

July 29, 1914, just when the Austrian Government had thrown off its mask and shown to the world its cruel purpose with regard to Serbia, the Austrian Socialists exhibited their weakness and incapacity. The sessions of that Congress were secret. Fabra Ribas describes with vivid colours the bad effect produced on the assembly by the speech of the Austrian delegate Adler, who confessed his party's inability to take any energetic and decisive stand. Adler, in spite of his personal prestige and influence, recognised by our author, who does not seem to doubt his honesty, was a wet blanket; and those who most indignantly protested against him were not the French, but the German delegates. Not only in the Brussels Congress, but in Germany itself, the Social Democracy appeared in those moments almost heroic. Fabra Ribas quotes at length the pithy articles published in the 'Vorwärts' against Austria, the same newspaper's threats against the German Government, and its courageous criticism even of the Kaiser. He gives also an extract of Haase's speech in Brussels answering that of Adler. Haase, one of the German delegates, announced that, just when he was speaking, his brethren were repelling by force the Berlin police, and bravely assured his audience that the Social Democracy would always stand by its word. Jaurés did not conceal his joy, and notwithstanding that he was unwell, rose up and thanked the Germans. The Congress of Brussels, says Fabra Ribas, was the last public act of the International; and Jaurés' oration, inspired by Haase's, the last he pronounced.

Three days later, on the momentous Aug. 1, when Jaurés had been assassinated, when Germany had declared war on Russia and presented her ultimatum to France, Müller, a commissioner from the German Socialists, arrived in Paris to assure the French that the party's deputies at the Reichstag were not going to vote the credits required for the war by the German Government. Müller added that the party was divided merely on matters of detail and procedure, but insisted that the rejection of the war credits was 'beyond discussion.' The importance of this declaration and of the hopes it raised, are brought out by Fabra Ribas in a remarkable passage. He calls to mind the statement made by Bebel

at the Socialist Congress of Jena in 1905. 'A war against the decided will of the masses,' Bebel said, 'is utterly impossible.' In Germany, he added, 'there is an organised proletariat; and its members constitute not battalions, but whole regiments of the army. If the Reserve and *Landwehr* are called to arms, there will be whole brigades completely formed by Socialists.' When Bebel spoke thus, Fabra Ribas remarks, the Social Democracy had recently cast, in the elections of 1903, a total of 3,010,000 votes.

'What would Bebel have said in 1914'—the Spanish author adds—'when the Social Democracy possessed 86 daily newspapers; when, of the 397 deputies in the Reichstag, 113 were Social democrats; when the Socialist parliamentary minority was stronger than all the other Liberal and Conservative groups put together, and when the 4,239,000 Socialist votes cast in 1912 represented one-third of the total cast in all Germany? The vote of the Social Democracy was not, therefore, the mere expression of an opinion with a moral weight as that of the Serbian Socialist party or even of the Italian would be. It was a vote on which peace or war depended, a vote which, given on the side of the Government, meant an absolute conformity with the principles of the German military party and the complete renunciation of Socialist ideals in favour of those of the Kaiser's followers. The German Socialist parliamentary minority had always voted, in conformity with instructions given at the meetings of the International, against the war budgets. Was the situation in 1914 less clear than in 1870? Could the Social Democracy believe in 1914 that the war was defensive?'

Fabra Ribas refers also to the many resolutions adopted on previous occasions by the Social Democracy, to the effect that they would never give either a man or a penny (*Keinen Mann und keinen Groschen*) for a war. But on Aug. 4, the Social Democracy in the Reichstag voted for the war credits; and that same Haase, the man who spoke so fiercely at Brussels, though he stood with the few still objecting faintly to the war, accepted the rôle of a mouthpiece of the majority, and read the incredible declaration that, Germany being attacked and her independence in jeopardy, it was the duty of all Germans to defend their country's life and liberty. That this colossal lie, with which the German Government has thrown and is still throwing dust in the eyes of the

German people, could not be believed, and was not believed, by any intelligent Socialist, Fabra Ribas proves by many quotations from Socialist speeches delivered before 1914. All Germany's military adventures in the 19th century, from the wars with Denmark in 1864 and with Austria in 1866, to that of 1870 against France, were, according to the German and Prussian Governments, purely defensive. 'Aggression marked as defensive war' was a favourite trick of Bismarck's, and consequently a trick as well known to the German Socialists as to everybody conversant with modern European history. William II having followed the old Chancellor's tactics (tactics already found out by public opinion) has deceived only those who wished to be deceived; and the action of the German Social Democracy has one name only, which the Spanish author does not hesitate to pronounce—treachery. With the exception of Liebknecht, and a very few others, the German Socialist deputies are traitors to their cause, and share the German Government's responsibility for the greatest calamity of history.

Fabra Ribas does not definitely state the cause of that treachery. After reading his book one is inclined to believe that in his opinion the Social Democracy was cowed by the Government, because the Germans are incapable of shaking off that submissiveness to their rulers above referred to, which has made them the victims and the tools of tyranny. Many facts related by our author remind us of Heine's words in 'De l'Allemagne': 'We Germans always do whatever our princes command us to do.' Spain is often quoted as the stronghold of monarchical loyalty in Southern Europe, and Russia as holding a similar position in the North. But Buckle, after having exhausted the subject of Spanish monarchical loyalty, pronounced the Germans to be much more submissive to their princes than the Spaniards. Kohl, in a book about Russia quoted by Buckle himself, declares that the Germans are more obedient to their Governments than the Russians. 'The Germans,' Kohl says, 'cling to the present, and, whatever may be the origin or nature of the governing authority for the time being, they always show themselves faithful to it.' The Germanophile books published in Spain present the Germans

as a liberty-loving people which sets reason and right above authority. A decisive argument which they adduce is that Luther was a German and the Reformation a German work, as if it were not well known, even by schoolboys, that, without the support of the Princes who backed up Luther, the Reformation in Germany would have been nipped in the bud, no matter how right its cause were, and how corrupt the Roman Church.

Such a national character could not fail to show itself in the most trying moments of Germany's history in 1914. But the tameness of the Germans, even of those belonging to a party which, like the Social Democracy, was essentially one of opposition, is described by Fabra Ribas in relating his personal experiences in Berlin, seven years before that date. It was in February 1907, just after the general elections to the Reichstag. The Socialists expected a great victory. Bebel had predicted it to Fabra Ribas in a statement published by 'El Socialista' in Madrid. But, in spite of the fact that they cast a larger number of votes than in the previous election, the party lost 41 seats out of the 81 it previously held. It is true that they were unlawfully lost, by corrupt and fraudulent means. Only in Berlin, where the Socialists, as usual, won five of the six seats representing the capital, were they really successful. When the news from the provinces began to arrive, and when the Socialists learned their defeat, they were astounded. The supporters of the Government, on the other hand, were proportionately elated. Suddenly, spontaneously, a Nationalist demonstration was organised by some ten or twelve thousand persons who paraded the streets shouting 'Death to the Social-democrats,' and 'Long live the Kaiser and Germany.' It was dark already, and the demonstrators marched up the Wilhelmstrasse, passed with a triumphant air through Unter den Linden and presented themselves before the imperial palace, asking the Kaiser to deliver a speech. William II and the Empress stood at a balcony, and the Kaiser, very willing to comply with his people's wishes and display his oratorial faculties, thundered out: *Silentium!* The twelve thousand persons instantly obeyed, and not a whisper was heard while His Imperial Majesty congratulated them on their victory. He ended by quoting Kleist's verses which say that, under

whatever rule our enemy is defeated, once his banners lie at our feet, that rule is the highest. A more shameless acknowledgment of the illegitimate processes by which the Socialists had been defeated, could not be asked.

Fabra Ribas, after remarking that Spaniards would have indignantly and fiercely protested against such outrages, declares that he was expecting to see, at any moment, the hundreds of thousands of Berlin Socialists—the *Arbeiterbataillonen*, as Lassalle called them—come out into the streets and massacre the provoking Nationalists, who were cheering the Kaiser. But nothing of the sort happened. Crestfallen and downhearted, the Socialists remained in their retreats, in the *Bier-* and *Weinstuben*, sadly commenting on their disaster. 'Never in my life,' the Spaniard says, 'had I suffered such a humiliation.' Next morning he frankly told his friends the impression made on him by the night's events. He assured them that at Madrid, Barcelona, Valencia or Bilbao the Socialists would not have swallowed such insults, or left unpunished such gross injustice. But they answered that it was useless to spend energy in futile struggles, and that the party was keeping its strength for the day of 'the decisive battle.' Fabra Ribas admired their wisdom, and believed in their threat. The day of the decisive battle arrived.

'The European war came (he says); the German Kaiserists wished to make of Europe an immense slaughter-house; and the German Socialist party, which had never wasted its energies in a revolutionary attempt, which had never committed any act of force, bowed to William II and said to him: "Lord, thy will be done!"'

Fabra Ribas observes that this has been the result of the Kaiser's iron rule, a rule which prevails everywhere within his empire, in the schools, in the barracks, in the homes. After reading this book one is forced to conclude that the Germans are born slaves, educated for slavery and content with their lot. How, then, does the Spanish author expect that some day, and by the Germans' own efforts, if not a Social republic, a democracy or a Liberal régime, at least, should be established there? Such an expectation does not correspond with the premises he sets forth. It is the same hope, vainly entertained by

Heine, in contradiction also with his own statements about his countrymen's political subjection. Heine died in the delusions of the Young Germany, of the New Germany, which, according to him and a few other dreamers, was ready to rise up at any moment, and strike a deadly blow at her tyrants. It was a dream, indeed. Spain had her revolution in 1808, has now a constitutional monarchy, and enjoys a Liberal administration. Russia has lately proved to the world that her sons are capable of uniting their efforts to defend their rights. But Germany has never revolted, and seems, on the contrary, proud of the barbarity of her rulers. Having played so great a rôle in the 18th and early 19th centuries in nearly all the highest spheres of the human intellect, she stopped there, and presents in the 20th the melancholy spectacle of a nation enjoying a wonderful material development, but living, politically and socially, in the darkness and ignorance of four hundred years ago. Her salvation is not to be expected, therefore, from within, but from without. If it ever comes, it will come as a consequence of the war, as one of the blessings to the human race from the utter defeat of 'Kaiserism' by the freer nations against whose life William II and his accomplices have conspired. When 'Kaiserism' is crushed, then the Young Germany, the New Germany, will become a reality, and will love her conquerors, for Germany, like the Brünhild of her old epic poem—'the Amazon-Queen of Isenstein'—is fighting against her saviours, and needs, for her own happiness, to be vanquished by them.

JOSÉ DE ARMAS.

Art. 10.—SOME ELEMENTS OF THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION.

ONE of the most dangerous features of contemporary thought is the neurasthenic impulsiveness which makes it a prey to changing moods and suggestions. 'Yellow Press' methods have never reached such a pitch of hypnotic power as in the days of Kaiser Wilhelm and of his journalistic compeers. As regards Russia, such methods have been especially harmful; there was a time—not very long ago—when it was deemed necessary to humour Russian autocracy as the creed, the 'Islam' of the Russian people. We witness now a kind of stampede in the direction of general disappointment and distrust. Fortunately this sway of melodramatic impressionism has its limits; a time comes when the call for trustworthy information and conscientious reflexion asserts itself with invincible force. And the best means to do justice to this claim is to attend not only to occasional snapshots, but to the historical setting of events.

The pyramid of Russian society, though shaken in its very foundations by the catastrophe of March, can certainly not be overturned or dissolved by them. Three of its social layers seem to be especially worthy of attention—the bureaucratic civil service, the intellectuals, and the peasantry. These three groups do not constitute the whole of the Russian nation, and a more complete survey would have to give an account of other classes—for example, of the clergy and of the town workmen. But, as want of space does not allow me to discuss the subject from all possible points of view, I will not treat of the established church, the members of which before the Revolution were closely connected with the official class. Nor can I speak of the town proletariat, though it is very much to the fore just at present; it is led by the intellectuals and dependent on the eventual support of the overwhelming peasant majority of the population.

Russian bureaucracy is not a product of chance; it owes its existence and its traditions of military discipline to the fact that it was founded by the Tsars of Moscow, as French bureaucracy was formed by Kings, to gather

and consolidate a nation during centuries of a desperate struggle for existence. As a great historian has expressed it, there was a commander in Moscow, there were officers, there were soldiers, but there were no citizens. What was the salvation of Russia grew to be a yoke; and, when the Germans came in after Peter the Great, the State assumed the aspect of a country under foreign domination. I will not repeat familiar tales of corruption and oppression, but one point has to be emphasised. The most terrible curse of this system was the necessity of periodical and savage 'repressions'—the cutting-down of unruly idealists, who under a healthier rule might have developed into excellent workers. The ever-recurring University riots, for instance, were not essentially the outcome of insane ambition on the part of the students; they were abnormal forms of protest and opposition, against which authority asserted itself by 'sending down' and sometimes exiling thousands of youths on whom the affection of their parents and the hopes of the country had been centred. In a sense the system may be said to have been supported by a careful elimination of the fittest.

Nevertheless this cruel and arbitrary bureaucracy was neither confident nor solid. Air and light could not be kept out of the Empire of the Tsars; and its civil servants were curiously divided in their views and sympathies, yielding sometimes to one and sometimes to another motive in their actions. One of the chief occupations of clever bureaucrats was to criticise and to oppose each other. Von Plehve and Witte were considered in their time intellectual giants and towers of strength in the service of autocratic bureaucracy. Is it not odd that they should have constantly contradicted and counter-acted one another? To take one case out of many—in 1903 Witte, then Minister of Finance, became alarmed at the threatening aspects of an economic situation in which the welfare of the people was undermined by exorbitant fiscal claims. At his suggestion an Imperial commission was instituted, to enquire into the condition of agriculture and the needs of the rural classes. The cooperation of Zemstvo elements was sought, and the representatives of the self-governing institutions were invited to express opinions fearlessly and freely. When,

however, some of these gentlemen ventured to hint that the decay of country life was to be explained, to a great extent, by the lawless practices of petty officials and the rightless conditions of the peasantry, the dreaded Minister of the Interior intervened in a drastic manner, exiling some of the advisers of his colleague and suspending others from their functions. One of the sufferers, Mr Martinoff, a Voronesh landowner, not unnaturally complained that the Minister of Finance had entrapped him into an action which from the point of view of the Minister of the Interior was a punishable offence.

The feuds between officials sometimes helped and often harmed the interests of the State; it was, for example, a common belief that the parcelling up of educational institutions among various Ministries was a protection against the arbitrary methods of the Ministry of Public Instruction. In many cases one could trace the redeeming influences of humanitarian ideals in the psychology of prominent officials. Prince Serge Urusoff, for instance, the gifted governor of Bessarabia, who succeeded in restoring to some extent the moral authority of the Imperial Government in Kishineff after the horrors of the pogrom of 1903, tells us in his memoirs that, though he knew nothing of the Jewish question when he arrived in Bessarabia, his conduct towards the Jews was prompted by the notions of justice and morality which he had acquired in the course of his education—in the lecture-rooms of the University of Moscow, I may add, without fear of committing an indiscretion.

The atmosphere of civic ideals has sometimes taken hold even of men brought up under special conditions in establishments created for the distinct purpose of turning out members of a privileged and subservient class; witness the career of General Rostovtzeff, an official who, when he was placed at the head of the military schools of the Empire, inaugurated his accession to his high office by declaring that the sovereign power is an incarnation of the public conscience, and that its decrees make it unnecessary for officials to seek guidance in their own private conscience. And yet this apostle of the renunciation of individual responsibility, the exponent of this singular variation of Loyola's famous direction to the Jesuits—'to be as a corpse' (*perinde ac cadaver*)—

developed into a staunch and enthusiastic adherent of Alexander II's emancipation policy, faithful even unto death—he succumbed to the strain of the reform work in 1860.

But the most glorious example in Russian modern history of the results achieved by a comprehensive and idealistic reform movement is presented by the evolution of the Law Courts. The tribunals of the reign of Nicholas I were notorious for their worthlessness and corruption; 'they were overlaid with black injustice,' as a leading slavophile has expressed it. And yet the reform of the judicature carried out in 1864 was a brilliant success; it led to the creation of a Bench conspicuous for integrity, equity and public zeal, and of a Bar distinguished by skill, eloquence and independent spirit. It is only under the influence of political reaction that the reputation of Russian courts has been tarnished to some extent by subserviency and prejudice; and yet, even now, the judicial order has kept on a much higher level than administrative bureaucracy. The wonderful regeneration of the judicature in the sixties was undoubtedly the result of an influx of generous idealists from the ranks of the educated class. In other words, arbitrary bureaucracy was suffering from a mortal disease long before the final breakdown of 1917. Like the King's servants of the *ancien régime* in France, it was yielding to the irresistible influence of its enemies—the Intellectuals.

The evolution of Russia has, without doubt, been unfavourably affected by the cultural dualism which dates in a general way from Peter the Great's reform. Petrograd and Moscow—the pupils of French and German teachers on one hand, the Old Ritualists on the other—symbolise the sharp contrasts of point of view and methods. For some time Russian educational systems produced 'foreigners in their own country,' men severed from national traditions. But what is really to be wondered at is, not that there should have been such a period in the history of Russia—this was a necessary prologue to a closer intercourse with European civilisation—but rather that the conditions of this period should have given way so rapidly before a healthier and more

independent type of development. The process, evident in many directions, is remarkably illustrated by the rapid advance of Russian literature. After the laborious exercises of Lomonosoff and of Derjavin it passed through a brilliant spring time in the age of Pushkin, whose creations, while powerfully influenced by foreign masters, especially Shakespeare and Byron, glow with independent beauty. With Tolstoy and Dostoyevsky, Russian literature has come of age and attained a standard which challenges comparison with the greatest literary productions of neighbouring countries.

In political matters progress was not quite so rapid, but it was nevertheless clearly marked. If we look back no further than to the beginning of the Reform period of the sixties, we have to notice two great currents among the intellectuals, one leading up to the Liberal parties of the Duma and the Constitutional parties of the present time, the other to the various groups of militant socialism which are so prominent in the contemporary politics of Russia. The first of these currents proceeds directly from the literary movement of Nicholas I's reign and from the practical reformers of Alexander II's period. It bears the stamp of what may be termed middle-class culture or 'bourgeoisie.' Its principal contribution to the political education of Russia is embodied in the magnificent work of the Zemstvos and the municipalities, which have been struggling for fifty years to build up Russian self-government, popular education, and public health, and have applied scientific statistical and economic methods to this task.

I need hardly speak of the direct political manifestations of these groups in the four Dumas of the pre-revolutionary period. But it is necessary to refer briefly to the manner in which this work was developed and made effective by the so-called Unions—the great associations of local workers created for the purpose of supplementing the insufficient activity of the official State in time of distress and danger. While, in great emergencies, the bureaucratic system was found wanting again and again, the Zemstvo and town organisations came forward in full strength and filled up the most important gaps. The story of official breakdowns, followed by astonishing recoveries through the help of the country units, was

repeated over and over again with the same characteristic sequence of stages. In the beginning the Imperial Government would turn for assistance to the self-governing bodies, because it could not master the situation arising from a famine, or a pestilence, or war; then the Zemstvos and towns mobilised their forces by calling in workers from all classes of the population and forming unions on a national basis; ultimately, the Government, when the storm had been weathered, would disband the improvised organisations that had achieved the work and remunerate their services by reproofs and penalties.

The first performance of this kind took place in the years 1891-92, when the Zemstvos mobilised to meet a famine produced by a failure of crops. In 1897-98 the Zemstvos and municipalities repeated the attempt at national work on a minor scale, and provoked similar displeasure on the part of the Government. In 1904, when the Japanese war broke out, a Zemstvo Union was organised to assist the Army in the rear, under the leadership of the Chairman of the Moscow Executive board, D. Shipoff, and of Prince George Lvoff, who thus made a name for the first time, as an indefatigable worker and an able organiser of national resources.

The same problem arose, with much greater force, in connexion with the present world-war. It was again out of the question for the Imperial Government to cope single-handed with the immense task of organising the rear. Simultaneously with the declaration of war, steps were taken to group the Zemstvos and the municipalities of the Empire in vast associations. In August 1914 two Unions were formed, in close contact with one another and yet distinct—the Union of the Zemstvos, with Prince Lvoff at its head, and the Union of the towns, with M. Chelnokoff, the former Mayor of Moscow, as President. The magnitude of the work performed by these Unions may be gathered from the fact that between them they fitted out and kept up no less than 400,000 hospital beds and attended to 2,000,000 cases in the course of 1914 and 1915. It would be impossible to enumerate the cases in which help was rendered to refugees, to crippled soldiers, to prisoners of war, to the destitute and unemployed. By Jan. 1, 1916, the General Staff had transferred to the Zemstvo Union for various

purposes 152,000,000 R. and the Commissariat 30,000,000 R., apart from the money voted by the Zemstvos themselves. The Union employed 15,000 persons in its service. The figures of the Urban Unions are of a similar nature.

In addition to this many-sided activity for organising the rear, the Unions assumed most responsible and difficult new tasks in consequence of the breakdown of the regular administration in departments under its immediate control. The chief of these breakdowns was the failure to supply the Army with proper artillery and munitions, which led to the disastrous retreat from Galicia, Poland and Lithuania. The Unions held congresses in June 1915, and decided to start munition works of their own to assist the Army. They joined hands in this case, and formed a special association, commonly called the Zemgor.

In spite of their fragmentary nature, these data will probably suffice to establish the claim of the Unions to have performed patriotic services of the highest kind. But, instead of the recognition they deserved, the efforts of the country associations were regarded with ever-increasing suspicion and hostility by the ruling bureaucracy. Nothing would please the officials and courtiers—for the simple reason that every success of the Unions was regarded as a reproach by those who had failed in the same field.

It is of the utmost importance to note that the workers gradually proceeded from schemes of reform to distinctly revolutionary tendencies. In December 1916 the discontent in Union circles had reached the revolutionary boiling point. The humiliating challenge addressed by the Duma to the Stürmer Government, the 'leap-frog' game of fleeting Ministries, the quashing of the Moscow elections, the prohibition of Union congresses, had brought the feelings of the country to such a pitch that the Revolution was openly proclaimed to be the one remedy against political gangrene. Speaking at a meeting of Zemstvo delegates, Prince Lvoff said, among other things:

'The ancient sore of discord between Government and Society has spread all over the country like leprosy; it has

penetrated even into Imperial palaces. We feel indeed that the words of the Gospel are coming true for us: "A Kingdom divided against itself cannot stand." Do we not feel that our great Empire is divided against itself? The Government is irresponsible, not merely in regard to the country and the Duma, but also to the Sovereign; it is engaged in the criminal attempt to charge him with entire responsibility for the administration, and is thereby exposing the country to the menace of a Revolution.'

It is all-important to realise how intimately the Zemstvo movement was connected with the approaching Revolution; it formed, as it were, the background of the opposition in the Duma, and it supplemented in many respects the agitation spreading among the working-men and in the Army. It would, therefore, be a great mistake to suppose that the events of last March were exclusively the result of the street fighting in Petrograd. The widespread discontent of the provincial organisations ensured the rapid acceptance of the New Régime by the whole of Russia. Another significant feature of the activity of the Unions was their breaking away from the franchise limitations imposed by the provincial and municipal statutes. Although these statutes were framed for the distinct purpose of keeping local self-government within the bounds of very restricted oligarchies, it was impossible to maintain the narrow franchise regulations when social work on a great scale had to be organised. Workers were called in from all classes of the population and welded into efficient groups by the local leaders. Altogether, the Union movement stands out in Russian history as a remarkable instance of practical ability and self-sacrificing energy. It is to be hoped that it may be revived for general political purposes with similar success.

In contrast with the Zemstvo line of development we notice the growth of purely revolutionary parties led by members of liberal professions—lawyers, journalists, doctors, teachers, engineers. Turgeneff's Bazaroff, the nihilist, may be taken as a literary figure representative of this type of men, a rough, energetic, bitter materialist, who delights in ruffling the feelings of people clinging to old-fashioned ideas and customs. The type prospered in the atmosphere of bitter discontent and disappointment

characteristic of the Old Régime. The constructive thought of these revolutionaries followed several distinct channels, but it is especially important to keep in view two principal varieties: first, the so-called Popular Socialists, whose pedigree may be traced to the 'people's party' (*narodniki*) of the eighties and, in a more remote sense, to the slavophiles; secondly, the Social Democrats, who have adopted and modified in various degrees the doctrines of Karl Marx. The first group looks for inspiration and guidance to Russian folklore and communal life. Many of its adherents are pacifists by temperament, but they do not follow an international programme; they are keenly alive to the organic value of national life, and naturally gravitate towards a policy of 'active defence' in the present war. With most of the Social Democrats, the watchword of class-war dominates the situation. Although the most clear-sighted among them, *e.g.* Plekhanoff or Tseretelli, understand perfectly well the necessity of national cohesion and of strenuous cooperation with the Allies against Kaiserism, a large number are devoted to the cult of formulas inspired by internationalism and craftily exploited by the Power most hostile to any kind of international peace organisation.

The magic power of crisp formulas like that of the 'Four Tails' suffrage (equal, universal, secret, direct vote), or that of 'no indemnities and no annexation,' is enormous among Russian intellectuals, who have been accustomed for years to take refuge from practical disappointments on the unassailable heights of abstract thought. But there is more than this in the 'no annexation' watchword. It has been handed over direct from the workshop of a militant internationalism which is equally hostile to all national 'capitalistic' governments, to France, Great Britain, the United States, as well as to Germany or Austria. Indeed, its polemical zeal is directed nowadays more against Lloyd George, Ribot, and Wilson than against the Kaiser, because these three statesmen have staunch and outspoken supporters in Russia, while the supporters of the Kaiser are pleased to don the red cloak of international socialism. In this connexion I may be allowed to remind the readers of the 'Quarterly Review' of the fact that the formula

insisted upon with such asperity by the Petrograd Council of Workmen and Soldiers is not an invention of that body, but simply borrowed from the Zimmerwald manifesto, signed in September 1915 on behalf of the Russian Social Democrats by N. Lenin and on behalf of the Swiss by Robert Grimm. Here are some significant passages from that manifesto.

'The ruling forces of capitalist society, in whose hands were the destinies of nations, the monarchical and the republican governments, secret diplomacy, the mighty employers' organisations, the middle-class parties, the capitalist press, the Church—all these forces must carry the full weight of responsibility for this war, which has been produced by the social order nourishing them and protecting them, and which is being carried on for the sake of their interests. . . . In this intolerable situation we have met together—we representatives of Socialist parties, of trade unions, or of minorities of them, we Germans, French, Italians, Russians, Poles, Letts, Roumanians, Bulgarians, Swedes, Norwegians, Dutch and Swiss, we who are standing on the ground, not of national solidarity with the exploiting class, but of the international solidarity of the workers and the class struggle. . . . This struggle is also the struggle for liberty, for brotherhood of nations, for Socialism. The task is to take up this fight for peace—for *peace without annexations or war indemnities*. Such a peace is only possible when every thought of violating the rights and liberties of the nations is condemned. There must be no violent incorporation either of wholly or partly occupied countries. No annexations either open or masked, likewise no forced economic union. . . . The right of nations to dispose of themselves must be the immovable fundamental principle of international relations.' ('Justice,' Sept. 30, 1915.)

It seems to me that such a reference is not without its significance. The Russian extremists, intoxicated by their victory over Tsarism, find it opportune to raise the banner of revolt against the middle classes and the Governments of Europe, in spite of the fact that they are clearly helping to save the one really dangerous and aggressive Government from destruction. Their revolutionary and internationalist associations are obvious; and one can understand that the bait which they are holding out to their misinformed countrymen, in the shape of confiscations and expropriations, may be alluring enough

to draw big crowds to their side for a time. But I refuse to believe that either the majority of the Russian intellectuals or the bulk of the Russian people will submit to the hypnotism of the Zimmerwald formula and renounce the alliance with the civilised Powers of the West for the sake of a Utopia of socialistic upheaval. The decisive word is sure to be spoken by the peasants, who form 80 per cent. of the population of Russia.

It would be altogether wrong to apply standards of ordinary legality to the present condition of the rural classes in Russia. Even apart from the general excitement and fermentation produced by the revolutionary crisis, the peasantry have long-standing grievances and claims. To understand the situation one must remember that serfdom in Russia was never recognised by the subject population as a conclusive legal arrangement. The people retained an instinctive and stubborn notion that their subjection to the squires was a matter of political necessity and not of private law. More especially, as regards land, they never ceased to consider it as soil belonging to the tiller. There was a quaint saying commonly used in the days of serfdom by the peasants. They would say to their masters, 'We are yours, but the land is ours.' The historical Mir community enabled them to maintain their class consciousness right through the days of servitude; and, when emancipation came in 1861, it was regarded not as a new arrangement, but as a restitution of historic rights. From this point of view it seemed to be incomplete and unsatisfactory. About one-fifth of the area formerly occupied by the peasants had to be surrendered as a result of division with the squires; the rest of the land was charged with heavy redemption payments; the holdings formed at the time were exceedingly unequal in size and value—five millions of them contained less than three acres each, and yet the normal size of the holding of a family of five was supposed to average 28 acres.

During the fifty years which followed the emancipation, the pressure of the rural masses on the land kept steadily increasing. Statisticians tell us that the yearly increase of population in Russia amounts to 1,600,000. How could this increase be disposed of? The industrial

development is still in such a backward condition that only about one-fourth of the increase finds an outlet in urban life and industrial work. Colonisation is still flowing towards the East, but opportunities for settlement are becoming more and more infrequent, owing to natural conditions and the insufficiency of Government support. Irrigation, means of communication and facilities of transport, credit to colonists and assistance in acquiring machinery and tools—all these requirements of a colonising policy on a large scale are still very imperfectly represented in Russia. As a result, only one-sixth of the superfluous population finds its way out of the congested districts by emigration. Of course the congestion is to a large extent a matter of proportion, and corresponds to a primitive system of extensive husbandry, with a prevailing three-course rotation of crops. If improved methods and modern machinery were introduced, the whole aspect of the situation would be changed. The substitution of intensive for extensive culture would be equivalent to a grant of 200,000,000 additional acres to the country; but such a process demands time and cannot be improvised by command. It should be intimately connected with a clear-sighted economic policy and energetic assistance on the part of the Government—matters in which the Old Régime, in spite of spasmodic efforts, was conspicuously deficient.

Even under these conditions cultivation was gradually becoming more productive, and agricultural progress was noticeable everywhere, but the gains in this direction were entirely out of proportion with the growth of the requirements of the rural classes. The ever-increasing pressure on the land induced the peasants to buy or rent plots at extremely high prices. In the competition with other social groups for possession of the soil they were gradually ousting in most provinces both the squires and the commercial owners, but they were overstraining their forces in the process; and threatening symptoms of economic deterioration were manifesting themselves in the shape of heavy indebtedness, an insufficient stock of cattle, bad harvests, and other defects.

A first warning was given to the established powers by the risings of the peasantry in 1905, when, in the atmosphere of revolutionary excitement, agrarian outrages

and forcible expropriations of landlords took place in most provinces. This movement collapsed at the same time as the revolutionary symptoms. The Government of M. Stolypin took notice of the situation and tried to remedy it in its own way. Instead of a thoroughgoing redistribution of land, as advocated by the progressive parties, it initiated a policy aiming at the creation of a rural middle-class—a kind of peasant bourgeoisie which, in the view of Stolypin and his advisers, was to act as a breakwater against revolutionary tendencies. Stolypin summarised his plan in the terse saying: 'We stake our money on the strong.'

To achieve this purpose, a bold policy of individualisation was carried out, involving the dissolution of the historical Mir community; the decree of Nov. 9, 1906, and the law of June 14, 1910, made it possible for individual peasants to secede from the community and to require the formation of allotments in severalty; while, at the same time, all holdings were declared to be in the ownership of the chiefs of households, and all villages which had not practised redistribution in recent years were deprived of their standing as communities. We need not consider the pros and cons of this *coup d'état*. Undoubtedly the archaic Mir had to undergo a process of transformation in any case, and the claims of individualism could be urged in many respects with plausible force; but, apart from this consideration of general economy, the political results of Stolypin's measures have proved disastrous from the conservative point of view which he intended to represent. If his policy had been allowed a couple of centuries to consolidate and to develop it might have borne the good and the bad fruits of agrarian individualism, so well known from the practice of Western Europe. As a matter of fact the *coup d'état* produced an indescribable confusion in the rural world; all the rules and forms of tenure, occupation, surveying, actual cultivation became fluid—and this on the eve of the second and overwhelming Revolution of 1917.

I need say no more in order to explain that the encroachments and collisions reported from all provinces of Russia are not the result of peculiar lawlessness on the part of the people or even of mere revolutionary excesses;

the seething cauldron of rural disorder had begun to boil long before the events of March 1917. And yet it is to this rural world that one has to look primarily for organic reconstruction. When the peasants get clear of the entanglements of agrarian redistribution they are sure to exert a steadying influence on the life of the commonwealth, as their French compeers have done in the course of the 19th century. In order to realise the possibility of such a change, it is necessary to take stock of the psychological processes that have been taking place in the midst of the peasant class. Our best guide in such an undertaking is Uspensky, a writer who lived towards the close of the past century but whose descriptions of custom and character are still perfectly applicable to the present generation.

Uspensky's attitude towards the rural world is entirely different from that of Tolstoy, Dostoyevsky, or of the so-called *narodniki*, intellectuals seeking to idealise peasant lore and at the same time trying to smuggle their own hopes and aspirations into its supposed creed. Uspensky, though he never renounces his ideals of justice and civilisation, and is fully conscious of his organic kinship with the poor, is profoundly imbued with the idea that truth, the full truth, and nothing but the truth will serve. He is keenly sensitive to the vices, the weaknesses, the misdeeds of the village world; but his positive teaching nevertheless stands out in a clear light, and that is what gives to his writings their priceless value. They are the verdict of a searching mind as well as of a loving heart.

Uspensky does not believe in the all-healing action of the village community. One of his 'rightful peasants,' Ivan Ermolayevich, tells us how the Mir handicaps energetic and enterprising work, how it levels the industrious and the lazy by redistributing land which had been improved by the exertions of good husbandmen. The Mir was a necessity in former times, but it belongs, as we might say, to the age of natural husbandry. It was undergoing a process of disruption even before the decree of 1906 struck a mortal blow at its existence. Money, cash nexus, free agreements were rapidly breaking-up established economics and the old ways of thought in the villages.

The disruptive, corrupting force of money is often dwelt upon by Uspensky with great bitterness. For example, in a dialogue between a true peasant, attached to the normal round of his rural economy, and another, a progressive one, the latter dwells with delight on the rapid turn-over and the wonderful gains achieved by buying and selling. There is the essence of a Kulak, a 'closed fist,' in this progressive economist's views. The Kulak is the terror of the village; like Tolstoy's Mitukha, he skins his simpler fellow-rustics; they become tools, things, sources of profit in his enterprising hands. He is a capitalist, a usurer, perhaps the agent of some German or English business man, some Charles Ivanovitch, who seemingly does nothing, drives about in wonderful carriages, and somehow or other gets hold of the whole neighbourhood and pulls it about as if by strings. The victims and the whole country-side resent and condemn such a godless use of human beings. But the social process is going on as a whole—no mistake about it—and that makes the life of the rural population in the state of transition, and of those educated people who come into contact with it, exceedingly painful. It is permeated with sickness of mind, sickness of heart, sickness of conscience.

'Of course, the mighty spirit of the people is neither dead nor dying; it will overcome all weaknesses and difficulties; the people is sure sooner or later to understand that the precept "love thy neighbour as thyself" is not the same thing as the saying "when dogs fight, let no strange dog meddle." I know (he says) that all this is coming and I see it coming even now, but I maintain that it is coming with an unnecessary amount of evil, of torture; it is coming in an ugly and an absurd way.'

Two forces appear to this writer as guiding factors in the struggle—a material and a spiritual force. The material force is the 'power of the soil,' the domination of work adapted to nature and to its laws, inexorable and beneficial at the same time. The real peasant lives in a constant tension of intellect and character while managing his farm—attending to the seasons, to the growth of his crops, to the habits of animals, to the needs and combined efforts of his family and labourers. His life is a full, healthy round of duties, and it trains

shrewd, stubborn, honest men, who in the aggregate form the backbone of a great nation. The spiritual force is the fear of God, sometimes rising to a pitch of heroic asceticism, of saintlike charity, but never entirely silenced even in the hearts of sinners. Uspensky divides men into three categories: (1) the grey majority, men of the type described by Tolstoy in his Platon Karatayeff, submissive, fatalistic, of immense weight on account of their numbers and elemental pressure; (2) the wide-awake Kulak-leaders, selfish, rapacious, ferocious; (3) the righteous, ardent, tireless confessors of truth and helpers in need. The ancient saints venerated by the people were men of this third type—Tikhon Zadonsky, who fed the hungry, and provided villagers with seed for their fields; St Nicholas, who, according to popular legend, was honoured by many feast days because he appeared before the Lord in clothes soiled and worn by labour; while St Cassianus, who arrived in Heaven in brilliant garments, was accorded one memorial day in four years—Feb. 29. Great Saints are not to be found in our days, but in a more humble way there are men among the people who thirst for righteousness and are not afraid of hardships and danger in helping the poor and the weak. The religious spirit makes itself often felt in the daily life of the people. To illustrate this, Uspensky tells of a curious scene witnessed in a busy town on market-day. A blind man, a broken-down lawyer, recites a prayer for a crowd of eager listeners:

'The blind man bent over the instrument, a rickety harmonium; and his face suddenly assumed a fine, a profoundly fine expression. In a low, soft tenor voice he pronounced slowly and intently the first verse of the 51st psalm, "Have mercy on me, O God, according to thy loving kindness." He touched the keys slightly, and two or three long-drawn sorrowful chords gave to this sigh of repentance a kind of sobbing expression.'

The crowd was at once taken by it 'in its soul,' as they say in Russia.

There is a significant chapter in Dostoyevsky's *Diary of a Writer*, where he tells of his impressions on reading Tolstoy's *'Anna Karenina.'* Dostoyevsky quotes at length the pages in which Tolstoy describes Levine's

search for truth and the way in which he reached a solution. A peasant speaks to Levine about two of his fellow-villagers :

"Mitukha is sure to make good profits. He will press till he gets his own; he won't have pity on a man. As for Fokanitch, he is not going to skin a man—not he. He will let him off sometimes." "Why should he be let off?" "Well, people are different. One man lives only for his own needs; take Mitukha, he is bent on filling his belly; as for Fokanitch, he is a truthful old man—he lives for his soul, he minds God."

In the words of the exile, Herzen :

'I think there is something in Russian life that is higher than the village community and than the powerful State. It is difficult to define that something in words, nor can you point it out with your finger. I am talking of that inward, half-conscious force which has miraculously preserved the Russian people under the yoke of Mongolian hordes and of German bureaucracy—of the inward force that has kept up the fine open features and the active mind of the Russian peasant in spite of humiliating serfdom; I mean the faith in our powers that is alive in our breast.'

It is not enough to believe in latent power; the power must be transmitted like steam or electricity into the details of life. The Russian people is the very last to lapse into contemplative quiescence; it wants practical results, actual progress; the work of Martha and the work of Mary are indissolubly connected in its mind. When the forces of rejuvenated government, of the intellectuals and of the 'people' are reunited—as no doubt they will be—Russia will emerge from her troubles in all the glory of a free commonwealth and take her proper place by the side of the Western nations.

PAUL VINOGRADOFF.

Art. 11.—THOUGHTS ON THE PRESENT DISCONTENTS.

1. *Munitions of War Act*, 1915. [5 & 6 Geo. 5, ch. 54.]
2. *Munitions of War (Amendment) Act*, 1916. [5 & 6 Geo. 5, ch. 99.]
3. *Schedule of Protected Occupations*, M.M. 130. April 28, 1917.
4. *Munitions of War Bill*. [7 & 8 Geo. 5. Bill 43.]
5. *Reconstruction Committee. Sub-Committee on Relations between Employers and Employed: Interim Report on Joint Standing Industrial Councils*. [Cd. 8606.]
6. *Board of Trade Labour Gazette*, June, 1917.

THE engineers' strike and other recent manifestations of industrial discontent have had one result of supreme importance; they have compelled serious attention to the aims and conceptions of British workmen, to their doubts and fears, to the whole political, social and economic outlook of those on whom the country depends for the supply of war material and the maintenance of the food services. Hitherto, the policy pursued with regard to Labour unrest has been very much like trying to avert an eruption by proclaiming the volcano to be extinct. To-day, we have a public acknowledgment of the danger and a general recognition of the need for a broad, definite and constructive labour policy.

From time to time, during the last three years, indications of the disquieting elements masked by the industrial truce have risen to the surface; but in few cases has the magnitude of the trouble been generally understood, and in hardly a single case has it been publicly referred to until it had reached the stage of open conflict. Thus, each successive announcement has come with the shock of unpleasant surprise. On each occasion the Government, the press and the public have exhibited a pathetic eagerness to get the strike settled, to induce the men concerned, either by threats or by persuasion, to return to work; and a still more pathetic belief that, if this could be accomplished and a compromise arrived at on the specific points at issue, all would be well.

There are many excuses for this attitude. The general public have little knowledge of industrial affairs, but the requirements of a great war have been brought home to

them by the presence of friends and relatives at the front. It requires exceptional strength of mind and foresight for Ministers and officials staggering under the responsibilities of a world war, or employers beset by urgent War Office and Admiralty demands, to look beyond the immediate requirements of the moment. The flow of munitions, the construction of tonnage, have taken precedence of every other consideration; and, when a stoppage of work occurs which affects the output of ships or shells, there is a natural tendency to regard the resumption of work as the one thing needful.

Nevertheless, the real problem goes much deeper. Strikes are only symptoms of a disease whose effect upon the industrial organism is not confined to the periods of actual stoppage. A return to work brought about by invoking the extraordinary powers conferred upon the Executive for the period of the war, or by an appeal to the patriotism of the men's official representatives, will not necessarily afford any real security against a renewed outbreak. Unless the terms of the settlement are such as the rank and file of the workers accept as just, it may even accentuate the diminution of maximum energy by absenteeism, broken time, and that slackness of effort which arises from sullen and unwilling service. This point is vital and too often forgotten. A ten days' stoppage of work by ten thousand men is much easier to realise and much more likely to attract attention than the fact that fifty thousand men have been working at five per cent. below their maximum capacity for forty days; yet the effect on output is exactly the same. In any ordinary year the time lost in strikes is very much less important than the loss of time, or its equivalent in limitation of effort, caused by discontent and friction which stop short of declared hostilities.

These considerations apply with particular force in time of war. Labour has given ample proof of patriotism and self-sacrifice during the present conflict. Neither the raising of immense armies by voluntary enlistment nor the astounding increase in the output of war material would have been possible without the willing cooperation of the workers. The response made to the call of the nation revealed a spirit in which men will not strike readily or for trivial considerations. The series

of disturbances which have culminated in the events of the last few months indicate either the existence of deep and widespread grievances or a gradual change in the general attitude of Labour towards the national policy and the war. In either case it is certain that the effects of the unrest have not been confined to the men who have 'downed tools,' or to the days during which they ceased work.

The Prime Minister was, therefore, well advised in urging on the Commissioners appointed to enquire into the subject of industrial unrest, the importance of interpreting the terms of reference in the widest possible manner. The Commissioners' report will be valuable just in so far as they succeed in going behind the specific grievances of the moment and throwing light on that largely inarticulate and unformulated dissatisfaction from which these grievances themselves derive most of their significance. If the treatment is to be not merely palliative but remedial, the diagnosis must go to the root of the evil. It will be necessary, in considering the report, to remember the extreme difficulty of obtaining, before any Commission, evidence which reflects clearly what lies at the bottom of the workman's mind with reference to his employers, the Government, the constitution and conduct of industrial society, and the national policy in relation to the war. It is often a man's most profound convictions which he is most reluctant to discuss and least able to express, even to himself. The evidence obtained by the Commissioners should be invaluable; but the task of acting upon it will call for sympathetic knowledge of human nature and intimate acquaintance with industrial history before and during the war.

Of one thing we may be sure; the report of the Commissioners will dispose once for all of the idea, still prevalent in some quarters, that all Labour unrest springs from the influence of a small minority of extremists or irresponsible agitators. It is perfectly true that the Labour ranks include a number of firebrands whose activity in fomenting trouble is restrained by few considerations of prudence or principle. They include also a larger, but still comparatively small body of men who are definitely opposed to the war, either on pacifist grounds, or through their irreconcilable hostility to the

existing political and economic system. Among the leaders of this group are several men of great ability and high personal character; but neither the extremists nor the firebrands are numerous enough or powerful enough to bring about industrial unrest on the scale witnessed in recent months. Such influence as either group possesses, outside their own immediate following, must be traced in the main to the preparation of the soil for their propaganda by already existing causes of discontent and irritation.

In the case of the engineers' strike, there is no doubt that the specific grievances alleged—the withdrawal of the Trade Card Scheme and the extension of dilution to private work—were the immediate causes of the outbreak. Both these measures were forced upon the Government by the logic of circumstances, and neither could be reasonably objected to in principle; but the history of the strike and of the events which led up to it, throws valuable light not only on the action taken by the engineers, but on the general attitude of Labour.

The Trade Card Scheme, by which membership of the engineering Unions constituted, in itself, an absolute exemption from military service, was instituted in November 1916. Ever since the passing of the first Munitions Act there had been complaints by the engineers that men who had incurred the dislike of their employers or foremen were victimised by a declaration that they had ceased to be indispensable, leading to the withdrawal of their protective badge. Both the engineers and the employers complained that the Ministry of Munitions allowed the War Office to call up men whose skilled work formed an essential link in productive processes, thus throwing whole sections of workshop organisation suddenly out of gear. A big strike at a Sheffield munition factory was only settled by the personal intervention of the employer on the men's behalf; and finally, in order to avert a widespread stoppage, the Trade Card Scheme was hastily drafted and was accepted by the engineering Unions.

From the start it was clear that the Scheme was open to serious criticism. It was not satisfactory that a man's exemption should depend upon his membership of a

particular union rather than on the national utility of his work; and Labour critics, as well as others, have accused the engineering Unions of driving a selfish bargain for the protection of their own members at the expense of other workers. Thus, in discussing the recent strike, the London representative of the Workers' Union said plainly, 'This is not a strike against the Government or the employers. It is a strike to force all unskilled or semi-skilled men of military age into the Army before any members of the A.S.E., whether they are nineteen or forty, single or married, are called upon.'* The position was the more anomalous in that Unions such as the National Union of Railwaymen, which competed for members with the engineering Unions, were not protected under the scheme, which thus raised in an acute form the long-standing jealousy between the craft and industrial organisations.

There was thus a strong case for revision of the scheme, even apart from the increasing demands of the War Office for men; and, had the Government approached the Unions concerned with a statement of their requirements and an invitation to negotiate a fresh agreement, there should have been no difficulty in effecting the necessary readjustments. Unfortunately, what they did was simply to announce that the scheme which had been instituted in November 1916 would be cancelled as from May 1, 1917, and that its place would be taken by an extremely complicated Schedule of Protected Occupations, which it was not even suggested would be final. At the same time they introduced the Munitions of War Bill, 1917, 'to enable the Ministry of Munitions to carry into effect a scheme of dilution of skilled labour by the introduction of less skilled labour (either male or female) upon private work.'

This measure raised issues which were even more delicate than those connected with the withdrawal of the Trade Card Scheme. The skilled trade unionist regards the abolition of task demarcations as threatening, not merely a monopoly which forms his chief economic asset, but his pride in his craft and the whole basis upon which his union organisation is erected. No greater

* Mr George Dallas, in the 'Star,' May 14, 1917.

sacrifice was made by organised Labour for the national cause than its acceptance of the principle of dilution in the case of munitions work. In return for this concession, the Government gave an explicit pledge that in no circumstances should the dilution of labour be enforced on any work other than war work. This pledge was repeated when the Munitions of War (Amendment) Act was passed in January 1916. Since that date, the difficulty of reconciling the maintenance at strength of the Armies in the Field with the necessity of keeping private trade in some measure alive has greatly increased. An extension of the dilution principle appeared to be the only means of meeting the double demand; and in November 1916 the Government arrived at an agreement on this point with 28 Trade Unions, whose names were published on May 10 last. Unfortunately, they were unable to obtain the consent of the Amalgamated Society of Engineers and of at least four other of the unions principally affected, and they accordingly introduced the Bill already mentioned, to enforce their proposals.

The present situation with regard to man-power is sufficient explanation of the Government's desire to extend the application of dilution; but in view of the specific and unconditional pledges given to Labour, it is exceedingly unfortunate that they should be in the position of withdrawing from their side of the agreement, while regarding the Unions concerned as bound by their acceptance of compulsory arbitration and the suspension of Trade Union rules. It would be interesting to know more of the negotiations with the engineering Unions, and the points on which they broke down. So far as the rank and file were concerned, the position was so far from clear that large numbers of men believed it to be the intention of the Government to enforce dilution on private work for a period of seven years after the war; and it became necessary, after the strike had broken out, to insert a special amendment in the Bill to clear away this misconception.*

The situation was complicated by the fact that, while the Amalgamated Society of Engineers, which refused

* See Mr Tootill's speech on the Supplementary Vote of Credit; Hansard, May 9, 1917, cols 1125-1127.

its assent to dilution on private work, was induced, with some difficulty, to accept the Schedule of Protected Occupations as a substitute for the Trade Card Scheme, those engineering Unions which had signed the dilution agreement refused to accept the new Schedule.* In fact, the engineers, as a class, found it difficult to obtain a clear assurance as to the combined effect of the two measures. While the Ministry of Munitions assured them that the object of dilution was solely to spread the skilled men more evenly over industry as a whole, and not to release such men for the Army, it was known that the War Office expected to secure large drafts from the engineering industry through the operation of the Bill and the withdrawal of the Trade Card Scheme. It must be remembered that the engineers have been told again and again that this is an engineers' war, and that every skilled worker is urgently needed on his own job. It may very well be that the idea of military service is unwelcome to some, especially of the elder married men; but their justification for claiming protection rests, in their own eyes, upon their belief that there is a danger of men whose services would be more valuable at home being taken for the Army, if the selection is left to officials ignorant of industrial requirements, or to the mechanical operation of a schedule.

A further cause of hostility to the new Munitions Bill was the dislike of the trade unionist to sacrifice his rules in order to pile up profits for private employers. With regard to this latter point, a statement was issued by the Ministry of Munitions on May 9, to the effect that, wherever dilution was introduced, 'all the provisions of the Munitions Acts relative to the limitation of profits . . . must be applied.' Yet, only six days earlier, the Chancellor of the Exchequer had announced that the limit placed by the Munitions Act of 1915 on the profits of controlled establishments was to be abolished as from Jan. 1, 1917, leaving the employers subject only to the ordinary Excess Profits Tax, payable equally in all industries.

In these circumstances trouble of a sporadic kind broke out in over thirty munitions areas. It was strongly

* See statement issued on May 11.

discountenanced by the Executives of the Trade Unions concerned, even by those who had refused their assent to the new measures; and on May 11 the Government issued a notice threatening 'all persons who incite to any stoppage of work on munitions' with penal servitude for life, under the Defence of the Realm Regulations. Nevertheless, the trouble spread until a quarter of a million men were affected, the strike leaders, who were mostly members of the Shop Stewards Committee, repudiating any intervention by the official Executives. On May 18, eight of the leaders were arrested; and next day a conference was held between the Ministry of Munitions and the Executive of the Amalgamated Society of Engineers, accompanied by a deputation from the unofficial strike conference. At this conference the delegates agreed to the resumption of work; but considerable numbers remained out until the 24th, when it was known that the men arrested had been released. The Government have since agreed not to proceed with the Munitions Bill until the Unions concerned have had an opportunity to ballot their members on the subject; and they have made other important concessions, to which reference will be made later.

Thus, the salient points of the dispute were: the opposition of the engineers to measures which the Government had declared to be necessary in the national interest; the withdrawal by the Government from agreements into which they had entered with the Unions; the repudiation of the Union Executives by the strikers; the arrest and release of the strike leaders, and the concessions made by the Government after the strike.

In order to understand the significance of these points, it is necessary to go back to the outbreak of the war and trace the development of labour policy and of the attitude of Labour during the last three years.

We are apt to forget that the outbreak of war found the relations between employers and employed at a stage of acute tension. Demands for higher wages, arising from the increased cost of living, coupled with the struggle for recognition of the Unions and for a measure of control over working conditions, had led, during some years, to increased frequency and bitterness of industrial

disputes. Both sides were organising and marshalling their forces for a conclusive trial of strength. The Employers' Federations were growing in completeness and power; and, to meet them on equal terms, the 'Triple Alliance' of miners, transport workers and railway-men was being negotiated. At the moment when war broke out, a national miners' strike appeared inevitable, a great railway strike was anticipated, and arrangements were going forward for an international Conference of Transport Workers to secure simultaneous action against shipowners in all European ports.

The declaration of war put an end, for the time being, to all these movements. Disputes between Labour and Capital and internal dissensions between the craft Unions, the 'Industrialists,' and the 'Syndicalists,' were alike suspended; and the workers as a class threw themselves whole-heartedly into preparation for the great struggle. This voluntary sacrifice of sectional to national interests did not, however, imply that the old disputes were forgotten. While the workers were willing to co-operate with the employers and the Government in carrying on the war, they had no idea of weakening their position for a subsequent resumption of industrial conflict.

So long as enthusiasm was still fresh and no new causes of dissension had arisen, the industrial truce remained unbroken; but it was not long before complaints began to be made as to the lack of knowledge and sympathy displayed in handling Labour questions. The workers became aware that many employers were making large profits out of the war; and the rise in the cost of living led to constant demands for increased wages, many of which were strenuously resisted. The atmosphere had already changed distinctly for the worse when, in July 1915, the Munitions of War Act was passed as the result of an agreement between the Government and the engineering Trade Unions.

This Act consisted of three parts. By the first, compulsory arbitration was established, for the period of the war, in all trades directly or indirectly concerned with the production of war material, and strikes were rendered a punishable offence. By the second, the Minister of Munitions received power to take over as

'controlled establishments' any establishments in which munitions work was being carried on. In such controlled establishments, all Trade Union rules and customs having the effect of restricting output were suspended for the period of the war; all questions affecting wages and salaries were to be submitted to the Ministry; the right of a workman to transfer his services to another firm was limited; finally, all profits exceeding the standard *ante-bellum* rate by one-fifth were to be paid into the Exchequer. The third part of the Act related to the setting up of special tribunals to deal with offences.

Almost immediately after the passing of the Act a strike broke out in the South Wales coalfield. The Government issued a proclamation bringing the dispute within the compulsory arbitration clause, whereupon the Miners' Federation appealed to the men to resume work from day to day. This they refused to do; and the strike was ultimately settled, by the intervention of Mr Lloyd George, on terms which practically admitted the justice of the men's demands. The effect of this incident on Labour generally was exceedingly bad. It strengthened the workers' belief in the strike as the one means of obtaining redress of grievances; it revealed the difficulty of coercing or punishing a large body of strikers; and it tended to weaken the authority of the Trade Union Executives.

In fact, the denial of the right to strike, while regarded by the Government as the keystone of the whole edifice, was a disastrous mistake. It has increased and embittered discontent by depriving it of an outlet. It has handicapped fair employers by discouraging the old-established method of free negotiation. What is still worse, it has created a breach between the official leaders of the Trade Unions and those whom they represent. The men know that it is impossible for their leaders to countenance a strike in any circumstances without exposing themselves to penalties and the Trade Union funds to confiscation. They complain bitterly of the delays of compulsory arbitration and the dilatory action of the Ministry of Munitions in dealing with breaches of faith by employers. They believe that, if the Unions were unshackled, the mere threat of a strike would often secure instant redress. Consequently, they

are more and more ready to take matters into their own hands. The provisions of the Munitions Act have provoked rather than prevented strikes, and have distinctly accentuated the constant friction which accounts to a still greater degree for diminution of output. At the same time, the restriction placed on the action of the Executives has both diminished their power to treat for and bind the men as a whole, and weakened their control over the small minority of malcontents, who would otherwise have had little chance of causing serious trouble.

This divorce between the leaders and the rank and file of the Unions has been accentuated by the extremely centralised character of administration and negotiations under the Ministry of Munitions and Ministry of Labour. Having undertaken the direct control of Labour during the war, the Government has rightly desired to keep in constant touch with the Trade Union officials. These on their part have devoted themselves with great patience and self-abnegation to the double task of representing Labour interests and furthering the prosecution of the war; but in so doing they have lost touch with the majority of their followers. Their close association with the Government departments and their appearance as advocates of, or apologists for, measures which they had originally resisted, have cost them, in large measure, the confidence of the men. The constant pressure of detail work has prevented them from following from month to month what is passing through the minds of the rank and file, with whom they come less and less into direct contact. The continual expansion of departmental activities has brought many of them into the position of recognised Government officials. Unfortunately, this means that they have ceased to be Labour leaders. The workers' view is that their influence has been insufficient to leaven the bureaucratic mass; that they have, in fact, taken the colour of their surroundings; if not bought over, they have been talked over. Far from placating Labour opinion, their appointment has made them the scapegoats of industrial unrest.

Meanwhile, unofficial and semi-official leaders, such as the shop stewards in the engineering trades, have risen into prominence. The shop stewards, before the war,

were simply agents of the District Committees of the Trade Unions for the purpose of collecting contributions and reporting matters requiring the attention of the Committees. Under the Munitions Acts their powers and responsibilities have increased, as it has been left mainly to them to watch the working of the Acts in the interests of the workers. The comparative remoteness of the Union Executives, and their association in the workers' minds with Government measures, have given these men, who are in close and intimate contact with their shopmates, an influence which was clearly displayed in the recent strike. In part it is the product of special circumstances; in part it represents a growing conviction that the war has revealed defects in trade-union organisation, as in that of the State, and that the necessary reforms must take the line of greater devolution of knowledge and responsibility.

The same thing has happened in the case of Labour members of Parliament. Like the Trade Union officials, they were elected before the war, on peace issues, and have grown somewhat out of touch with their constituents. The acceptance of six places in the present Government was ratified by a majority of six to one on a 'card' vote at the Annual Conference of the Labour Party; but this majority should not be accepted without qualification as an index to the feelings of the rank and file. While the speeches at the Conference always tend to over-represent the smaller societies, the 'card' vote, in strict proportion to the membership represented, is inevitably dominated by the delegates of two or three big organisations.

From the first, the acceptance of office by some Labour Members and the extreme pacifist attitude adopted by others have tended to split the Party. While the minority have drifted more and more into the position of free-lancers, the majority have become practically indistinguishable from any other supporters of the Government. It is certain that large sections of Labour would have preferred to see the Party remain united, performing the functions of a patriotic Opposition and supporting the war without loss of identity or abstinence from constructive criticism.

The result of these developments has been to deprive

the Government in large measure both of accurate knowledge as to current Labour opinion and of the power to influence it. The extremely difficult task of providing for the allocation of man-power between the fighting and productive services and between the productive services themselves has devolved on officials who, though able and zealous, have no intimate knowledge of industrial requirements, and whose Labour advisers have ceased adequately to represent the views or command the confidence of the workers. Their efforts have been productive of irritation and friction, because the decisions made have been arrived at over the heads of Labour and imposed upon it by exercise of the autocratic powers with which the Government has been invested. They have hampered production and irritated the employers because they ignored essential factors in the industrial system.

It can now be seen that the whole conception of direct control of industry was a mistake. The errors of the Governmental departments concerned have sprung not from bad faith or ill intent, but from the fact that the task imposed upon them was beyond their powers. To reap the full benefit of the early enthusiasm and secure at once the continuous and willing cooperation of the workers and the direct application of industrial knowledge to industrial problems, the control should have been decentralised and a definite share of responsibility entrusted to the Labour organisations.

It was, perhaps, right to offer the Labour Party representation in the Cabinet; but it would have been better if the Government had also offered, and Labour had accepted, an alternative arrangement. This arrangement might have taken the form of an Advisory Labour Council, representing both the Parliamentary Labour Party and the Trade Unions, to whom all questions affecting the workers as a class would have been submitted for discussion and report. Those affecting industry generally would also have been laid before a similar Council representing the Employers' Federations and professional institutions. The representative character and special knowledge of such Councils would have given them weight with the Government; their independence

would have preserved their influence over industry itself. Measures decided upon as the result of consultation with the Councils would have been carried out through the medium of joint District and Works Committees of employers and employed.

To such committees should have been entrusted the task of reporting on the labour resources of the country and devising the means whereby the conflicting requirements of the War Office, the Admiralty, the Ministry of Munitions, the indispensable supply services and private trade could best be met. In this way it would have been possible to secure for each essential service the maximum number of men, with the minimum of dislocation, and to carry through such measures as the introduction of dilution without the grating sense of autocratic and often incompetent dictation which has done so much to germinate unrest.

In any such scheme it would have been possible to assign definite and responsible tasks to Employers' Federations and Trade Unions as industrial units, while providing for proper supervision and direction by the Ministries of Munitions and Labour and affording ample scope for the patriotism and intelligence of the operatives themselves. The keenness and appreciation of national needs shown by the shop committees set up in certain munition areas and in establishments working on War Office contracts, for the purpose of enforcing discipline and accelerating the output of priority articles, bear witness, even now, to the stimulus afforded by giving men a definite responsibility and a feeling that they have a recognised and honourable part in the national effort.

At the time when the Munitions Act of 1915 was being negotiated, the Government intimated that they proposed to set up in every district, as part of the administrative machinery, joint committees representing equally employers and workmen of all grades. These committees have never materialised, but it is now understood that the Government are willing to consider any proposals on these lines that may be put forward. If such a scheme is carried into effect, it will do more than anything else to cure the unrest in munitions areas. By investing the various organisations of shop stewards and delegates

with positive and responsible functions, it will divert into constructive channels energies which have hitherto been wasted or alienated, and it will secure from the mass of the workers a whole-hearted cooperation which the coercive clauses of the Munitions Acts have never been able to command.

One great advantage to be obtained from the establishment of joint committees would be the avoidance of further friction on such questions as that of piece rates, which has been responsible for so much of the industrial unrest. Many workmen object on principle to 'payment by results.' They consider that all who give honest work should receive an equal reward; that payment should be proportioned to needs, not to capacities. In actual practice, however, the chief obstacle to the acceptance of the system is the fear of rate-cutting by the employer. It is admitted by fair-minded employers that this fear is not without foundation. Mr Michael Longridge, the President of the Institution of Mechanical Engineers, said in his Presidential Address in April last that 'it would almost seem to have been an article of economic religion that a workman's earnings should be limited by precedent,' and ascribed the opposition to piecework mainly to this shortsighted policy. During the war, the cutting of piecework rates and the reduction of premium bonus time, in defiance of the Ministry of Munitions, has become an open scandal.

The great difficulty lies in the impossibility of fixing a permanent rate. Apart from the fluctuation of money values which affects 'real' piece-rates as well as real wages, the work in many establishments varies continually. The Munitions of War Bill, 1917, provides that piece prices or bonuses shall not be changed except when there is a change of system. This may give adequate protection in trades where the work consists in the repetition of standardised articles; but, when the articles made vary widely, it becomes necessary to fix a fresh rate for each in proportion to the labour required. If these changes are left to be made by the employer's rate-fixer or foreman, without proper provision for Trade Union control, the whole system of collective bargaining is gone. By enforcing dilution of labour, the Munitions Acts have introduced a fresh complication, inasmuch as

the unskilled or partly skilled pieceworker frequently earns more than the foreman or skilled instructor, who is paid by time. While the increase of output which can be obtained under the system is admitted, the problem of securing its willing acceptance by the workers has not been generally solved.

The true solution is suggested by the experience of establishments and trades in which a system of payment by results has been introduced, at first gradually and experimentally, in consultation with the men. In such establishments, where the whole system is thoroughly understood by the workers and rates are fixed at frequent intervals in joint conference, there has been an entire absence of that friction which throughout industrial history has been associated with piecework and bonus systems. With regard to bonuses, it has been found that a 'group bonus,' which encourages the team spirit and avoids jealousy between individual workers, provides perhaps the best incentive. Whatever form of payment may be adopted, full explanation, voluntary agreement and joint control are the essentials of success.

A still more vital problem, and one which can only be dealt with by the cooperation of both employers and employed with the State, is the restoration of the Trade Union safeguards after the war. The Trade Unions may or may not have been justified in the value which they attached to their restrictive regulations. They were probably justified, if we accept the ideas concerning the relations of employers and employed held by both parties before the war, but largely unjustified on any broader and saner conception of industry. Rightly or wrongly, these regulations were regarded by Labour as essential to the protection of its interests; and the one condition on which the workers have consented to every relaxation rendered necessary by the war has been the subsequent restoration of the *status quo*. This restoration has been promised to them in the most explicit terms and without any qualification; yet grave doubts have arisen as to whether that promise will or can be kept.

What is in the minds of the more reactionary employers we know from the Annual Report of the Employers' Parliamentary Council, which advocates not

merely the non-restoration of *ante-bellum* conditions, but the repeal of the Trade Disputes Act, the Factory Acts, and all other legislation tending to restrict industrial autocracy. It is quite certain that this programme does not reflect the opinion of the vast majority of sane and honest employers, nor would it be tolerated by the Government; but there is undoubtedly a considerable number of employers who dislike and distrust Trade Union influence, and look on the war and the conditions which will arise at its close as an opportunity of breaking or weakening it.

Manifestations of this spirit are the more mischievous in that the process of returning to *ante-bellum* conditions will be one of great difficulty, even with complete good faith and goodwill on both sides. Under the pressure of war demands, the whole constitution of industry has been transformed. The plant and machinery of hundreds of factories have been remodelled on lines involving a very large displacement of skilled by unskilled labour. Processes, methods and organisation have been completely changed. A whole army of women workers has been introduced into industry. Unskilled and non-unionist workers in great numbers have gone into factories to replace men at the front, or for the purpose of dilution. Will it be possible to scrap the new machines, reinstate machinery of the old pattern, discharge the new workers, and revert to an organisation which has become antiquated, at the very moment when every nerve is being strained to revive the industries of the country?

The plain truth is that the literal restoration of the *status quo* will be next door to a physical impossibility; and the public repetition of pledges which no one really believes does no good. It tends to strengthen the belief, unhappily widely entertained, that in order to obtain the support of Labour to its proposals the Government will promise anything, without considering too carefully the possibility of fulfilment. The scepticism of Labour as to the value of Government pledges has arisen from a long succession of such incidents as the withdrawal of the Trade Card Scheme and the extended application of dilution. It is obviously unfair to blame the Government because circumstances have changed, or to deny

their right to ask for a revision of agreements in the light of new national needs. The mistake has been that of making promises unconditionally without sufficient enquiry into probable developments, and ignoring the necessity for frankness and patience in negotiating new agreements. Much allowance should be made for harassed departments, imperfectly informed as to industrial conditions and struggling daily with urgent problems, but the effect upon the mind of Labour has been disastrous.

This matter of the Trade Union safeguards is fundamental. The Government and the employers are pledged to restore the *status quo* at any cost; and, if this has become impossible, they are bound in honour to find some other solution of equal value to the workers and equally acceptable to them. It is not the letter but the spirit of the agreement that is important; and this, we may believe, is what the Government have in view in their recent endorsement of the pledges. What is vitally important is that both the Government and the employers should make it clear, beyond a shadow of doubt, that they recognise not only their obligations but the difficulties of the situation, and that, if an equivalent has to be found, it will not be presented to the workers as a *fait accompli*, but worked out in full and frank cooperation with them.

If the problem is approached in this way, it will afford an opportunity of reconstituting the whole industrial system, not on the basis of 1914 but on a foundation juster, broader and more stable than it has yet known. There are not wanting signs that Labour would be willing to lay aside such of the old Trade Union rules as can be proved to be restrictive of output and an obstacle to efficient and economic production, if it were admitted to some measure of more direct control over the conditions under which it works; and that many employers would welcome the admission of Labour to such participation in knowledge and responsibility as would make for intelligent and willing cooperation, in place of the old open hostility or passive resistance. Apart from the enormous economic advantages of industrial solidarity, there is a strong feeling among many on both sides that

the efforts and sacrifices of the war will have been made in vain unless the establishment of a better order in international affairs is accompanied by a quickening of the national life; and that the conception of industry as a scramble for profits must be superseded by its recognition as a valuable and honourable form of public service.

When, some six months ago, the Garton Foundation issued a Memorandum pleading for 'continuous and constructive cooperation' between employers and employed, and suggesting the formation of National Councils in the staple industries for the purpose of giving effect to this cooperation, the authors were surprised as well as gratified by the warmth of its reception amongst both employers and trade unionists. A scheme for a National Builders' Parliament, devised on very similar lines, has recently been put forward by the National Associated Building Trades Council and accepted by the executive of the Employers' Federation. The question of joint Industrial Councils has for some time been before a Sub-Committee of the Reconstruction Committee, who have now reported strongly in their favour. If the restoration of the Trade Union safeguards or the finding of an equivalent therefor can be made part of a great scheme of industrial reconstruction of this kind, there should be no difficulty in solving the problem without friction.

Nothing is more desirable at the present time than full, sympathetic and public discussion of the problems of *post-bellum* reconstruction, for the ideas entertained by the workers as to industrial conditions after the war profoundly affect their present attitude. The prevalent unrest, which has found expression in war-time strikes and in opposition to measures proposed by the Government for the carrying on of the war, is due in large measure to a belief that the future of Labour is imperilled by the developments of the last three years and by the attitude of the employers. It is in the light of this belief that we have to review the condemnations so frequently passed upon the workers for their alleged lack of patriotism, and their indifference to the men in the field. Those who pass these condemnations forget that there can be few men in the factories who have not sons, brothers or friends in the trenches. It is monstrous

to accuse the workers as a class of forgetting this, or of being willing to imperil the lives of their brethren. Indeed, the position of men engaged in the munition and kindred industries is one which should plead for more than usual care to prevent them from suffering any remediable grievance; for, while they can be told that every day's stoppage of work will exact its price in blood, they have other responsibilities which, to them, are no less serious.

How does the plea to 'remember our lads in the trenches' strike the men themselves? It cuts two ways. The men in the trenches are fighting for the cause of those at home. The men in the workshops regard themselves as trustees for those at the front. It is their business to supply them with whatever is required for victory in the quickest time and at the lowest cost. It is also their business to see that the economic scale is not weighted against them in their absence, that the principles of liberty and justice for which they are fighting are kept alive. To the trade unionist the Trade Union cause represents something much more than increased wages or shorter hours. It is, to him, a charter of liberties, a vital element of his social and political faith, an essential part of a worthy national life as he conceives it. Thus, when changes are imposed, or proposed, which seem to him to cut at the root of Trade Unionism, he is placed in a cruel dilemma. If he stops work as a protest, the press and the public call him a traitor to his friends; if he acquiesces, he himself feels that he has betrayed their interests and he dreads to be called a traitor by them on their return. It is no answer to say that the principles of Trade Unionism were too frequently narrow, selfish, founded on false economics and a purely sectional outlook. Such as they were, they were the natural outcome of the conceptions of industry entertained before the war by the whole community—employers and employed alike. The dilemma in which the workers are placed is a real one; and, mistaken as the men's attitude towards the questions which have arisen during the war may sometimes have been, it is founded on principle as well as on self-interest.

It is this concern for the future of Labour and the passionate adherence of the worker to his idea of freedom

—‘a sense of the continuous possibility of initiative’—which is at the back of the fear of industrial conscription and the opposition to the Military Service Acts themselves. The idea that this opposition was due to cowardice or lack of patriotism is sufficiently disproved by the millions of men who voluntarily enlisted or attested in the first eighteen months of the war. It is well known that the control of the armed forces of the country by a Government drawn mainly from the capitalist and employing classes, and the fear that these forces might be used in the interests of Capital against Labour, have always been a nightmare to the workers. This fear was roused in an acute form by the methods adopted by some among the advocates of compulsion. The real arguments in its favour were discredited by the efforts made to ‘crab’ the Derby scheme and the reckless allegations of cowardice and shirking brought against men who had entered munition factories or continued to work at their usual trades because they were told that it was their duty to do so. Side by side with the arguments for compulsory military service as a necessity of the war, there developed at an early stage the argument for compulsion *quâ* compulsion as a beneficial permanent institution, with a strong hint that its disciplinary effect on the working classes ranked high among its merits. While accepting compulsion for the war as an unavoidable necessity, Labour has not forgotten these utterances; and they have reinforced its dread of industrial conscription—the subjection of civilian workers to military law and the consequent interference with their freedom of contract and association.

The concessions made by the Government in the last few weeks should go far to remove this dread. Recognition of the right to strike on private work, the abolition of leaving certificates and the expediting of arbitration awards will remove some of the gravest causes of suspicion as to the real intention of war measures. If, however, they are to have their full effect, they must be accompanied by tact and discretion in the administration of the Munitions Acts, which at present appears to Labour to be one-sided. The threat of penal servitude for strike leaders is contrasted with the 50*l.* fines inflicted on

wealthy employers, and the prompt action taken against strikers with the treatment of such cases as that of Messrs Tweedale and Smalley, when six weeks were allowed to elapse in negotiations before prosecution was instituted for a particularly flagrant breach of the Acts.

Resentment against the burdens imposed on Labour is increased by the conviction that corresponding sacrifices have not been asked of other classes of the community. Labour is apt to forget the extraordinarily high percentage of loss which has fallen upon what may be loosely termed the officer class, and to exaggerate the financial hardship of enlistment to the worker as compared with the professional man and the tradesman. But, in addition, there is a strong feeling that the necessity which justifies compulsory service and the suspension of trade union rules would also justify the conscription of wealth. The gigantic subscriptions to the war loan do not impress the workers. The patriotism involved in accepting a gilt-edged security at five per cent. leaves them cold.

The view that a much larger proportion of the cost of the war should be raised by taxation has been argued with great force by expert economists; and it is obvious that the accumulation of war debts will involve the transference of a large proportion of the national income from the general body of taxpayers (including the consumers of dutiable commodities) to a comparatively small class of investors. Not unnaturally, this condition of things is ascribed by Labour to the rapacity of the rich. It may be doubted whether the charge is just, for the rich have shown themselves ready to meet whatever demand may be made, but it is certainly prevalent.

Exceptions to the general attitude there have been, and they have been most prominent among those associated in the mind of Labour with the enormously increased cost of living. The estimated percentage increase in retail food prices, as compared with July 1914, has reached 102 per cent.* The food problem is so complicated and so little understood, that it is not surprising that the working class, to a man, believes that practically the whole of the advance is due to the action of profiteers.

* 'Board of Trade Labour Gazette,' June 1917.

The facts are that the general rise in prices is caused in great part by the fall in money values arising from the flotation of gigantic loans and the issue of paper, and is accentuated in the case of food-stuffs by an actual shortage due to bad harvests, the sinking of food cargoes, the difficulties of transport, and the withdrawal of men from agriculture. The food problem is, in the main, one of sustained production, security of import, facilities for distribution, and economy in consumption. Enquiry into the charges of profiteering and the effects of high freights do not confirm the view that any appreciable part of the increase in prices can be traced to these causes. Yet a section of the press daily inflames the public mind by articles which suggest that the Government can raise crops, fix prices abroad, neutralise the submarine, and kill the potato blight, by a stroke of the pen. Until the real facts of the situation are clearly explained and widely understood, and the Food Ministry is able to show that it has a definite policy based on those facts, the discontent of Labour will grow; and its pressure will hurry the Government into steps only too likely to increase the evil.

With regard to war profits as a whole, there is undoubtedly a strong feeling that the sacrifices and efforts demanded of Labour should not be used to earn huge dividends for investors. The merging of the munitions levy in the excess profits tax was resented not only as a breach of agreement but because, by giving the employer the utmost stimulus to reduce the cost of production, it appeared to put a premium on increasing profits, at the expense of wages. It is clearly undesirable to remove altogether the profit incentive, for, after all, the profit and loss account is the rough and ready test by which a business man judges the efficiency of his working methods; but it is doubtful whether wider measures of profit limitation would really have hampered output. The revolution in equipment, processes and organisation effected in controlled establishments suggests that employers as a class take a higher and wider view of their functions than is generally believed either by Labour or by the Government, and that the making of inordinate profits is not the only motive to which they will respond.

Less, probably, would be heard about the iniquity of

war profits, if there were not a disposition in some quarters to treat profits as a divine institution and wages as a necessary evil; and if workers who demand an advance corresponding to the increased cost of living were not so frequently told that they ought to lay aside all selfish interests for the period of the war. The adoption of this tone towards Labour has been one of the most fruitful causes of exasperation. The incessant scolding in the press, the cold superiority of departmental officials, and the strong flavour of music-hall patriotism about the recruiting and war economy appeals, have been equally irritating to men who were called upon for extraordinary exertions in a great national emergency, and who differ in no respect of patriotism and intelligence from the rest of their countrymen.

It ought to be remembered that industry has reached a very critical and very difficult stage in its development. It is only within the last half-century that Labour has acquired any real measure of education or of economic and political influence. The intolerance sometimes displayed by its leaders is, in the words of Mr Longridge, 'the natural reaction of inexperienced youth in possession of unlooked-for power against past oppression and injustice.' The defective sense of reality shown, at times, by Labour politicians is the natural result of limited experience and newness to responsibility. Their failures are less surprising than their achievements.

Nothing is so much required in dealing with the workers as a frank recognition of their position as citizens and an honest attempt to understand their views. It is exceedingly unfortunate that the expression of those views in the press should be so imperfect. It is not merely that the tone of leading articles almost invariably tends to falsify the issues of industrial disputes. What is more serious is the bias of the news columns. The Labour case is seldom clearly stated; the employers' case is given in full. It is the same with Labour utterances on questions of national policy. The speeches of those who take the orthodox view receive a prominence often disproportionate to the influence or representative character of the speakers. A deliberate attempt is made to depreciate, openly or by innuendo, the importance of those who express unorthodox sentiments.

The effect of this absence of publicity is altogether bad, and it is increased by the restriction of discussion under the Defence of the Realm Regulations. A rigid censorship, particularly severe in the case of Labour publications, the prohibition of meetings, interference with postal and telegraphic facilities, have combined with the restrictions of the Munitions Acts to produce an atmosphere of repression which is a real danger. Extremist doctrines, which would find little support in an atmosphere of free discussion, become formidable when they are driven underground and make their way in the guise of covert innuendoes, more difficult to meet than argument. The small minority of malcontents and irreconcilables find ready hearers in men who are irritated and bewildered by what they consider arbitrary infringements of their liberty. The closing of constitutional channels for the expression of discontent is the most certain method of forcing it into unconstitutional action.

The widespread dissatisfaction with the treatment of industry has been accentuated by public criticisms of other branches of the Administration—the failure to settle the Irish question, the conduct of the war and of foreign policy. Much of this criticism is ill-informed and unjust, but its effect has been to give a strong appeal to the claim of the Russian revolutionists for direct Labour control of national policy. The influence of the Russian example may be seen as clearly in the action of the Seamen's Union as in the resolutions of the Leeds Conference. There is no strong revolutionary party in this country; but there is a large amount of general unrest which has been stimulated by the idea of Russia's short-cut to a democratic millennium, and, in particular, by the Russian manifesto as to war aims.

In the early months of the war, Labour was strongly swayed by belief in the national cause and a desire to support it. This attitude was, perhaps, too generally taken for granted. It would be a mistake to say that Labour as a whole is definitely pacifist, but its normal attitude towards war is one of indifference or aversion. The worker takes little interest in problems of foreign policy, which he does not understand and which he believes to have no real bearing on any of the matters

which deeply concern him. He knows that the war will lay heavy burdens upon him, and he feels instinctively that it implies a suspension of those social and political activities about which he really cares.

At the outset of the present conflict this attitude was overborne by the idealism of the conflict itself—the conception of a war to end war, a fight for the rights of small nations, a struggle of freedom against autocracy. If it must be said that that early enthusiasm has waned, the statement must not be misunderstood. It does not mean that there is any strong ‘stop-the-war’ party with a clearly defined programme. It is true that there *is* such a party, whose influence may as easily be under-rated as over-rated; but the attitude of the majority may best be described in the slang term, ‘fed up.’ War weariness does not necessarily imply the lack of determination to see the thing through, and is particularly excusable in the case of men who have long been subjected to an excessively severe strain, coupled with restrictions on their personal habits, their freedom of movement, their tastes and sports. But its result is the frame of mind in which the worker is apt to ask himself what it is all about, and whether the sacrifices he is making are made for any object in which he is interested.

In this frame of mind the Russian formulas, with their lofty if vague idealism, appeal to him strongly; and his knowledge of foreign affairs is insufficient to enable him to see the pitfalls which beset their interpretation. In his impatience, he feels that the principles for which his support was asked have been allowed to fall into the background, and he suspects that the whole dreary business of slaughter and waste is being allowed to go on for the sake of some obscure boundary question or to serve some private ends of the capitalists and bureaucrats.

In this state of doubt, largely inarticulate and unformulated, as to the direction of the national policy, the specific grievances complained of by the worker are felt more keenly; and he begins to ask whether the war is to end by establishing in this country the Prussian system against which we are fighting. If the present unrest is not to become an embarrassment in the war and an obstacle to reconstruction after the war, these suspicions must be removed. For this, two things are

required. The war aims of the Allies must be set forth in terms which the working man can understand, with a force which will carry conviction, and in such a way that he can see their relation to the principles of democracy, freedom and justice in which he profoundly believes. At the same time, the whole policy of the Government and the nation with regard to the control of industry during the war and the reorganisation of our industrial system after the war must be taken in hand in constant and intimate cooperation with Labour itself. The economic and political villeinage of the workers has been abolished; they have become citizens. But the tone adopted towards them, and the conception of industrial relations shared by employers and employed, have tended to make them citizens of a State within the State. We shall not get rid of Labour unrest until we have made it possible for the workers to feel themselves members of an undivided community, united by the double bonds of common interests and reciprocal obligations.

C. ERNEST FAYLE.

Art. 12.—SWINBURNE.

1. *The Life of Algernon Charles Swinburne.* By Edmund Gosse, C.B. Macmillan, 1917.
2. *The Boyhood of Algernon Charles Swinburne.* Personal Recollections by his Cousin, Mrs Disney Leith. Chatto and Windus, 1917.
3. *Portraits and Sketches.* By Edmund Gosse, C.B. Heinemann, 1913.
4. *The Posthumous Poems of Algernon C. Swinburne.* Edited by Edmund Gosse, C.B., and T. J. Wise, with an Introduction by Edmund Gosse. Heinemann, 1917.

SWINBURNE only died in 1909, but to many people he almost seems to have been dead for twenty years. Indeed for the thirty years which he spent at Putney under the protection of Watts Dunton, and especially for the second half of them, he had lived so regularly, silently and obscurely, that except for an occasional publication which made a little noise, or an occasional quarrel which made a good deal, he was almost forgotten even in the world of letters. Outside it he had never been known, except as Don Juan is known to Mrs Grundy or the fairies to the Governor of the Bank of England. His life is, in fact, divided into two halves of almost exactly equal length and extraordinarily unequal importance. He went to Eton in 1849; from that day forward for thirty years he lived a life of ever-increasing intellectual activity, of promise, performance, fame, authority, of no little noise and scandal, of private friendships and private feuds, of public abuse and public homage. In 1879 Watts Dunton took him to Putney; and the thirty years which followed were years of always diminishing activity, of friendships lost by disuse as well as by death, of a life which more and more forgot and was itself forgotten. The most potent of the stars that guided the first half were the stormy brilliance of Rossetti and the circle of genius which surrounded him. The sole star of the latter half was that of an industrious solicitor who had a remarkable talent for introducing method and order into the study of poetry and into the life of a poet. The resulting contrast could not have been more complete. Chelsea was *Sturm und Drang*, 'Poems and Ballads,' and

'Songs before Sunrise'; it was creation, excitement, and violent energy of life alternating with catastrophic seizures of illness. Putney, on the other hand, was a life monastic in regularity, almost monastic in quietness; filled full of air and sleep and exercise and sobriety; with less and less creative energy and no illness, till the delicate author of 'Poems and Ballads' became 'a sturdy little old man without an ache or a pain,' who 'ate like a caterpillar and slept like a dormouse'; till that Nemesis arrived which, alas, in all fields lies in wait for too much order, and, in Mr Gosse's words, it came about that 'nothing could be more motionless than the existence of "the little old genius and his little old acolyte, in their dull little villa."' "

The contrast between these two halves of Swinburne's life suggests the key to his character and work. Genius is mind on fire. In some cases, as for instance in Goethe, there was so much mind that a fire, which did not always burn very vigorously, could not always keep it more than respectably warm. The same thing may be seen, on a smaller scale, in our own Arnold. In others, as sometimes even in Shelley, and often in many of the Elizabethans, the fire is apt to burn too long and too fiercely for the material supplied to it. There is no doubt that Swinburne belonged to the latter of these two classes. It is a complete mistake to say, as is sometimes said, that he was nothing but a reed through which every breath of wind passed into music. Neither the marvellous music of his verse nor the accumulated and cumbrous violence of his prose ought to conceal from the reader so often as they are allowed to do that there is a mind of real power working behind both. But still there is no doubt that the dominant feature is rather the passions and emotions which never fail, than the thoughts which, though far from absent, are in no equal abundance. This was always the case with the man as well as with the poet, and resulted in a youth of violence followed by a middle and old age of exhaustion and routine.

This is the story which Mr Gosse has told in what will rank as one of the pleasantest of our literary biographies, especially if read in conjunction with the curious and amusing sketch of Swinburne already given by the same

writer in his 'Portraits and Sketches.' No life was ever more entirely that of a man of letters than Swinburne's. He never had any other profession or occupation. Outside his own family he had no friendships but those which were rooted in literature or art. Whether he was loving Burne Jones and Morris, or worshipping Hugo and Landor, or consigning Furnivall to the depths of Hell, it was always the artist or writer (I was almost making him call Furnivall an artist!) as well as the man that he kept in view. Such a life, even when lived by so original and excitable a personality as Swinburne, cannot provide a great deal of incident for a biographer. And it is not the least of Mr Gosse's merits that he has kept his story within one volume. But all that it does provide asks for exactly those gifts which Mr Gosse brings. It asks for a combination which can only rarely be achieved. We often get biographies by friends or relations who knew and loved their hero indeed, but, knowing little else, cannot really deal with his work. Or we get them of another sort, written by those who have full knowledge of the subject of the man's work but never knew the man himself. The latter kind almost necessarily lacks charm and the former authority. Mr Gosse's book abounds in both. It is the book of one who has given all his leisure, which has fortunately meant much of his life, to letters, and one who was Swinburne's intimate friend. It is at once amusing enough to entertain those who are curious about an eccentric individual, and serious enough to interest those who want to know more of a great poet. Its only defects are the two rarest of all in these days—an excess of brevity and of caution.

Mr Gosse must know a thousand good stories about Swinburne; indeed he has told a good many in his earlier sketch. But here he has hardly given us a dozen. Even the exciting episode of his narrow escape from drowning at Étretat, which fills half a dozen of the best pages in 'Portraits and Sketches' and is called 'the most important adventure' he ever had, is here very briefly related. It seems, too, that, with his tongue if not with his pen, Swinburne was often extremely humorous; and here again Mr Gosse's caution has shown us hardly anything of a feature certainly wanted to complete his portrait. And, golden as brevity shines in an age of verbosity,

most people will think that this biographer has carried his worship of it unnecessarily far by his decision to omit the intended chapter on Swinburne's place in the history of poetry, which few could have written with greater authority than he.

Mr Gosse's 'Life' was preceded earlier in the year by another picture of the poet, the volume called 'The Boyhood of Algernon Charles Swinburne,' written by his cousin and life-long friend, Mrs Disney Leith. This has some claim to be considered the worst edited book in the world. It contains some interesting recollections of Swinburne by one who knew one real side of him—the affectionate, domestic, family side—better than any one now living. But neither they nor the Letters which occupy the rest of the volume are at all confined to his boyhood. The book would have been far more accurately called by some such title as Swinburne and his Family. That is its real subject; and the picture it gives of the devotion to his parents and sisters and cousins which, but for one or two brief intervals inevitable with such a temperament as his, never failed but rather deepened all through his long life, is full of interest and charm. But the Letters are presented to us in such a state of absolute confusion that irritation with their editor often drives out all interest in their writer. It is a small thing that Mrs Leith follows the exasperating practice, as old at least as the publication of the Letters of Madame de Sévigné, of heading three-quarters of the letters 'To the Same,' a method which often forces the reader who is not reading straight through to turn back a dozen or twenty pages before he can discover who 'the same' is. 'To his Mother' would have cost the printer exactly two letters more. This bad practice is, however, so long established that an editor so careless could hardly be expected to correct it. But Mrs Leith has methods of her own which are much worse. She professes to keep the letters 'more or less together according to their subjects,' and to give 'the periods as far as possible in chronological order.' This was not in itself a good plan, and, bad as it is, it is not carried out. Consecutive letters take us backwards and forwards from his last year to his youth. Of the letters under the heading 'Hugo,' for instance, one is dated 1900, the next 1883, the next

undated, the next 'probably sixties.' The result, of course, is blank and enraging confusion. If Mrs Leith knew no better, her publishers ought to have told her that they could not issue a book in such a state of primeval chaos.

Yet, in spite of all this, and of such amazing aberrations of judgment as that which declares that his best poetry was written at Putney, the book is worth reading. It gives the private side of the man of genius, the local and personal pieties which linked his youth and age together, all the love and loveableness of the friend, the cousin, the brother, above all, of course, of the son. It gives the prose picture of that intense devotion to children which was the source of so many of his poems. It gives his love of nature, especially thunder-storms and the sea (his family called him 'the seagull' when he was a boy), and his consciousness of what he owed to it: 'If only poor Coleridge could—if only poor Rossetti could—have taken the same wholesome and happy and grateful delight in Nature as Wordsworth and Tennyson did and as Walter and I do, they would have been so much happier—and (I hope and think) such much better men.'

Altogether the picture, which includes the last thirty years almost as much as the boyhood, is a very pleasant one—one indeed of increasing happiness, if of receding genius. 'What stuff people talk about youth being the happiest time of life! Thank God . . . I am very much more than twice as happy now as I was when half my present age just twenty-five years ago.' This is to his mother; and it is beautiful to see her brilliant son going to meet her in all matters wherever he possibly can and travelling with her as far as he can, not concealing differences, but taking pleasure in telling her of the points on which his belief drew steadily nearer hers, as, for instance, his growing faith in a life after death. It is to her—as one discovers after a search through more than twenty pages—that he writes of Philip Marston's death in 1887: 'his poor father sent me a note announcing it on the very day that he—as I do hope and trust and believe—passed from a life of such suffering and sorrow as very few can have known, to a happy one.' And it is to her, then over eighty, that he wrote a little confession of faith that he must have known would give her great pleasure:

'It is so beautiful and delightful to think of "being together when this life is over," as you say, and of seeing things no longer "in a glass darkly," but all who have ever tried to do a little bit of what they thought right being brought together—if what they thought right was not absolutely wicked and shocking, like the beliefs of persecutors—and understanding and loving each other, that I sometimes feel as if it ought hardly to be talked about. The most wonderfully and divinely unselfish man I ever knew, Mazzini, whose whole life was self-sacrifice, was so intensely possessed by this faith that, if he could have been uncharitable, it would have been towards the disbelievers and preachers of disbelief in it.'

These intimate affections, faiths, and loyalties, belonging, as they generally do, especially to his childhood and his later years, are the least known side of the poet who had drunk so deeply and so sincerely of the intoxication of religious and political rebellion. But they were there. The pagan poet seldom ceased altogether to be his Christian mother's son; the fiery republican never for a moment forgot that he came of two houses of ancient blood; and, whether we think this wisdom or folly, weakness or strength, there it was, quite real and, in his later years, as most people will think, not only a growing but on the whole a beautiful reality—how real and how beautiful we should not have known without the help of Mrs Disney Leith.

But of course the Swinburne of permanent interest is neither the son nor the friend nor the descendant of a long line of Swinburnes and Ashburnhams, but the poet. And it is the poet who is the subject of Mr Gosse's book. Nor was there ever a man more entirely and exclusively a poet than Swinburne. Even Shelley could not content himself with the poetic service of humanity. He made more than one excursion into the sphere of action in promotion of the political and ethical ideals he had so much at heart. But Swinburne was a pure artist who knew that his art was his only business. He was pleased at being asked to go into Parliament, but he had never 'felt any ambition for any work or fame but a poet's, except indeed, while yet a boy, for a soldier's'; and he refused to transfer himself from his books to a place where, as Mr Gosse says, he would certainly have proved a portent of ineffectuality.' When Mazzini, who advised

this refusal, showed that his object in keeping the poet free from English politics was to put his genius into other harness, Swinburne's sound instinct stood firm even against the pressure of the revered 'Chief.' 'He wants me to dedicate and consecrate my writing power to do good and serve others exclusively; which I can't. If I tried I should lose my faculty of verse even.' So he writes to his mother, who probably shared Mazzini's view, adding for her consolation: 'when I can, I do.'

Art, especially in such a born artist as Swinburne, may, and probably will, serve all kinds of good causes indirectly, but only on condition of serving none but herself directly. But that is a lesson which neither the Lady Jane Swinburnes nor even the Mazzinis will ever be quick to learn. *Quem tu Melpomene* represents a truth they never really accept. But there was never a man in whose case it was so much the central truth as it was in Swinburne's. He was signed with the Muse's mark at Eton, perhaps even earlier; at Oxford 'he is the one among us who certainly has genius,' and he shows its originality and strength by writing verse which exhibits no trace of the influence of Tennyson, or of either of the Brownings; in London he at once takes his place in the brilliant Rossetti circle, in which, in fact, we now see that his was the most authentic genius, the one destined to shine longest and over the widest field. Rossetti had as much genius perhaps, in original power, but he divided his strength between two arts, and in neither achieved anything that rivals the best that was accomplished by the undivided strength which Swinburne gave to one. Morris had many great and some noble qualities, but of sheer genius it can hardly be doubted that he had less than either Rossetti or Swinburne. Burne Jones no doubt had it in abundance; but it seems possible that it took him too much out of the main current of life and art to allow him the sure immortality of Swinburne. Art is a synthesis of present and past, of nationality and universalism. Burne Jones must always suffer from having deliberately made himself so far as he could a Celt of the Middle Age instead of a European of the 19th century, a century rich with an inheritance of so much beside what came from the mediæval Celt. Swinburne made no such mistake.

Enthusiastic lover and user of Greek poetry as he was, he never forgot that he was an Englishman and not a Greek; passionate in his devotion to modern Italy and France, it was with English eyes and an English heart that he looked at both. He knew that, if art throws itself upon any distant age or foreign country before it has really lived in its own, its relations to the stranger are usually those not of a master but of a slave.

This, then, was Swinburne from the first, a lover and creator of art, a poet and artist born and dedicated. Neither mother nor 'Chief' could make him anything else; and as that and that alone Mr Gosse has given his portrait. Perhaps it was just that exclusive devotion to art which produced the eccentricities of which Mr Gosse gives some amusing pictures, as well as the more serious weakness at which he only hints with an unnecessary reserve which may do injustice to Swinburne by leading to worse suspicions. It would have been better to say frankly that Swinburne was rescued by Watts Dunton from a life over which the vice which degraded Pitt and Lamb and Porson was obtaining a sway which must ultimately have been as fatal to one of the greatest of modern English poets as it was to the greatest of all biographers. That, in any case, was the truth. We may think that some practical occupations outside his art, such as, no doubt, made for the health and sanity of his own adored *Æschylus* and *Sophocles*, as well as of *Shakespeare* and *Milton*, *Dante* and *Goethe*, and many of the greatest poets of all countries, would have saved him from this disease, which preys especially upon the solitary and self-centred. But that remedy grows more difficult with each generation, which sees Art become a more jealous mistress as her inherited wealth grows greater. At any rate, Swinburne was, and paid for being, a poet and nothing else.

The very form that Nature had given him prophesied his history. The immense head, high-domed with genius and crowned with a burning bush of fiery hair, but falling away into a chin of almost absurd insignificance; the small and beautiful but rather too dainty features, the skin over-white with a delicacy both of refinement and of constitution, the sloping shoulders, small limbs and tiny feet, as if there were no body to balance the great

head, all suggested that presence of genius and absence of will and self-control, in which his father epitomised his life on a melancholy occasion. But their consequences were not always melancholy. The eccentricities into which his excitable temperament led him were often harmlessly amusing, and even interesting as revelations of his real nature, which a more mannered and restrained poet would not have allowed us. Miss Alice Bird's picture, for instance, of Swinburne reciting 'Songs before Sunrise,' is no doubt rather ridiculous, but it has also significance and even beauty. She describes him, Mr Gosse says, as

'dancing about the room convulsed with passion, while he half read, half recited the songs to her brother and herself. In particular, those in which Napoleon III was denounced he repeated with such violence and such "poison" that his voice sounded like the hissing of serpents, while he jigged round the room, his hair flying out behind him, and his arms flapping and fluttering at his sides. At these times, when he was transfigured by excitement, his wonderful head looked like that of a young god, if only the weak mouth and receding chin could be ignored. Directly the storm of melody was over, and the poem put away, Algernon would sink down on a sofa with the gentleness of a child, and his voice would immediately resume its rich soft cadence.'

So when Mr Gosse himself first met him in 1871, he kept hopping on and off a sofa as he talked, 'so that I was reminded of some orange-crested bird—a hoopoe perhaps—hopping from perch to perch in a cage.'

That he was purely and merely a poet he showed by something more important than these external eccentricities. Prof. Herford has lately discussed, in a lecture delivered before the British Academy, what he calls the 'Poetic view of the World.' He argues that side by side with the two great world-views, the religious and the philosophical, there is another, the poetical. While the first is 'dominated by the consciousness of a power or powers distinct from man, controlling his fate and determining his moral code,' and the second originates 'in the effort to give a final and universally valid account of experience,' the third 'has a radically different psychological origin and character. It is equally intense and

absorbing, but it is not determined by conscious relation to an outer power and it seeks to express rather than to explain.' It may seem to differ from the other two in detachment from reality and even 'in liberating us from the necessity or desire of contemplating reality'; but this detachment is only apparent. Reality and experience are always doing their work in the poet's mind.

'What distinguishes poetic from religious or philosophic apprehension is not that it turns away from reality, but that it lies open to and in eager watch for reality at doors and windows which with them are barred or blind. The poet's soul resides, so to speak, in his senses, in his emotions, in his imagination, as well as in his conscious intelligence; and we may provisionally describe poetic apprehension as an intense state of consciousness in which all these are vitally concerned.'

Prof. Herford goes on to say that 'a view of the world reached through poetic experience will tend to have certain characteristics, such as an indisposition to doctrines which either brand the senses as illusory or erect them into a sufficing faith'; an attitude of somewhat distant respect to the mere logical intellect, a love of myth and story as expressing truths about Nature and man, which no other words, and in particular no reasoned formulas of science, can express; a recognition of the irrational elements of life as at least needful ingredients in it. These are what one may roughly call intellectual characteristics. Others belong more to the emotional side of the poet, such as an acceptance of love—the 'mysterious love of man and woman'—so often feared by religion and ignored by philosophy, as one of the very greatest things in life; an exaltation of 'all the energies of the soul which carry men out of and beyond themselves,' a faith in heroes and the heroic, a tendency to think greatly of man, an assertion of his freedom to be himself in the highest and fullest way, of the power of his spirit to defy all material obstacles and, though bounded in a nutshell, not merely to count himself but to be a king of infinite space.

This is not the occasion to discuss this interesting analysis of the poetic temperament and attitude. Whatever reserves we may make as to details, we shall all agree

as to its general truth. Has there often been a poet who exhibited more of the characteristics gathered together by Prof. Herford and fewer of any other very marked characteristics than Swinburne? Other poets have been partly given over to the religious or to the philosophical view of the world; or they have been men of the world and men of action, politicians or satirists or students of society, for whom it was impossible to take a purely poetic view of the significance of life. Their very greatness is often inseparably bound up with these excursions outside the strictly defined poetic province. Neither Dante nor Lucretius nor Milton would have been as great as they are if their intense interest in high matters outside the world-view taken by the poet merely as poet had not led them sometimes to attempt things which poetry cannot perfectly achieve. But in Swinburne's case triumphs and failures are alike purely poetic. He never was, wished to be, or could have been, anything but a poet. Maupassant thought him 'the most exasperatingly artistic human being he had ever met'—so Mr Gosse records in 'Portraits and Sketches.' But Maupassant should have said 'poetic,' not 'artistic,' for Swinburne's understanding of any art but his own was very limited. And, outside the world of imagination, he had hardly any interests. He had no 'small talk,' showed a 'glazed eye' of inattention when the 'common topics of the day' were discussed, had no taste whatever for science, and an absence of musical ear so complete as to expose him to practical jokes. His passionate interest in politics was wholly ideal and poetic, a love partly of great men alive or dead, and partly of those creations of his imagination, true with a truth beyond actuality, the England, the Italy, the France, the Universal Republic of his vision.

It is on this side that Mr Gosse's book is weakest. Swinburne himself considered his most political volume, 'Songs before Sunrise,' to be his best work, 'the most intimate and the most sincere.' Mr Gosse himself calls it 'Swinburne's cardinal and crowning work.' But he has a strange notion that its subject is now a very serious drawback to it, that the reader of to-day is unpleasantly conscious that the Liberty to whom Swinburne addresses his hymns of adoration is 'largely a chimera, a vain

fancy' of the poet's own unselfish imagination,' and that, when Swinburne addresses Italy in such terms as

'The very thought in us how much we love thee
Makes the throat sob with love and blinds the eyes,'

'we are embarrassed by the knowledge that he had no relations and hardly any acquaintances in a country which he only visited twice, as a tourist, for a few weeks,' and wonder how a poet can get 'so excited about problems of state-craft which do not affect his own life.'

This is strange language for a man like Mr Gosse, who has not generally been accused of being a Philistine. The notion that a poet, the essence of whose being, one rather thought, was to have an imagination transcending time and space, must not love Italy unless he has lived there or at least been represented by a great aunt at Florence or a second cousin at Rome, is astonishing. Swinburne loved Italy and the Republic in the same way as he loved children and the sea, in the way that he loved love itself: that is, in each case he loved the reality as we call it, the thing we can all see, but at the same time by the power of penetrating imagination he passed behind the veil of mere reality and brought back from those secret places a revelation of something greater and more spiritual, a more essential truth arising out of the facts as they are known to the senses, but transcending them, not bound by their limitations. The Italy of whom he speaks in such words as

'This is she,
Italia, the world's wonder, the world's care,
Free in her heart ere quite her hands be free,
And lovelier than her loveliest robe of air';

the Freedom of which he says that it moves and works

'Till the motion be done and the measure
Circling through season and clime,
Slumber and sorrow and pleasure,
Vision of virtue and crime;
Till consummate with conquering eyes,
A soul disembodied, it rise
From the body transfigured of time,

Till it rise and remain and take station
 With the stars of the worlds that rejoice ;
 Till the voice of its heart's exultation
 Be as theirs an invariable voice ;
 By no discord of evil estranged,
 By no pause, by no breach in it changed,
 By no clash in the chord of its choice'—

these are plainly not the Italy or freedom of guide-books or newspapers; or rather they are that but also something immensely more than that, something that the poet, in Wordsworth's phrase, perceives indeed, but also 'half creates,' a truth beyond experience, which has an existence apart from and above the world of experience and yet has a power of drawing that world after it.

So to-day, in this present catastrophe of the world, we have again and again seen the poets doing exactly this work. The Italy, France, England, America, the Freedom and Law, which Leopardi and Carducci and Victor Hugo, which Milton and Wordsworth, Shelley and Whitman saw where, but to eyes of the spirit, they were not visible, have been very present with us in these last three years, and have been all along at work helping to transform our actual visible imperfect world into their own glorious likeness.

If we ask ourselves, as we must when his Life appears, what is to be considered Swinburne's ultimate place and greatness, we must certainly look for part of the answer in this direction. He is taking his share in the inspiration of the world to-day, a share which he certainly could not have taken if, as Mr Gosse seems to wish, he had been unable to care much for countries and peoples which he had not himself seen, if he had not been 'infatuated with the dream of Italian revolution.' Mr Gosse has apparently no objection to these poems so far as they are dedicated to 'something vaster and higher behind the dream.' But that will not do by itself. The way to the invisible is through the visible. 'He that loveth not his brother whom he hath seen, how can he love God whom he hath not seen?' is a saying true in more than one field. Swinburne's defect was not that he loved too much the good he saw in the world, but that he saw so much less than there was. Still, he was never false to his pure, if rather narrow revolutionary creed.

However far or often he fell short, as all who aim at the heights must, of the ideal he had set before himself, he never by any deliberate word or act unsaid that loftiest of his poems in which he turned his back, as Mr Gosse says, on 'the service of sensual pleasure,' and gave himself to a nobler call :

'Play then and sing ; we too have played,
We likewise, in that subtle shade.'

But now that stage is past, and we are conscious of life as having more and greater things in it than that, as being indeed

'A little time that we may fill
Or with such good works or such ill
As loose the bonds or make them strong
Wherein all manhood suffers wrong.
By rose-hung river and light-foot rill
There are who rest not ; who think long
Till they discern as from a hill
At the sun's hour of morning song,
Known of souls only, and those souls free,
The sacred spaces of the sea.'

At this moment, of all the notes that entered into Swinburne's amazing music, in which only the sensual ear hears nothing but the delicious sound, it is this note struck by the great Prelude of which we most naturally think. The publication of his *Life* necessarily sends us back to his work as a whole. But it is impossible to discuss that as an appendage to his biography. All that can be said here is that we have no English poet who so invariably takes a purely poetic method of treating whatever subject he touches ; that we have none with a more extraordinary variety of music ; and that we have none with a more unerring instinct for language. Of the first point something has already been said. Of the second this may be added. Most poets tend to use a few metres in which they have acquired a mastery or to which at any rate they have grown accustomed. Swinburne's metrical powers seem to have been almost unlimited, and they never rusted for lack of use. In the second series of 'Poems and Ballads,' for instance, which appears to be Mr Gosse's favourite volume of his verse, an

examination of the first twenty poems, more than half the book, will show that the poet only on one occasion repeats the use of any metre. All the rest of the poems differ from each other; even the two sonnets have different arrangements of the sestet. And this gift of metrical freedom and abundance remained with him to the very end. In his last volume, 'The Channel Passage,' there are some forty poems, apart from sonnets, and all but one or two of the metres occur only once.

Of the third of these points in which Swinburne could challenge all rivals in English poetry, his instinct for language, there is this distinction to be made. It was strictly an instinct for the right word, not for the right sentence. Not even in his poetry, and still less in his prose, did he ever manifest much of that intellectual ear which gives strength and beauty to the structure of the sentence. But as an artist in words he is consummate, and entirely impeccable. He often uses too many words, it is true, but he cannot use the wrong word when a right word exists. He is constitutionally incapable of enduring for the sake of rhyme such emotional discords as are felt when Wordsworth uses a running 'brook' for an example of worldly ostentation, or when Browning makes a Neapolitan girl in Bomba's days speak of men who took a shot at him as 'felons.' And he would have died rather than write down the hideous four words 'Who prop, thou ask'st,' with which Matthew Arnold opened a justly famous sonnet. From the beginning to the end, from 'Atalanta' to 'A Clasp of Hands,' never a word makes its way into his verse which cannot fitly come from one who knew the Bible by heart, worshipped Milton, and had kneeled before the old age of Landor. And he had a special gift for the difficult task of handling successive monosyllables, without which an English writer cannot hope to succeed. In one of the greatest speeches in his dramas there is a passage of 137 words, 129 of which are monosyllables. Like Shakespeare, he especially uses this power for the expression of whatever is most solemn and most tender. What are the last words of Meleager?

'And now for God's sake kiss me once and twice
And let me go; for the night gathers me,
And in the night shall no man gather fruit.'

And how does the poet open that beautiful translation in which he has, line for line, as I cannot but think, surpassed a beautiful original?

'Take heed of this small child of earth ;
He is great : he hath in him God most high.'

How admirably, here and everywhere, he manages the musical balance of these monosyllables ! It is a dance in which each step has a distinct value and yet is felt to be part of a rhythmical whole.

Of the other whole of which words provide the parts—the logical sentence—he has, as I have already said, a much less certain feeling. Indeed, few writers have less. This is an injury to his verse and one of several defects which ultimately became fatal to his prose. That deserves to be read much more often than it is ; not many critical essays in the language, for instance, are more worth reading than that called 'Wordsworth and Byron,' in the *Miscellanies*. But it cannot be denied that his prose, never very easy to read, gradually became impossible, and this not merely for the reasons given by Mr Gosse ; but for defects more omnipresent and fundamental, the defects, in fact, too frequent in the prose of a poet. There is no relief in it, no ease or lightness or quietness ; every step is conscious of itself, as it should be in dancing but should not be in walking ; every word is emphasised, so that the impression made is of a man walking with weights on his feet. And the sentences are so long and complicated that the meaning of a phrase is often not fully clear till one has read its successor or even further.

But it is not his prose of which people are likely to be thinking to-day. In that field he is not one of the great masters of English as he is in verse. It is to his poems that Mr Gosse's book will send people ; and the tremendous hours through which we are living, the struggle of the free peoples for the hope of a free world, the sight of so many crowned and uncrowned Republics joined together against the last remaining despotisms—all these things, so entirely after Swinburne's own heart, send us especially to the volume of which he said, 'Other books are books. "Songs before Sunrise" is myself.'

That is the answer to give to-day to the people who,

fresh from Mr Gosse's book or the newspaper articles about it, wish to make or renew acquaintance with Swinburne and ask which of his books they should read. Perhaps 'Songs before Sunrise' was never so actual as it is to-day. When it appeared, we in England scarcely saw the cause of freedom as one throughout the world; and we did not dream of France and Italy, and still less of a regenerated Russia, as our allies in a universal war fought for liberty and right. But that, even the regenerated Russia, is just what Swinburne did dream of. And there is something more than that. There has been a great return to Wordsworth, and especially to his political poetry, during the war. No poet can be put to a severer test. But those who have gone for strength in these times to the poet of 'The Happy Warrior' and the Sonnets have not found either the man or his words fail them. The austere unity of his life; the consuming fire of his love of freedom, which was neither ashamed to be a love of England nor afraid to be something larger and wider; the elemental power of his poetry—all these things were just what was called for by men and women daily facing death for themselves or those most dear to them. It would be absurd to suggest that Swinburne recalls Wordsworth in these qualities. His way of life is not austere, nor his habit of mind stern and simple, nor his words few, grave and bare. On the other hand, if less of a moral force than Wordsworth and with less power of thought and less knowledge of the actual political situation of his day, he has much more consciousness of the past history of freedom and is a much better European. This is the truth; and if it had not been for the fame of 'Poems and Ballads' on the one hand and for our national distrust of eloquence on the other, we should certainly have long ago recognised that we have not much English poetry of a more 'imperishable excellence of sincerity and strength' than 'Songs before Sunrise.' These words Swinburne himself used of another poet who deserved them much less than he did, who could hate as Swinburne hated but could not love as Swinburne loved. Byron left no volume that strikes the heroic note as it is struck again and again all through the 'Songs.' Where has he sounded that call of utter self-devotion to the cause to which the best

men in Europe are responding to-day as it is sounded by Swinburne in this astonishing sequence of poems?

'But weak is change, but strengthless time,
To take the light from heaven, or climb
The hills of heaven with wasting feet.
Songs they can stop that earth found meet,
But the stars keep their ageless rhyme;
Flowers they can slay that spring thought sweet,
But the stars keep their spring sublime;
Passions and pleasures can defeat,
Actions and agonies control,
And life and death, but not the soul.'

There is the Prelude. Here is the 'Eve of Revolution':

'Love of our life, what more than men are we,
That this our breath for thy sake should expire,
For whom to joyous death
Glad gods might yield their breath,
Great gods drop down from heaven to serve for hire?
We are but men, are we,
And thou art Italy;
What shall we do for thee with our desire?
What gift shall we deserve to give?
How shall we die to do thee service or how live?

And here is 'Super Flumina Babylonis,' perhaps the noblest of all:

'Whoso bears the whole heaviness of the wronged world's
weight
And puts it by,
It is well with him suffering, though he face man's fate;
How should he die?

Seeing death has no part in him any more, no power
Upon his head;
He has bought his eternity with a little hour,
And is not dead.

For an hour, if ye look for him, he is no more found,
For one hour's space;
Then ye lift up your eyes to him and behold him crowned,
A deathless face.

On the mountains of memory, by the world's well-springs,
In all men's eyes,
Where the light of the life of him is on all past things,
Death only dies.'

And here is 'The Halt before Rome':

'Serve not for any man's wages,
Pleasure nor glory nor gold;
Not by her side are they won
Who saith unto each of you, "Son,
Silver and gold have I none;
I give but the love of all ages,
And the life of my people of old."

And then there are the words he addressed to the mother of the Cairoli, which must come home to so many English mothers to-day as the very message for their sorrow and their pride:

'Somewhat could each soul save,
What thing soever it gave,
But thine, mother, what has thy soul kept back?
None of thine all, not one,
To serve thee and be thy son,
Feed with love all thy days, lest one day lack;
All thy whole life's love, thine heart's whole,
Thou hast given as who gives gladly, O thou the
supreme soul.'

And how many soldiers to-day are replying, as Swinburne's Pilgrims reply, to an inner or outer cynical voice that will not yet be quite silenced:

'—And ye shall die before your thrones be won.
—Yea, and the changed world and the liberal sun
Shall move and shine without us, and we lie
Dead; but if she too move on earth and live,
But if the old world with all the old irons rent
Laugh and give thanks, shall we be not content?
Nay, we shall rather live, we shall not die,
Life being so little and death so good to give.'

That is the note that rings all through these wonderful poems, a note that in such days as these, none perhaps, except the soldiers and the mothers, can hear without shame mingling with the inspiration.

Swinburne has never received his full meed of gratitude for sounding it so finely. His greatness has been too little remembered, the weak things in him too much. He was always a child, or at least never a grown man, in politics as in so much else. One can more easily fancy him writing almost any of Wordsworth's greatest poems than the pamphlet about the Convention of Cintra. But of the high ardour and true instincts of youth no one has had more, nor of the pure utterance of poetry by which the breath of a moment achieves eternal life. There is much else in him to remember; but that is the thing which calls most for remembrance to-day.

This article was already in type when the volume of Posthumous Poems appeared. It is edited by Mr Gosse and Mr Thomas James Wise, who has done so much for Swinburne and Swinburnians. Mr Gosse gives some account of its contents in an interesting preface. Most of the poems were found after Swinburne's death in old newspaper bundles of miscellaneous rubbish, which it had been the poet's curious habit all his life to pack together when the litter of paper on his table grew intolerable. They were then stowed away in shelves, and carried about whenever he moved his abode, but never again opened.

Neither time nor space admit of any detailed discussion of the volume. As to the contents of the volume, nearly half of them are ballads written in Swinburne's Rossetti period, but apparently considered by Rossetti to be 'too rough and bare' for publication. They represent Swinburne's conviction that the manner of the old ballads could be followed by modern poets much more closely than had been thought. Whether the result is quite a living thing will be a matter on which opinions differ. The best of the new ballads is, perhaps, 'Duriesdyke,' because it has most of that bareness which is the power of the ballad at its finest, and least of the irrelevant and garrulous detail which is its bane. But few will think even this as fine a thing as 'The Bloody Son' of 'Poems and Ballads,' with its beautiful unity and monotony.

For the rest, there is a miscellaneous collection of poems of no very great importance. Several of them

are those tributes to great men, Landor again, and Shelley and Mazzini, and Leconte de Lisle and Karl Blind, in which Swinburne was more abundant than any poet. There is an early version of the 'Dies Iræ,' a parody of Tennyson and a parody of himself, amusing as showing he was aware that his readers had some excuse for getting tired of his rhapsodies about the sea. But the finest thing in the volume is the rejected Newdigate on The Death of Sir John Franklin, which, one hopes with Mr Gosse, was rejected unread because it was not in the heroic couplet. In all essentials it is the Swinburne of the later volumes; only, of course, it is not maturity but youth. It must be by far the finest thing ever sent in for the Newdigate. And that Swinburne was entirely himself from the first may be seen by such lines as these, which describe the dying men thinking of spring in England:

'And how the meadows in their sweet May sloth
Grew thick with grass as soft as song or sleep'—

or by the last lines of all, which, like so many of his most famous poems, end with his first and last love, the sea:

'These chose the best, therefore their name shall be
Part of all noble things that shall be done,
Part of the royal record of the sea.'

It is just a little young. But, except for that, the passage might have its place in any poem of his prime. And, indeed, the best part of Swinburne was always young. The boy's love of the sea grew into the man's love of poetry and liberty without loss or change, for to his poet's vision the three were one, a spiritual unity which remained all his life unbroken. To him, in age as in youth, the sea meant poetry, and poetry meant liberty, and, again, liberty and poetry, in their turn, meant the freedom, the boundlessness, the exaltation of the sea.

JOHN BAILEY.

Art. 13.—THE COURSE OF THE WAR.

THE principal fighting of the past three months on the western front has taken place on either flank of the line to which the German armies had withdrawn, in the latter part of March, between Arras and the Aisne. Whatever designs may have prompted the German retreat, the Allied Commanders were not lured into advancing across the belt of devastated country, styled by Hindenburg the 'prepared battle-field,' to attack the new positions. They contented themselves with following up the retreat, and pressing the enemy back to his main line of defence. In a series of intermittent operations, spread over the past three months, the French have advanced their front to the margin of the upper Coucy Forest and the forest of St Gobain, and captured the villages of Moy (on the Oise, due east of Cerizy), Urvillers, and Gauchy; while the British occupied a line embracing Fayet, Gricourt, Pontru, Lempire, Gouzeaucourt, Havrincourt Wood, and Boursies.* Our troops hold the heights overlooking the Somme Canal east of Le Verguier, and have reached the Scheldt east of Epehy. An attack on a front of ten miles, on April 2, gave them possession of Noreuil, Ecoust St Mein, Croisilles, and Henin sur Cojeul, and brought them in contact with the enemy's main positions between the Bapaume-Cambrai road and the Sensée, where the so-called Hindenburg line embraces the villages of Quéant, Bullecourt, Fontaine lez Croisilles, and Chérisy.

The early days of April were characterised by the aerial activity which usually precedes great battles. On the 5th and 6th engagements were fought between large forces; and extensive raids were made against the enemy's aerodromes, depôts, and communications. The losses were heavy on both sides, 46 German machines being destroyed, or driven down in a damaged condition, while 48 of ours failed to return. This appears to be the last occasion on which the enemy has made a serious attempt to gain supremacy in the air; for, though many engagements have since been fought, our pilots have had

* See map in the 'Quarterly Review' for April. The French have lately taken over part of this line, as far north, at least, as Gricourt.

to seek their foes behind the German lines. Our ascendancy has increased until, at Messines, on June 7, the hostile aeroplanes were debarred from taking any part in the battle. As on the Somme, the officers of the Royal Flying Corps have been free to attack the hostile infantry with bombs and machine-guns, a form of activity which, as testified by captured official documents, has had a demoralising effect on the troops concerned.

In the meantime preparations had been pressed forward for an offensive on the Arras front, where assembly and communication trenches, telephone lines, light railways, and all the other provisions for a great battle were already in existence, and had only to be extended or supplemented. It may, indeed, be surmised that most of this work had been already done, in anticipation of the probable development of the spring offensive, as originally planned. The opposing lines were in close contact, obviating the tedious process of capturing a succession of advanced positions, which had been in progress for some time in front of the new Hindenburg line.

The attack was delivered at 5.30 a.m. on April 9, on the front between Henin sur Cojeul and Givenchy en Gohelle. The blow was sudden and effective; and, if the Germans were aware of our intention, their preparations for meeting the attack at the moment of its delivery were inadequate, and their attempted counter-attacks were belated and abortive. On the right wing Neuville Vitasse and Tilloy lez Mofflaines were taken in the first rush, together with the intervening positions on Telegraph Hill and Observation Ridge, features of the long spur which stretches from the neighbourhood of Monchy au Bois to beyond Monchy le Preux, and divides the waters of the Scarpe and its tributary the Cojeul. In the centre Blangy and St Laurent, suburbs of Arras, also fell to the first assault; while, on the left, La Folie, and all but the northern extremity of the historic ridge of Vimy were captured. In the second stage Feuchy, Athies, and Thelus were occupied. An ample supply of munitions enabled the attack to be prepared by a bombardment far surpassing in intensity all records of the Somme. Progress, however, was impeded by heavy snowstorms, which continued for several days; and the advance of the artillery was hampered by the sodden condition

of the country, and the havoc wrought by its own projectiles.

Despite these disadvantages our troops, on the second day, gained possession of Fampoux, and of the village and wood of Farbus, and completed the capture of the Vimy ridge; and, in the third day's fighting, they carried Monchy le Preux, and penetrated the enemy's main positions near Bullecourt, though they were expelled in the afternoon by a counter-attack. On April 12 Heninel, Wancourt, and the heights on the opposite bank of the Cojeul were captured. On the two following days the area of operations was extended to the north, and Bailleul, Vimy, Givenchy, Angres, Liévin, Cité St Pierre, and the Double Crassier, of Loos fame, were taken. The captures during the six days' offensive amounted to 14,000 prisoners and 194 guns. The enemy was driven from all his advanced positions south-east of Arras; and to the north, nearly as far as Loos, he had been expelled from the main defences which he had occupied for many months, and fortified with great labour. The commanding ridge of Vimy, which had dominated our positions, and given him an extensive view over the country in rear of our lines in that region, passed, with all its advantages, into our possession.

Before dawn on April 15, five regiments of Prussian Guards made a determined attack on a front of six miles between the Bapaume-Cambrai railway and Noreuil. Repulsed at all other points, the enemy gained a footing in Lagnicourt after desperate hand-to-hand fighting, but was ejected by a prompt counter-attack, delivered at 7 a.m. The Prussians, losing direction in their retreat, were caught in their own wire entanglement, where they suffered severely from our artillery fire. 3000 prisoners were taken, and dead were counted to the number of 1,500.

While these events were proceeding on the Arras front, our French Allies were preparing for a complementary offensive on the Aisne, and in western Champagne. On April 16 they launched an attack on a front of 25 miles between Reims and Soissons, and, in the course of a desperate battle, in which the enemy employed nineteen divisions, they captured the enemy's first system of defence from Craonne to Soissons, carried the second line south of Juvincourt, and reached the Aisne Canal on

the south-east of Berry au Bac. The offensive was extended on the following day to the region between Auberive and Prunay, where the first line was again carried at the outset, and, in the second line, the village of Auberive, and the fortified heights extending from Mont Cornillet to the Suippes at Vaudesincourt. On April 18 the French occupied the crossings of the Aisne from Chavonne to Condé, which had resisted the assaults of our Second Army Corps in September 1914; and, by the 21st, they had established their front close to the crest of the Chemin des Dames plateau from the neighbourhood of Craonne to Laffaux. In Champagne they captured Mont Haut, and made progress at other points on the Moronvillers heights. In these operations over 19,000 prisoners and 100 guns were taken. Berlin announced that the occupation of the "zone of Siegfried positions," which had commenced on March 16, was completed on April 19 by the abandonment of the line of the Aisne.

On April 23 the armies of Generals Allenby and Horne resumed the offensive, attacking on a front of nine miles astride the Scarpe. The positions captured included the villages of Guemappe and Gavrelle, and the defences south of the latter as far as Roeux cemetery. Progress was also made south-west of Lens. The Germans employed seven divisions; and the fighting on this, and on subsequent occasions, was characterised by the frequency and violence of their counter-attacks, in which their troops suffered severely from our artillery fire. Several important positions changed hands more than once, but, with the exception of a few buildings north of Roeux, all remained ultimately in our possession. During the four following days further progress was made, especially on the right flank, where the front was advanced to within a few hundred yards of Chérisy and Fontaine. A renewal of the attack, north of the Scarpe, on April 28, resulted in the capture of Arleux, and in general progress on the rest of the front. The fighting about Roeux and Oppy was particularly severe. The latter village was partially captured early in the day, but had to be abandoned in face of a heavy counter-attack.

On May 3 the offensive was resumed on a broader

front, extending from south of the Sensée to the Vimy-Acheville road. The line was again advanced at all points, and the captures included a section of the Hindenburg line west of Quéant, and the village of Fresnoy, with the adjoining positions on a two-mile front. Throughout the succeeding fortnight the neighbourhood of Bullecourt was the scene of exceptionally severe fighting, the Germans employing large reserves in ineffective efforts to recover the lost section of the Hindenburg line; while our troops attacked Bullecourt, the greater part of which was taken by a night attack on May 12. Its capture was completed on May 17. The night operations of May 12 comprised an advance astride of the Arras-Cambrai road to a point due north of Chérisy, and the capture of part of Roeux, and of the chemical works, chateau, and cemetery, strongly fortified positions between the village and the railway. Fresnoy village and wood were lost on May 8, but the wood was recovered on the following day, and has since remained in our possession.

In the meantime the French were not inactive. Without encountering serious opposition they continued to improve their positions both on the Aisne front and in Champagne; and, by local attacks on May 4, they captured the village of Craonne with the adjoining positions, and carried the first German lines south-east of Berry au Bac on a front of nearly three miles, capturing 600 prisoners. On the following day they assailed the angle in the enemy's line south-east of Vauxaillon, and captured a section of the hostile positions four miles in length, which they held against repeated counter-attacks. By a simultaneous attack further east they gained possession of the entire plateau of the Chemin des Dames from Cerny to a point east of Craonne, and reached the rocky crests which command the forest of Vauclere and the upper valley of the Ailette. The prisoners taken in these operations brought the total captured by the French since April 16 to 29,000.* Throughout the remainder of the period under review there was a continuous struggle,

* The captures made by the Allied Armies during April and May exceeded 82,000 prisoners and 880 guns, besides a large number of machine-guns, trench-mortars, and other equipment.

sometimes of great severity, on the Chemin des Dames, and on the heights between Moronvillers and Nauroy, the enemy making large drafts on his reserves, in desperate efforts to recover these dominating positions. After much in-and-out fighting the Germans remained in possession of some advanced trenches in the Laffaux, Filain, and Cerny sectors; while our Allies made progress in the neighbourhood of the Laffaux Mill, on the plateau west of Craonne, north-east of Chevreux, and on the Moronvillers heights.

During the latter part of May there were no operations on the British front which need notice in this brief outline, except an attack in the early morning of the 20th, which gained possession of the first and support trenches in the Hindenburg line between Bullecourt and Fontaine, on a front of more than a mile. The remaining days were characterised by raids in many localities, of which the chief were Loos, Vermelles, Neuve Chapelle, Armentieres, Ploegsteert, Messines, and the front north of Ypres. Partly, no doubt, with the object of further engaging the enemy's attention, night attacks were made on the outlying defences of Lens, south and west of Avion, on June 3, and the west slopes of Greenland Hill on June 5. In the latter region the hostile position was captured on a front of one mile. The attack at Lens was less successful, our troops being obliged by heavy counter-attacks to withdraw from some of the ground they had won on the high ground about La Coulotte.

The assault on the Messines ridge was prepared by a week's intense bombardment, culminating, at dawn on June 7, in the explosion of nineteen gigantic mines, which wrecked a great portion of the defences and dug-outs, and doubtless caused general confusion.

'The German forward defences,' to quote an official report, 'consisted of an elaborate system of well-wired trenches and strong points, forming a defensive belt more than a mile in depth. The numerous farms and woods were thoroughly prepared for defence, and included in their garrisons large numbers of machine-guns. Guns of all calibres were placed to bear not only on the front, but on the flanks of an attack. Communication trenches and switch lines, radiating in all directions, were amply provided with strongly-constructed concrete dug-outs and machine-gun emplacements.'

The attack proceeded throughout in almost exact accordance with the prearranged time-table. On the firing of the mines the barrage was laid, and the infantry, springing to the assault, captured in a few minutes the enemy's first-line system on the whole front of attack, extending from St Yves to the Ypres-Comines railway. In less than three hours the entire crestline was in their hands. Soon afterwards they captured Messines, and by midday they had occupied Wytschaete after hard fighting.

The troops then advanced against the formidable line of defences 'which lay, like the chord of an arc, across the base of the salient formed by the ridge.' The village of Oostaverne was captured in the afternoon, after heavy fighting among fortified woods and strong points; and by nightfall practically the entire trench system had been captured, and all the day's objectives had been gained. An attempted counter-attack against the southern part of the new defences was broken up by the artillery, and similar efforts on the following day were equally ineffective. In the evening (June 8), after heavy artillery preparation, the Germans launched a formidable attack, on a front of about six miles, embracing nearly the whole of our new positions. Large forces, composed of fresh divisions drawn from the enemy's reserves, pressed the attack with great determination, the fighting being particularly severe on the flanks, in the neighbourhood of Messines and Klein Zillebeke. The struggle, which lasted till midnight, ended in the total defeat of the enemy.

During the remainder of June, minor operations have extended our positions east of the Messines ridge, and in the region of Arras and Lens. Infantry Hill, which forms the extremity of the spur on which Monchy le Preux is situated, was captured on the 14th; and, on the following day, a further portion of the Hindenburg line was occupied between Bullecourt and Fontaine. Important progress has been made on both banks of the Souchez River, including the capture of part of Avion and the adjoining positions; with the result that, at the time of going to press, the Germans appear to be falling back to the western margin of Lens.

With regard to the general design of the operations

outlined above, it will have been observed that the French and British attacks were not simultaneous. The alternation of the offensive in widely separated regions was presumably not accidental. It may be recalled that a similar plan was followed by the Germans in their Russian campaign of 1915, the probable effect being to embarrass the adversary in the transport of reinforcements from his strategical reserve. Troops set in motion to meet one attack may have to be diverted to meet a sudden emergency at another part of the front. Such abrupt changes of destination cause a dislocation of the railway traffic, and of the system of supply, that would not arise if the attacks were simultaneous, when the troops could be despatched direct to their ultimate destinations. The alternation of the offensive between the Aisne and Moronvillers fronts, and the frequent changes of objective on the British front, would have somewhat similar effects with respect to the general reserves at the disposal of the commanders of the German army-groups. Orders and counter-orders proverbially lead to disorder. As regards the troops themselves, change and uncertainty, whether the movements are extensive or local, cause fatigue, impair confidence, and are detrimental to *moral*. The men are quick to perceive that the adversary controls the situation, and that their rôle is rather to avert defeat than to win victory.

Under present conditions, the element of surprise is practically unattainable, except when the attack is on a small scale, especially at the beginning of an offensive. The vast preparations involved occupy many weeks, and cannot escape detection. As will be seen later, the recent Italian offensive may be an exception, for the enemy appears to have been deceived as to the objective. The attack at Messines, far from being unexpected, was foreshadowed in the Berlin *communiqués*, and formed a topical subject in the German press a week before its delivery. But, while the locality of an attack can be foreseen, the time of its delivery is a matter of conjecture. The Germans probably did not expect to be attacked on Vimy Ridge on April 9; and there are certain indications that they were unprepared for the attack at Messines at the time of its delivery. While the objective cannot be concealed, it is possible to mislead the enemy as to

the time of the attack. The first definite notice is given by the artillery, which, by its increased activity, discloses the intention to attack within a limited period, which may be a few hours, or may extend to a week, or more. During this period the defending troops are incessantly on the alert, and their efficiency is affected by nerve-strain, and by the want of regular rest. Those in the front trenches suffer most, as it is seldom practicable to supply them with food, or to arrange for their relief.

The Germans were kept in this state of tension for more than a week before the battle of Messines. Frequent raids caused false alarms, accentuating the nervous strain, and tending to relax vigilance. On several occasions the bombardment was increased to an intensity which suggested that attack was imminent; while, during the night preceding the actual assault, it declined to an extent which seems to have led the enemy to count on another day's respite. The occasion appears to have been considered opportune to relieve the garrison of the trenches, for the Germans were surprised in the act. On one portion of the front the 3rd Bavarian division had come up to relieve the 40th Saxon division, and the latter had not yet marched out.

The dearth of authentic details in the published reports only admits of a few general and tentative observations on the subject of tactics. In the attack the most striking features are the great concentration of artillery, and the volume and accuracy of the fire which swept away the wire entanglements, and demolished the defensive works; the close cooperation of the guns and the infantry, and the efficiency of the barrage covering the advance; and the excellence of the staff work, by which every detail of the operation was thought out and arranged beforehand in the form of a time-table. It might seem, at first sight, that the last-named does not fall within the scope of tactics; but a closer consideration will show that, under present conditions, the higher control of a battle throughout its various phases can only be exercised by means of orders issued beforehand, in anticipation of its probable course, and not, as formerly, by the issue of orders at each stage, to meet a situation which actually exists, or is seen to be imminent. In fact, the duties of the higher commanders and staffs require

not only a quick eye for an existing tactical situation, but the imaginative power to foresee a whole sequence of such situations long before the beginning of the attack. Needless to say, the entire structure is founded on the work of the Flying Corps, which makes it possible to produce accurate maps of the maze of entrenchments which constitutes the modern battlefield.

In all these respects great advances have been made since last year; and a consideration of such details of this year's battles as have been published indicates that the improvement continues, and that finality has not yet been reached in the tactics of the attack. There have been fewer instances of detachments going astray, or of being unsupported at the critical moment. On most occasions each objective has been reached up to time, and made good before the appointed moment for the barrage to lift, and the advance to enter on the next stage. Naturally there have been exceptions—for delays may occur for which the keenest foresight cannot provide—as, for example, at Oppy on April 28, where the troops which had carried the greater part of the village were attacked in flank, and driven out, by a force which appears to have cut in behind the barrage when it lifted. On other occasions troops which failed to keep pace with the barrage have fought their way, unaided, to their ultimate objectives. At Messines the attack was carried through, as designed, practically without a hitch, and, as always happens when operations are well planned, the losses were exceptionally light.

The great concentration of artillery for battle is necessary, in the first instance, to prepare the infantry attack by destroying obstacles and defences, and breaking down the *moral* of the troops in the trenches. The duration and intensity of the preliminary bombardment is limited by the available ammunition-supply. The result of the expansion by the Allies of their munition factories has been manifested on the western and Italian fronts, by its longer duration, as compared with last year; while the enemy, having accelerated production in a less degree, has been relatively at a disadvantage. It has been seen how, at Messines, the element of surprise was attained by varying the intensity of the bombardment, an expedient the efficacy of which depends on the

fire being maintained for many days. The conditions of warfare have brought about a revival of the artillery duel—which had been considered obsolete, as leading to a waste of ammunition which should be reserved for the direct support of the infantry attack—the defending artillery having to be countered in its endeavour to prevent the destructive action of the attacking guns. Hence the importance of artillery superiority, which must be sufficient to admit of this dual rôle being efficiently performed, the various types of gun being allotted the part for which they are best qualified. During the infantry advance, also, part of the artillery is employed on counter-battery action, while the remainder lays the barrage which precedes the troops.

The gradual lifting of the barrage must be timed beforehand to coincide with the estimated rate of the infantry advance, as the latter cannot be discerned by the existing means of observation. It should be noted that at Messines artillery was moved forward—also by prearrangement—during the progress of the battle; and that the extent of the advance, which attained a depth of 4000 yards and more, on nearly half the front, could hardly be considered practicable had not the state of the ground admitted of this movement.* In the battle north of Arras, which began on April 9, progress was restricted by the sodden condition of the ground, which, by retarding the advance of the artillery, led to the prolongation of the battle.

When the enemy had been driven from his original positions on the high ground between the Somme and Arras, it may have seemed that our armies would find their task simplified. Such an expectation was not likely to be realised. Having lost the advantages of observation, the Germans were not disposed to allow them to pass to their adversaries. They fell back towards the rolling plain south of the Arras—Cambrai road, where the Hindenburg line had been so traced as to take advantage of the undulating features of the ground. After the loss of Vimy ridge, a similar retirement was

* 4000 yards is about the maximum effective range of field-guns, and nearly half that of heavy howitzers; and artillery, especially the heavier types, is posted well to the rear.

made towards the Drocourt-Quéant switch-line. The intervening country was occupied by a series of irregular entrenchments, also adapted to the ground, the situation of which, being undefined by any well-marked feature, did not admit of being accurately determined either by direct observation or from the air. As our troops approached the Hindenburg line, these lines of resistance retained their character, but were made more complex by the extensive provision of subterranean cover and communications, and of armoured machine-gun emplacements, almost flush with the ground, and connected by tunnels with the infantry trenches in front of which they were situated. In some instances, as at Roeux chateau, the machine-gun pits were placed close in rear of buildings, or other cover, and designed for bringing reverse-fire to bear on the attacking troops after they had passed. The sections of the Hindenburg line which have been captured in the neighbourhood of Bullecourt were provided with a continuous tunnel behind the support-trenches, a provision which doubtless exists elsewhere. Serving as cover for the supports, as well as for lateral communication, it would enable the trenches to be lightly held during bombardment, and quickly occupied on the development of the attack.

In designing these 'Siegfried positions' * the Germans probably relied rather on invisibility than on material strength, as affording better protection against artillery fire. The absence of commanding points for observation is more disadvantageous to the attack than to the defence, which is intimately acquainted with the ground in front, and can determine the range of all recognisable points with accuracy and at leisure. The Germans modified their tactics to suit the changed conditions, paying less regard to the defence of trenches than to meeting attack by prompt counter-attack. These tactics, which were made possible by the existence of large reserves raised by various expedients during the winter, or transferred from the Russian front, are said to have proved costly; and they have rarely succeeded in recovering lost positions, though they have had the effect of retarding our

* So named by the Germans, presumably after Siegfried, the fabled possessor of an invisible cloak.

progress. The multiplicity of small features, characteristic of the battlefields on the Arras front, provide hiding-places where troops can be assembled for counter-attacks without being observed except from the air, and so remain comparatively immune from fire until their advance brings them under direct observation. In the fighting at Windmill Hill, north-east of Gavrelle, which changed hands seven or eight times on May 3, cover was afforded by a shallow valley stretching from between Gavrelle and Oppy towards Izel. In front of Fresnoy similar facilities were provided by woods and folds of the ground on the east; and, in front of Roeux, by a spur of Greenland Hill, which descends to the Scarpe between that village and Plouvain. The 'Oppy line,' between Roeux and Fresnoy, which has been attacked on several occasions with only partial success, probably owes its strength to these features as much as to fortification.

The German tactics, which are founded on the accepted principles governing an active defence, may be said to show an advance on the methods of last year, when more reliance was placed on the passive defence of positions, and the counter-attacks, with some exceptions, were too belated to be effective. The moment at which a counter-stroke is most likely to succeed is when the attacking troops have just reached the position, in a state more or less disordered according to the strain to which they have been subjected during the advance. As regards the cost entailed by counter-attacking across the open, this is probably no greater than would be involved by crowding the support and communication trenches during bombardment. And, whichever method be adopted, it is necessary, in the last resort, to bring a body of troops across the open, either to retrieve a failure in the defence, or to confirm a success.

The complete breakdown of the active defence at Messines is, of itself, striking evidence of the decisive character of the enemy's defeat; and it is the more significant because, as is proved by captured orders, extracts from which have appeared in the press, the arrangements had been carefully thought out, and were fully understood by the subordinate commanders and the troops. An army-corps order, issued on June 1,

dealt with the matter in some detail. It defined the supposed objective of the attack which was then believed to be imminent, and ordered a careful test of the measures to be adopted for defence and for counter-attack. Wytschaete and Messines were indicated as the decisive tactical points in the area, and were to be held at all costs, even though surrounded and attacked from the rear. Except for a few indispensable detachments, the divisions were placed unreservedly at the disposal of their commanders. The general plan comprised the stubborn defence of every section of the front, in order to gain time for the development of counter-attacks. The troops in the fighting-line were enjoined to hold out, even if surrounded at any point; and sectional reserves were ordered to be kept close up, to be available for immediate counter-attack. The divisional reserves were to be held in readiness further in rear, for more powerful and extended efforts. Lastly, a strong force was kept in hand by the army-commander, for the delivery of a great counter-stroke which was expected to retrieve failure or to confirm success. In the event, these well-laid plans were shattered by the unexpected violence of the assault; the local reserves were used up in reinforcing the local defence, leaving the divisional commanders without the means for effective counter-strokes; and the attack was carried through with such rapidity that the general reserve arrived on the scene only in time to find that the opportunity for its intervention had passed. The German echelons, instead of dealing successive blows with ever-increasing force, were defeated in detail, as they came up.

The Italian Second Army took the offensive on May 14, after several days' bombardment of the entire front from Tolmino to the sea. Its objective was the range of heights on the left bank of the Isonzo above Gorizia, which form an outlying feature of the Bainsizza plateau. The principal heights are Mount Kuk (611 metres), a mile and a half south-east of Plava, with the adjoining summits of Vodice (592 and 652); the Monte Santo (682), two miles further to the south-east, joined to the Vodice by a saddle; and the independent summit of San Gabriele (646), overlooking the town of Gorizia from

the north-east at a distance of three miles. From San Gabriele the ground falls irregularly to the Vippecco, with the lesser heights of Tivoli (174) and San Marco (227) immediately adjoining Gorizia on the east. The Kuk-Santo ridge ends, to the north, in Hill 363, 1200 yards east of Plava, and is joined to the Bainsizza plateau by a saddle which springs from Vodice, and closes the head of the Rohot valley, which trends northward to join the Isonzo; and of the Gargaro, which, following a southerly course, finds an issue between Santo and Gabriele. The Italians held a bridgehead on the left bank of the Isonzo at Plava.

The attack on the heights was accompanied by a vigorous demonstration in the northern section of the Carso, and by the passage of a small force across the Isonzo six miles above Plava, where it maintained itself for five days, drawing a portion of the enemy's forces in that direction. The main attack was at first held up by strong positions on the slopes of Kuk and Vodice, but on May 15 the summits 611 and 592 were carried with the aid of a flank attack by a brigade which issued from the Plava bridgehead. Hill 174 (Tivoli) was also occupied, and the summit of Santo was reached, but had to be abandoned in face of a counter-attack. On May 18 the Italians captured 652 (Vodice), the intervening days having been spent in moving guns forward and repelling counter-attacks; and, three days later, they took Hill 363, east of Plava, completing the occupation of the ridge north of Vodice, inclusive. During these operations the Austrians made violent demonstrations at points on the Trentino front without any perceptible result. Subsequently they concentrated their attacks on Vodice (652), the importance of which lay in its command over the saddle connecting it with Santo, along which the Italians were endeavouring to advance in order to take the latter in flank; and over that communicating with the Bainsizza plateau, from which artillery could enfilade the positions on San Gabriele. The Italians made some progress down the western slopes of the Rohot valley, which would offer a flanking approach to the latter saddle.

On May 23 the scene shifted to the southern section of the Carso, where the Third Italian Army took the offensive between Castagnavizza (Kostanjevica) and the sea. The

objective was the range of heights stretching south from Boscomalo (Hudi Log) to the Lisert Marshes, across which the enemy's line was continued to the sea by a series of strong positions established on rocky islets, each forming a nest of machine-guns. Ten British heavy batteries participated in the attack, and British monitors did good service by bombarding the hostile positions within range, including the heavy artillery grouped on the Hermada plateau.

The first attack was delivered at 4 p.m., after ten hours' intense bombardment. By May 27 the Italians had advanced their front an average distance of nearly two miles between Boscomalo and the coast, capturing Boscomalo, Locati, Jamiano, and Flondar, and reaching the western outskirts of Versic. On the right they fought their way across the Lisert Marshes, and gained the lower slopes of Hermada, occupying Hill 145 south-west of Medeazza, and the village of San Giovanni, one mile north-west of Duino. On the left Castagnavizza was taken towards the end of the battle, but, being exposed to concentrated artillery fire, it had to be relinquished, the line being established a short distance in rear of the village.

The consolidation of the new positions in the rocky ground involved great difficulty and labour, and was hindered by continuous bombardment and numerous counter-attacks. On June 4 the Austrians developed a counter-offensive with large forces, which obliged the Italians to fall back in the Flondar region; but elsewhere the front was maintained. By June 7 the battle had died out on the front north and south of Gorizia. The Austrians claimed to have taken 10,000 prisoners in their counter-offensive, and a total of 27,000 since May 14. The Italian captures during the same period amounted to 23,680 prisoners, and 36 guns, besides other material. On June 10 our Allies began a restricted offensive on the Trentino front, which has resulted in the recovery of some of the commanding positions on the northern edge of the Asiago plateau, which had remained in the hands of the Austrians at the end of last year's operations in that region.

The most prominent feature in the Italian operations is the skill shown by the Commander-in-Chief in deceiving

the Austrians as to his first point of attack, and in subsequently changing his objective, so as to keep their reserves on the move. There are grounds for surmising that the enemy had intended to take the offensive, the scene of which, for strategical reasons discussed in a former article,* and from indications in the German press, would probably have been laid on the Trentino front. General Cadorna, by seizing the initiative, subjected the Austrians to the disadvantages imposed by the length and restricted capacity of the lateral communications round the outside curve of the Venetian frontier, to which may be partly ascribed the delay in assembling forces for the counter-offensive on the Carso. Their difficulties were increased through their mistaking the locality of the impending attack. The Italians, having, by great exertions during the slack season, largely increased the troops and munitions at their disposal, had concentrated sufficient forces both north and south of Gorizia to enable them to attack in whichever region might appear, at the moment, more favourable, without being obliged to effect any great transfer of reserves, which might make their design apparent.

The Austrians, expecting to be attacked in the northern portion of the Carso, assembled the bulk of their forces in that locality. The Italian Second Army, in consequence, encountered much less opposition than might have been expected in accomplishing the formidable task of seizing the passages of the Isonzo and storming the heights on the left bank. No sooner had the Austrians reinforced the Isonzo front by withdrawing reserves from the Carso, than the Third Army sprang to the attack and captured the enemy's positions from Castagnizza to the sea. By denuding the Carso front the Austrians saved a collapse on the Isonzo, but no more; and their desperate efforts to recover the lost ground on that wing did not relieve the situation on the Carso. Their demonstrations on the Trentino front were probably designed to cover the withdrawal of troops from that sphere, the arrival of which, together with drafts from the eastern front, enabled them to undertake the counter-offensive which gave them back some of the lost positions.

* 'Quarterly Review' for July, 1915.

But the Italians took advantage of the weakening of the Trentino front to win back some of the commanding heights on the Asiago plateau which the Austrians had wrested from them last year.

The condition of affairs which followed the downfall of the old régime in Russia has gravely influenced the situation in every theatre of war. The army, infected with the idealistic theories of socialism, which sapped its discipline and undermined its ancient traditions, became negligible as a fighting force. The general anarchy which prevailed extended to the troops, who deposed or murdered unpopular officers, and set at defiance the authority of those who were allowed to remain. Such semblance of authority as existed was exercised by committees elected by the men. The peasant-soldiers, who form the bulk of the army, deserted in large numbers, and went to their homes in order to assert their claims in the general redistribution of the land. The Provisional Government, at the dictation of the Petrograd Committee of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates, issued the most remarkable code of discipline ever devised for the administration of an army. Entitled 'A Decree regarding the fundamental rights of men of the fighting forces,' and based on the revolutionary dogma of equality, it conferred almost complete freedom on the soldier, and restricted the functions of command to the issue of orders in connexion with military operations, all matters relating to interior economy, including discipline, being dealt with by company and regimental committees, on which the officers were in a minority. M. Gutchkoff refused to sign the Decree, and resigned his portfolio. A number of officers of high rank, who had served with distinction, found their position intolerable, and resigned their commands, while others were removed. General Alexeieff, who had been appointed Commander-in-Chief, summed up the situation in the pregnant words, 'The army is stricken with a fatal impotence.' He was superseded a few days later, probably on account of his plain speaking.

The failure of Russia to carry out her part in the agreed plan of operations has allowed nearly two months of the practicable campaigning season to slip by, and

involved the loss of a promising opportunity for bringing the war to an early and favourable end. Not only were the Russian armies, before they were weakened by desertions, numerically stronger than at any previous period, but there was an ample supply of munitions of every kind, much of which lay at the Russian ports because the authorities had not enough energy to overcome the difficulties of transport; while the other Allies, by whose exertions it had been provided, were correspondingly short. The Provisional Government ruled only in name, the real power being in the hands of the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates, whose avowed aims disclosed a profound ignorance of German designs, and of the conditions essential to success in war. The Germans, relying on the continuance of inaction at the front, seized the opportunity to transfer troops and artillery from Russia to meet the offensive in France; and the Austrians withdrew reinforcements for the Italian front. The Turks, freed from anxiety in Armenia, were able to reinforce their armies in Syria and Mesopotamia. The retreat of the force formerly commanded by General Baratoff,* after having occupied Kizil Robat on April 8, did not improve the situation of General Maude's advanced troops, which, having defeated the 13th Turkish corps on the Shatt el Adhaim, reached the foot of the Jebel Hamrin early in May. The inaction of the Russians in this quarter has resulted, according to a *communiqué* issued at Constantinople on June 22, in the reoccupation of Shahroban by the Turks. Meanwhile the policy of Germany, as definitely disclosed by the exposure of the Hoffmann-Grimm intrigue, was to make no move so long as there was a prospect of luring Russia into concluding a separate peace; and her emissaries were active in their endeavours to foment internal discord, to complete the disintegration of the army, and to detach Russia from the Alliance. Her proposal for a Peace Conference having proved abortive, she hoped to find her opportunity for setting the Allies by the ears at Stockholm, where international socialist delegates were to discuss terms based on the principle of a peace without annexations or

* General Baratoff is one of the Army Commanders who have been removed.

indemnities, which General Alexeieff has aptly characterised as a Utopian formula of German origin.

Towards the end of May the general situation began to show signs of improvement. The reconstitution of the Government on a coalition basis appears to have disarmed the Council of Delegates, and to have resulted in the adoption of saner views with respect to military policy. The idea of a separate peace was repudiated; and the necessity of taking the offensive was recognised in responsible quarters as the only sure means for thwarting the German scheme of crushing the Western Allies with the view of gaining freedom to deal similarly with Russia. In the army, also, there have been indications of a better tone. Instances have been reported of mutiny having been rigorously repressed, and of the disbandment of regiments which refused to go into the trenches. Fraternisation with the enemy was prohibited, and gradually declined; deserters came to be regarded with disfavour; and soldier delegates from General Brusiloff's group of armies unanimously adopted a resolution in favour of an offensive. M. Kerensky, the War Minister, in his visits to the armies on the northern front, used all the persuasive power of his virile eloquence and forceful personality in urging the troops to submit to discipline, and to fight for the honour and freedom of the new Russia.

The Russian revolution, by removing the obstacles to the adoption by the Allies of a firm policy in Greece, has indirectly affected the military situation in Macedonia. The abdication of King Constantine, the collapse of the pro-German party, and the restoration of a constitutional government with M. Venizelos as premier, have relieved the Allied armies under General Sarrail from the danger which menaced their rear; and their position has been further secured by the occupation of Southern Albania by Italian troops, which cover the left flank. In other respects the situation has undergone little material change. Intermittent fighting, which took place on the Monastir front during the spring, produced no decisive result. Local attacks by part of General Milne's army in the neighbourhood of Lake Doiran found the enemy in considerable strength, and made little progress. The first of these attacks, which was delivered on April 24,

between the south end of the lake and a point north-west of Dolzeli (a front of nearly three miles), resulted in the capture of the hostile positions in the latter region to a depth of 500 yards. Progress was also made on the right wing, but could not be maintained. On the night of May 8-9 the attack was resumed in the same locality, but on a wider front, extending four miles to the south-west of the lake. The left wing again reached its objective; but, as on the former occasion, the troops on the right, after having been successful at the outset, were obliged to fall back to their original positions before superior forces. The advantage gained on the left was extended to the neighbourhood of Krastali (three miles west of Doiran town) by a local attack on the night of May 14-15, which brought the operations on this portion of the front to a close. Fighting has also taken place on the Struma front, where our positions east of the river were extended, on May 15, by the capture of Keupri; but the valley was evacuated early in June, for sanitary reasons, the troops being withdrawn to the high ground west of the river.

While the default of Russia has increased the burden which her Allies have to bear, the situation has been somewhat alleviated by the accession of America. That this event has caused disquietude in Germany may be judged from the attempts which have been made, both officially and in the press, to minimise its importance. Time will be needed to organise the immense resources at the command of our new Ally; but the task has been entered upon with characteristic energy, and General Pershing's division is only the advanced guard of a force which is expected to number nearly a quarter of a million before next summer, when the first draft of half a million will begin to be available. An ultimate establishment of two millions is aimed at. An early increase of the flying detachment which has been doing useful service in France may be expected, arrangements having been made for the training of 6000 pilots, and the construction of 3,500 aeroplanes. In the meantime America is rendering valuable assistance at sea; and, by providing money, munitions, and other supplies, is contributing materially to the success of the Allied arms.

Since this article went to press, news has come of the Russian armies in north-eastern Galicia having taken the offensive on July 1, and driven the Austro-German forces from their positions in the region of the upper Strypa. The fighting extended as far south as the heights south-west of Brzezany, where more stubborn resistance was encountered. The capture of 18,000 prisoners and 29 guns has been reported as the result of two days' fighting. The material results of the operations, which, as yet, are only in the initial stage, are, however, of relatively small importance as compared with the effect which the news has exercised on public feeling at Petrograd and other large centres. The capital is said to have been transformed, a wave of patriotic emotion having swept away pessimism, and submerged the forces of disorder. The Congress of all the Councils of Delegates, which claim to 'watch over the liberty of Russia,' has issued a stirring appeal to all classes of the people, urging the troops to throw themselves boldly into the fight, and exhorting the civil population to concentrate all its efforts on helping the army. M. Kerensky, in an Order of the Day, calls upon the armies to take the offensive, pointing out that further delay in striking a decisive blow would be to the enemy's advantage. While it is yet too early to conjecture the ultimate effects of the military success in Galicia, it is plain that the outlook has assumed a more promising aspect. The future will depend on the revival of the military spirit of the army as a whole, and on the patriotism and endurance of the Russian people.

W. P. BLOOD.

CORRIGENDUM.

IN the last number of this Review, p. 389, the work entitled '*Les origines diplomatiques de la Guerre de 1870-1871*' was, by inadvertence, described as being published by the *Imprimerie Nationale*. It was printed there, but is published by M. Gustave Ficker, 6 rue de Savoie, Paris.

